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This thesis applies role theory to understand how Uzbekistan’s bilateral relationships 
became either conflicting or cooperative between 1991 and 2010. Roles are key 
elements of social interaction as they describe plausible lines of action in a particular 
subject-person. They are thus a helpful way of identifying actors and constructing 
narratives. Furthermore, if they are seen as metaphors for drama, one may argue that 
roles - as opposed to personal identities - encapsulate autonomous action, which, like a 
text, ascertains meaning beyond the author’s intent. In other words, by separating 
action from intent, one may regard politics in a different light - as interaction 
emplotted by roles -, thereby revealing how actions contradict a set of roles and lead to 
conflict and crises in public credibility. This manner of emplotting relationships 
divulges an alternative story that, rather than focusing on Tashkent’s strategic 
balancing and alignment, demonstrates how Uzbekistani leadership gradually 
developed an overarching self-reliant role set that shapes its actions. Moreover, 
Uzbekistan’s cooperative and conflicting relationships are described less in light of 
strategic survival rationale than as the outcome of gradual role compatibilities arising 
through time. Therefore, unlike some other accounts, this thesis argues that, 
throughout Uzbekistan’s first twenty years of independence, public disputes were 
crucial to understanding interaction and also that Tashkent was never actually aligned 
with Russia or the United States. To bring forth this argument, the following chapters 
expound the assumptions behind some scholarly research and develop the concepts of 
self-reliance, roles, action, public sphere, credibility and narrative. The discussion 
progresses toward self-reliance and how the concept captures President Karimov’s 
roles, which are used to emplot Uzbekistan’s interaction with the United States, Russia, 
Germany and Turkey. The first two are relevant for analyzing whether roles reveal more 
than the typical accounts based on security balancing. Germany is then included 
because its relationship with Tashkent was rarely conflicting in the public sphere, 
allowing it to increase bilateral trade and secure a military base in Uzbekistan after the 
2005 Andijan Crisis. It was thus a relatively stable connection, unlike Tashkent’s 
relationships with Washington and Moscow. Lastly, to control Germany’s middle-
power status, the case of Turkey is brought to the fore since Ankara’s willingness to 
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Preface: Notes on Transliteration and Sources 
 
As this is a work written in English covering Uzbekistan’s relationships with other 
countries communicating in different languages (Uzbek, Russian, German and 
Turkish), an overall standard of transliteration is required to avoid confusion and 
inconsistency. Uzbekistan’s government adopted a latinized script in 1995, which 
greatly facilitates the task (it is important to be aware, however, that Cyrillic slogans 
and books are still commonplace). Following Uzbekistan’s decision, the United States 
Board on Geographic Names (BGN) and the British Permanent Committee on 
Geographical Names (PCGN) agreed in 2000 for Uzbekistan’s new alphabet to be used 
in their official geographical spellings of the country. Hence, in conformity with 
standardization procedures, this work presents Uzbekistani names and locations 
according to Uzbekistan’s latinized alphabet, with the exception of English 
conventional names (e.g. Bukhara, Samarkand, Andijan, Tashkent, Amu Darya). The 
same practice is applied to the two other latinized alphabets covered in this thesis, 
namely German and Turkish, regardless of certain diacritic letters not existing in 
English. The Russian script, on the other hand, is transliterated according to PGCN 
conventions, with the exception of English conventional nouns (e.g. Moscow). 
 Furthermore, the thesis refers to Uzbekistan’s nationals as Uzbekistani rather 
than Uzbek, given that Tashkent’s foreign policy has been predicated on territoriality as 
opposed to nationality or ethnicity (Fumagalli 2007b). The term Uzbek is only used if it 
refers directly to the specific ethnicity or language. Despite the rise of what could be 
regarded as nationalism, the geographic territory still remains the official source of 
official identity. For example, after the 2010 massacre of Uzbeks in neighbouring 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan’s current leadership barely commented on the events (a 
decision that was not well appreciated by some Uzbekistani citizens, as I observed 
during my travels at the time). Moreover, even during the 1990s, when President 
Karimov took steps to support General Rashid Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek in northern 
Afghanistan, he conveyed that solidarity was not due to ethnic convergence, but instead 
to agreement on policy. 
 As concerns the referencing procedures, the Harvard system was applied 
throughout. The standard, however, was slightly adapted, in light of the vast number of 
transcripts and other unauthored sources used in the last past of the thesis. 
Consequently, those unauthored references were placed as footnotes in order to make 
the main body of text smoother and less confusing to read. Also, anonymous references, 
like BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, were almost all obtained from Nexis UK – a 
vast online data base. Hence, if not otherwise indicated, the reader should regard those 
sources as obtained from Nexis UK.  
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Introduction: Uzbekistan’s bilateral relations and their difficult 
assessment 
 
Opaqueness and the problem of assuming intent 
 
Uzbekistan is a challenging case for studying politics and international relations. On 
one hand, the overall foreign policy rationale of its regime remains somewhat shrouded 
in mystery and, on the other, its unstable relations with a number of countries make it 
difficult to understand the reasons, goals and repercussions of its actions. Indeed, 
unlike Turkmenistan’s own opaqueness and systematic ‘positive neutrality’, 
Uzbekistan’s external relations with Russia and the United States were characterized by 
several periods of friction from 1991 to 2010. This perhaps explains why, even today, 
discussions on Uzbekistani politics are enveloped in conspiracy theories and 
dichotomous perspectives; split, more or less, between those who argue that the regime 
simply pockets financial and political gain from the international system (e.g. Lewis 
2008) and those who state that it actually implements a consistent, albeit controversial, 
policy for its political economy (e.g. Spechler 2008).1 Similarly, in thirteen confidential 
interviews conducted between 2010 and 2012, there was no consensus as to the 
interests and preferences of Uzbekistan’s government.2 Some even argued that no 
actual foreign policy existed.  
Given the conundrum behind Tashkent’s intent, many geopolitical analysts 
bring order to the political environment by positing that Uzbekistan’s regime seeks to 
balance against competing powers (see Chapter I). This way of understanding events 
provides a conceptual framework that seemingly captures the so-called shifts in the 
country’s relationships. However, it also propounds a distinct set of problems as it 
reproduces the image that security and strategic calculation are pivotal to Tashkent’s 
interaction – a problem that can be otherwise avoided if no such assumptions 
regarding the government’s intrinsic preferences and intent are taken. For that reason, 
it is appropriate to make some preliminary observations about the impact of 
opaqueness, inferring intent and taking certain preferences as given. This may then 
contextualize why balancing might not be the most suitable approach. 
Despite opaqueness, scholars have attempted to trace the causes for a number 
of Tashkent’s practices. One current and noteworthy attempt is found in Alexander 
                                               
1 Some might argue that this is the case for any political environment. Any political action is obviously 
open to contestation and distinct interpretations. Yet, with Uzbekistan, this level of uncertainty is even 
more pervasive and exacerbated. The fact that no actual opposition parties, independent media or open 
political debate exist, alongside a highly secretive authoritarian regime and repressive security service, 
makes it even more difficult to ascertain the rationale behind almost any decision. 
2 Interview sources (2009-2012). See Appendix IV for information regarding sources and procedures. 
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Cooley’s (2012) book, Great Games, Local Rules, which portrays quite convincingly 
how global powers are unable to escape from the priorities and rules imposed by 
Central Asian Republics.3 Cooley (2012: 27; 48) focuses on a number of cases and his 
account demonstrates some of the dubious transactions involving Gulnara Karimova, 
the eldest daughter of the President of Uzbekistan. Her business deals are explained by 
making full use of telegrams issued by the American Embassy in Tashkent, recently 
leaked by Wikileaks. Indeed, resorting to this type of material evinces how difficult it is 
to depict Tashkent’s secretive politics and obtain reliable sources. Still, while it seems 
clear that extracting profit and seeking security guarantees are part of the narrative, 
resorting primarily to patrimonial exchanges and the elite’s need for survival (Cooley 
2012: 16; 21-29), makes local politics seem almost analogous to financial transactions, 
leading to a uni-dimensional picture of Central Asian society. This becomes even more 
problematic because other international elites are not portrayed in the same light. For 
instance, in Cooley’s (2012: 139-140) accounts of the Kazakhgate and Giffen affairs, the 
scholar demonstrates persuasively how a number of American oil companies and 
individuals purveyed hidden payments to Kazakh companies and officials. In 
Uzbekistan, too, a number of suspicious cases involving German companies have come 
into the international spotlight (see Chapter VI). Should one not then consider all those 
foreign actors and powerful businesses as profit-seeking elites too? So, how useful are 
profit-seeking preferences, survival and the label ‘elite’ if one is unable to identify 
clearly who all those actors are and their specific intentions?4 
Naturally, the purpose here is not to argue that corruption in Central Asia is 
easily comparable to other regions. The sheer number of incidents in that part of the 
world reveals that malfeasance is especially problematic.5 The point though is that 
Uzbekistani politicians are not more cunning than their foreign counterparts, and that 
accounts based on pursuing profit, manipulating great power interests and balancing 
against competitors are limited and sometimes even detrimental to understanding the 
region. Local leaders also need to pay heed to the promises they make to their 
international partners and domestic constituencies. When accessing those in control is 
difficult, narratives based on the intention to survive and profit-seeking, for example, 
                                               
3 David Lewis (2008) also provides a lengthy depiction of Uzbekistan’s authoritarian politics and its 
controversial economic policies. Cooley (2012), however, looks more into the geopolitical context, 
thereby putting forth some of the issues that this thesis aims to counter. For a more detailed discussion on 
authors who focus on Uzbekistani foreign policy, see Chapter I. 
4 Of course some research on Central Asia has focused on characterizing the elite level politics and their 
rise to power. For instance, Sally Cummings (2005: 38-58), using a wide collection of interviews, 
characterizes Kazakhstan’s elite and demonstrates how a specific group of individuals rose to prominence 
and consolidated power. 
5 Practically all interviewees from 2009 to 2012 agreed that corruption was a problem in Uzbekistan. See 
Appendix IV for information regarding sources. 
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may often serve to reproduce the idea of Central Asia being a hub of conspiracies, 
rather than just any other place of political interaction, where power, profit, ideas, 
emotions and violence all come to the fore. It is important to be aware, though, that 
Cooley (2012) makes a very strong case about one side of Central Asian politics and 
Chapter I explores how some other scholars took a strict number of preferences 
regarding survival and rationality. 
Let us return now to the issue of balancing. Explaining how Uzbekistan’s 
relationships shift by presupposing that Tashkent intends to play one against the other, 
may misleadingly lead one toward theories of alignment and realignment.6 Like Cooley 
(2012), the narrative becomes slightly one-sided and mechanical and other less 
conflicting relationships tend to be ignored since they are not straightforward cases of 
tactical calculation and relative gains. For that reason, analyses have tended to focus 
almost exclusively on Tashkent’s interaction with the great powers, particularly on the 
difficult relationships with Moscow and Washington (see Chapter I). Due to the focus 
on balancing, those two relations are regarded as closely interconnected. So, the 
possibility of each relationship having an independent dynamic is downplayed 
considerably. Furthermore, as objects of study, balancing and especially the idea of 
realignment, may make Tashkent seem like a place of relatively inconsistent or even 
unpredictable foreign policy. 
These issues raise the question of whether it is fair to use concepts such as 
balancing and alignment for depicting Uzbekistan’s interaction – points which are 
revisited in Chapter I and in the Conclusion. However, despite the difficulties, it is still 
possible to explain how Uzbekistan’s relationships varied across time – an explanation 
which may, however, not be typically causal in the Humean sense.7 Despite the 
restriction, though, there are in fact a number of factors that allow for inquiry to take 
place. The President of Uzbekistan, Islom Karimov, expressed his views throughout his 
rule and these statements were, by definition, not private but set in the open. 
Therefore, one need not enter the mind of the interlocutor nor infer intrinsic 
preferences and beliefs to ascertain intent, i.e. the intrinsic purpose of action. Beliefs, 
evidently, do make up the attitude of an agent, which shape intent (Ajzen & Fishbein 
1980: 47-63), and so some scholars have called for determining the agent’s preferences 
or belief systems (e.g. Goldstein & Keohane 1993: 13-17; Shapiro & Bonham 1973). Still, 
                                               
6 Robert Cox (1981: 132) would argue that a concept like balancing, derived from the assumptions of 
political realism, induces a mode of thinking that ‘also performs a proselytising function as the advocate 
of this form of rationality.’ Hence it may mislead analysis toward always depicting action in that manner. 
7 Causal explanations require exogenous preferences to explain action (Goldstein & Keohane 1993:5), 
which are not entirely available in Uzbekistan. Since it has not been possible to obtain biographical 
information of Uzbekistani policy makers and their decision-making procedures, the political process 
might be the best way of studying bilateral relationships. See Wendt’s (1992) study on the differences 
between causal explaining and process. 
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delving into the mind of the other is a complex endeavour because beliefs, while 
existent, cannot be observed directly (Rokeach 1976: 2). Specific preferences and 
intrinsic beliefs do of course matter and one cannot ignore that many actions are not 
congruent with rhetoric and thus aimed at manipulation,8 but positing strict exogenous 
preferences downplays how they might change over time. As Alexander Wendt (1992: 
407) explicated: ‘the forms of identity and interest that constitute such dilemmas (…) 
are themselves ongoing effects of, not exogenous to, the interaction; identities are 
produced in and through “situated activity”.’  
 So looking into a process of public interaction might be one way of studying 
international politics and Chapter II develops these core assumptions. Alan Finlayson 
(2007: 549; 552) recognized that politics is a place where traditions, arguments and 
rival narratives clash and are constantly subject to dispute. Regardless of the private 
intentions behind different agendas, statements as well as non-verbal actions affect 
social interaction and open up new possibilities. They influence international 
interaction, since ‘all politics is shaped through the webs of meaning that are 
developed, both intentionally and otherwise, through time and chance’ (Rengger 2002: 
353). Indeed, even if the ‘tsar breaks his word he does so with yet more words’ 
(Heathershaw 2009: 10); so action, in the public sphere, is never inconsequential, as all 
politicians have to deal with public credibility. For these reasons, rhetoric, public roles 
and their repercussions can themselves be objects of inquiry, irrespective of the actual 
intent. 
 
 The main thesis  
 
Overall, the goal herein is not to dispute that there is a geopolitical context for each of 
President Karimov’s external relationships, nor that rapprochement with Russia or the 
United States existed in certain periods, rather dismiss alignment interpretations and 
show how Uzbekistan’s bilateral relationships result from political interaction evolving 
through time. More specifically, the aim is to demonstrate that Uzbekistani leadership 
insists publicly on self-reliance - a type of political autonomy that is not simply reduced 
to the exogenous rationale of playing one against the other. (In)stability in bilateral 
relationships derives from periods of particular (in)compatibility in roles. These result 
from (in)coherency in public interaction and not from a particular calculating or 
tactical mindset. Once adopting this hypothesis, Tashkent is no longer taken to be 
aligning itself with any particular state for either financial gain or security, thereby 
                                               
8 Intentions cannot obviously be ignored if the goal is to determine accountability, explain frustration, 
deception and resentment. 
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mitigating the problem of inferring preferences for such an opaque regime. Periods of 
cooperation, instead, depend on how a process of public interaction evolved through 
time; shaped, in part, by Tashkent’s commitment to self-reliance. So, the way in which 
Uzbekistan’s bilateral relationships progress depends on two alternative hypotheses: 
 
- Uzbekistani leadership developed roles in the public sphere pertaining to political 
self-reliance, which shape and give meaning to its actions; 
 
- Bilateral relationships can be explained as a political process, in which the roles of 
Uzbekistani leadership and those with whom it interacts shape action in the public 
sphere, thus leading to conflict and cooperation. 
 
This thesis is organized around those two pillars. Chapter I starts by reviewing 
the literature on Uzbekistani foreign policy and the focus on geopolitical balancing; 
explicating then what is meant by self-reliance as a typology of strict autonomy and 
political independence. Afterwards, Chapter II delves into the framework of the thesis, 
elucidating all the key concepts in detail, namely the notions of role, narrative, action, 
public sphere and public credibility. Chapter III builds on the former two chapters and 
looks into rhetoric to infer the self-reliant roles propounded by Uzbekistani leadership 
from 1989 to 2010. It evaluates whether the role set was relatively consistent and also 
the contexts that led to its public prominence. Lastly, Chapters IV through VII propose 
four distinct narratives for each of Tashkent’s relationships with the governments of the 
United States, Russia, Germany and Turkey. It is worth clarifying why the thesis 
focuses on those four cases. The first two deal with Tashkent’s bilateral interaction with 
the ‘great powers’, namely Russia and the United States, which are the usual targets of 
scholarly accounts (see Chapter I for how Uzbekistan’s relations have been described). 
Hence, these two narratives shed another light onto those relations, less focused on 
geopolitical calculation than on highlighting their specific dynamics and public 
interaction. On the other hand, a section focused on Germany - an important middle 
power - shows that some consistent cooperation with Tashkent is possible and that not 
all of relationships in the international public sphere need be conflicting. It is thus an 
important control-case, seeing as Germany was one of Uzbekistan’s main import 
partners in the 1990s,9 and the only foreign actor to maintain a military base in the 
country after the Andijan crisis of 2005. This account will hopefully demonstrate that 
cooperation depends on compatibility in roles arising through time. Lastly, Tashkent’s 
                                               
9 See Uzbekistan’s main trade partners in ‘Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2011’ Asian 
Development Bank, available via http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/KI/2011/pdf/AFG.pdf, accessed 
July 2012. 
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relationship with Turkey’s government somewhat controls the middle power influence 
of Germany, thereby showing that conflicting interaction can arise with any other 
country and not just with the ‘great powers’. This, then, is a way of observing how 
conflict comes about. If the narrative conforms to the core hypotheses, Tashkent’s 
conflicting relationship with Ankara, like with Washington and Moscow, was more a 
product of growing role incompatibility than of preconceived rational calculation or 
strategic balancing.   
Lastly, the conclusion discusses whether focusing on public interaction reveals 
anything different and so revisits the question of whether balancing is just as useful for 
explaining Uzbekistani relations. In any case, a cautionary note is required, seeing as 
this thesis does not seek to become a definitive explanation of all events. On the 
contrary, this work takes as its main premise that the intrinsic preferences of the 
regime are highly secluded and so focuses only on public politics and interaction.  
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I. Self-Reliance: The Complex External Relations of Uzbekistan’s regime 
from 1991 t0 2010 
 
Uzbekistan has the largest population of the former Soviet Central Asian Republics and 
is one of the only double landlocked countries in the world.10 Stable leadership since 
independence in 1991, in addition to its size and location, means that Tashkent has a 
substantial role to play in Central Asia. It is therefore important to characterize how 
some scholars portray Uzbekistan’s complex external relations and its tussles with the 
‘great powers’, namely Russia and the United States, and how self-reliance may be an 
appropriate way of depicting its international engagement. 
A number of works on Central Asian politics refer either to the systemic 
importance of Uzbekistan or to the influence of its domestic environment on foreign 
policy (e.g. Cooley 2012; Allison 2008, 2004; Allison 2001; Blank 2005; Deyermond 
2009; Lewis 2008; Kazemi 2003). These two distinct points of view disclose different 
characteristics: the geopolitical level reveals how local securitization is part of a wider 
regional context (Buzan and Waever 2003: 44) and a domestic focus, like studying 
Uzbekistani leadership (e.g. Kazemi 2003), locates the origins of Tashkent’s foreign 
policy decision-making.  
Looking into the regional or domestic level, though, is not the goal herein. 
Instead, the lens is focused at the bilateral state level in order to downplay a bit of the 
systemic context and show how each relationship has its own independent dynamic. 
This may come at the cost of greater methodological complexity (Singer 1969: 27-28) 
but, as Waltz (1990) would argue, explaining foreign policy is not analogous to studying 
systemic politics.  
The purpose of this Chapter is to look into works concentrating solely on 
Uzbekistani foreign policy and international relations, namely  those of Fumagalli 
(2007a), Aneschi (2010), Akbarzadeh (2005), Spechler and Spechler (2010, 2009), 
Melvin (2000), Bohr (1998) and Hale (1994). These contributions are then split into 
those that focus on Uzbekistan’s regime survival and alignment (I.1) and others that 
look at bilateral relationships independently (I.2) - a division that purposefully brings 
into light some of the points made in the Introduction. Each work will be analyzed 
separately, since many contain different assumptions that need to be contextualized 
appropriately. It is also worth noting that some criticisms may appear pedantic in that 
they concentrate on wordings/definitions; yet, subtle distinctions do influence how 
                                               
10 Double land-locked means that goods and people have to cross two political borders before reaching 
the sea. Liechtenstein is the other double land-locked country in the world. 
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each relationship is depicted and therewith play a role in reproducing the idea of 
inconsistency in Uzbekistani policy making that this thesis aims to counter. 
 
I.1. The Focus on Uzbekistan’s regime survival and alignment 
  
Matteo Fumagalli’s (2007a) article ‘Alignments and Realignments in Central Asia’ is a 
suitable way of opening the discussion since it is an excellent parsimonious application 
of a balancing paradigm. The scholar applies Steven David’s (1991) omnibalancing 
theory to ‘understand the rationale of Uzbekistan's rapprochement with Russia, look at 
the implications thereof, and locate this discussion within the theoretical debates on 
international realignments’ (Fumagalli 2007a: 254).  The article makes a number of 
important inferences regarding the relationship between Russia and Uzbekistan: the 
existence of a deteriorating political relationship during the 1990s followed by revived 
interest in the energy sector; President Putin as the main instigator of rapprochement, 
leading to an improving relationship after 2000; President Karimov’s goals of 
maintaining autonomy in the international arena; and scepticism toward Russian 
encroachment (Fumagalli 2007a: 255-256; 261-262).  
The inferences listed above suggest the existence of an unstable bilateral 
relationship between the Russian and Uzbekistani governments that does not depend 
necessarily on surrounding context or even Washington’s interests. However, the 
author then portrays Tashkent’s rapprochement with Moscow as a result of increased 
‘normative competition’ with the United States (Ibid: 254; 264), even though he 
recognizes that the relationship between Russia and Uzbekistan had been improving 
after 2000, following President Putin’s new approach of good-will toward Central Asia 
(Ibid: 261-262).  
Evidently, the relationship between Moscow and Tashkent cannot ignore 
surrounding factors, such as the Colour Revolutions, as the author pointedly explicates 
(Ibid: 257). Still, balancing as an analytical tool derives from a number of underlying 
assumptions regarding the preferences of Uzbekistan’s leadership. As concerns 
intrinsic motivation, the article argues for the need to understand Uzbekistani foreign 
policy-making (Ibid: 254). Yet, instead of concentrating on internal politics (a 
complicated endeavour given Tashkent’s obsession with secrecy), the author proposes a 
number of exogenous preferences by inferring ‘underlying continuity in the driving 
forces behind Uzbekistan’s international alignments, namely, regime survival’ (Ibid: 
261), and Tashkent playing ‘various powers against each other in order to retain 
political autonomy’ (Ibid: 256).  
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Notwithstanding their apparent validity, the assumptions are far from being 
satisfactory. For example, if regime survival was indeed the main goal of President 
Karimov’s government, why then would it have to play one against the other? Could it 
not simply retreat from the public sphere, as did Turkmenistan throughout the late 
1990s? In fact, one could argue that all leaders of Central Asian Republics aim at 
survival, except that this does not show why their international relationships differed. 
So, the model applied by Fumagalli (2007a) already takes as its core premise that 
strategic balancing is the more rational strategy, thereby begging the question of 
(re)alignment. In other words, focusing on balancing implies that Tashkent was at 
some point aligned with either Washington or Moscow.  
According to Steven David’s (1991: 234) model, alignment ‘occurs when a state 
brings its policies into close cooperation with another state in order to achieve security 
goals.’ The definition is broad yet straightforward in calling for ‘close cooperation’. So, 
at a first glance, applying David’s (1991) model offers a seemingly convincing picture of 
Tashkent’s actions from 2000 to 2006. However, it cannot be extended to the 1990s, 
since evidence suggests that the relationship with both powers was equally unstable at 
the time.11 In any case, if it was just after 2001 that Uzbekistan’s government aligned 
with Washington, one has to take into account the empirical evidence. Negotiations for 
Tashkent leasing K-2 to Washington were difficult (see Chapter V) and the 2002 
‘Strategic Partnership Agreement’, signed between both parties, is hardly proof of 
alignment. The document was more a list of reforms than a ‘strategic’ security 
document: only a number of bilateral consultations were proposed and no American 
security commitments were guaranteed (only a reference to ‘grave concern’ was 
indicated, in the case Uzbekistan were attacked, as well some clauses for providing 
military equipment, which Washington had already started supplying since 2000).12 
Actually, Tashkent signing international agreements is not evidence of alignment. 
Already, in 1994 and 1998, Moscow and Tashkent signed agreements on joint strategic 
and economic cooperation, yet no close cooperation came about. Indeed, Fumagalli 
(2007a: 244) actually described this as the period Tashkent ‘decisively undertook a 
progressive distancing from Russia.’ Fumagalli (2007a: 264) also recognized that 
Uzbekistani leadership was reluctant in conceding to Russia even after it joined the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2006. In fact, there is no evidence 
that the two countries ever closely cooperated within CSTO. So, bearing in mind these 
                                               
11 Matteo Fumagalli (2007a) admits that the relationship with Moscow was not strong in the 1990s. 
Moreover, the relationship with Washington only began improving significantly after 1998, once the 
American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were attacked by Al Qaida. 
12 See ‘Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework Between the United States 
of America and the Republic of Uzbekistan’ March 2002, available via, 
http://www.fas.org/terrorism/at/docs/2002/US-UzbekPartnership.htm, accessed: September 2010. 
 18
events, how is it then possible to conclude that alignment was a feature of Uzbekistani 
interaction? 
In sum, (re)alignment is not equivalent to rapprochement, i.e. improving 
relations. Instead, autonomy seems to have been the underlying motif and Fumagalli 
(2007: 256) was aware that President Karimov hoped for ‘retaining political autonomy 
and stability in order to avoid entrapment’. The relationship between Tashkent and 
Moscow certainly improved after 2000, but this is not a sine qua non condition for 
realignment or strategic balancing against Washington. There is, therefore, much more 
than security to the relationship between Russia and Uzbekistan, as Fumagalli (2007a: 
261) also recognized. 
Luca Aneschi’s (2010) analysis of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan’s foreign 
policies has a number of similarities. Like Fumagalli (2007a), the author offers very 
insightful explanations of the interconnection between domestic concerns and foreign 
policy-making and demonstrates how both regimes took special steps to ensure total 
control of foreign policy (Aneschi 2010: 145). As such, the article portrays convincingly 
how building foreign relations is a significant prestige and nation-building tool: 
‘Turkmen and Uzbek nation builders selected analogous strategies in their 
propagandistic exploitation of foreign policy and, at the same time, adopted parallel 
discourses in support of such propaganda’ (Ibid: 146). In the case of Uzbekistan, the 
scholar shows how the regime’s top-down hierarchy instrumentalized Amir Timur 
(Tamerlane) as one of the originators of Uzbekistani foreign policy and how President 
Karimov frequently portrayed himself as an innovator in the field (Ibid: 147). The 
article offers thus an important perspective on how foreign policy was a source prestige, 
particularly as a ‘drive for internal legitimacy’ (Ibid: 146).  
Nevertheless, one of the main problems lies in the way it connects foreign policy 
decisions to the long-term goals of the regime. The scholar recognizes that in 
Uzbekistan, like in Turkmenistan, ‘leaderships considered both excessive dependence 
on external power and international isolation as detrimental to their political survival’ 
(Ibid: 144). The difficulty lies precisely in this last point, i.e. in equating their 
worldviews with ‘regime survival’ - very much like Fumagalli’s discussion (2007a). 
Aneschi (2010: 146) argues explicitly that ‘regime maintenance and regime survival 
became therefore central to Turkmen and Uzbek foreign policy making and wielded 
equal influence on declaratory and operational foreign policy, which the regimes 
constantly manipulated to consolidate their internal power.’ Thereupon, he argues that 
‘both regimes made frequent reference to vaguely framed declaratory statements to 
justify elastic operational foreign policies, in which (…) sudden shifts and constant 
realignments featured regularly’ (Ibid: 148). Naturally a question comes to mind: what 
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kind of political establishment does also not manipulate for the sake of 
manoeuvrability? Michael Denison (2009: 429) too contested this point in his review of 
Aneschi’s (2009) book on Turkmen foreign policy: ‘given that diplomacy is, more often 
than not, a dirty game of compromise and backroom deals, this dissonance could be 
applied to virtually any state.’  
Besides over-extending the argument of manipulative foreign policy, Aneschi 
(2010), much like in the case of Fumagalli (2007a), deduces regime survival to be the 
key decision-making factor. To show then how foreign policy was instrumentalized for 
that purpose, Aneschi (2010: 149-153) discusses Uzbekistan’s relationships with two 
major powers, namely the United States and Russia.13 This choice spawns from the 
author’s aim of focusing on the ‘complex linkage connecting regime survival and 
sudden shifts in the relationship between Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the Great 
Powers’ (Ibid: 144).14 The latter statement, however, is not fully accurate because, as 
Fumagalli (2007a) recognized, Tashkent’s rapprochement with Moscow was not 
sudden, but gradual. As such, when the article argues that ‘in the early Putin era, Uzbek 
foreign policy continued to pursue disengagement from Russia’ (Ibid: 150), this 
deduction is not precise, especially because Aneschi (2010: 155) justifies it with the fact 
that a Strategic Partnership was signed between Washington and Tashkent. As 
aforementioned, for Uzbekistan’s regime, signing an agreement is not evidence of 
alignment. Indeed, the inference is even more perplexing in Aneschi’s (2010) case 
because he argues that Tashkent’s declarations do not often match operational policy 
(see above). Moreover, the argument assumes implicitly that Tashkent cannot be 
improving relations with both powers at the same time.  
While Aneschi (2010) recognizes that an improved relationship with 
Washington was certainly important to the prestige of the regime, he ignores that 
Tashkent was focused on control and that increased public spotlight was not entirely 
compatible with internal stability. Hence, the relationship with Washington was never 
without friction, unlike the succinct picture portrayed in the article. John Heathershaw 
(2007: 137), for example, argues that the ‘partnership’ with the United States was 
‘always an illusion in that it was built on wishful representations of each other and what 
the partnership did and did not entail. While at first these contrasts lead to a formal 
vagueness and a constructive ambiguity, this ambiguity became unsustainable as the 
playing out of events made the differences more acute and brought them into conflict.’ 
 Shahram Akbarzadeh’s (2005) book, Uzbekistan and the United States: 
Authoritarianism, Islamism and Washington’s Security Agenda, offers an excellent 
                                               
13 The first problem comes from the choice of focusing just on these two states. Suffice to say, great 
powers cannot be ignored, but what about other relevant actors such as Germany, Turkey or even China? 
14 Italics added.  
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compilation of some of the main issue-areas affecting Uzbekistani foreign policy. 
Akbarzadeh’s (2005) work does more than the title suggests as he also pays great 
attention to Tashkent’s relationship with Moscow. The overall thesis of the book is that 
President Karimov’s regime sought mainly to fight against Islamism and strengthen 
itself against Moscow, but that these goals ‘did not always coincide and seldom allowed 
Uzbekistan to follow a consistent foreign policy (…) and that the United States offered 
the best chance of pursuing goals in tandem’ (Akbarzadeh 2005: 3). In order to develop 
the argument, the book is divided into seven chapters, in which only the fourth and 
fifth focus specifically on Uzbekistani-American relations. The Chapters are rich in 
information and depict quite consistently Uzbekistani overtures toward Washington 
and the latter’s initial reluctance to engage with Tashkent (Ibid: 61-75). The story also 
shows the effects of policy debates by demonstrating how some of Washington’s 
internal discussions affected the Russian press (Ibid: 78-81).  
While the work is incredibly coherent, it is still important to question 
Akbarzadeh’s (2005) thesis, i.e. Tashkent’s focus on curbing Islam and Russian 
influence, and how this resulted in inconsistency. For one, the scholar argues that ‘the 
Uzbek regime’s relations with Islam followed a complex and contradictory course’ 
(Ibid: 24). It is important to bear in mind that inconsistency in foreign policy was not 
defined in Akbarzadeh’s (2005) book. So, if the scholar means that Tashkent entering 
and exiting international organizations is a sign of inconsistent behaviour, then what 
could be said about American and Russian foreign policies during the same period? 
Moscow distanced itself from the region and only regained interest gradually in the late 
1990s. Washington also paid little attention to Central Asia and only later became 
interested in the region’s natural resources and security situation. The author 
recognizes this, so how can Tashkent’s policies be regarded as inconsistent if its own 
counterparts were also changing their perspectives of the region? Either all were 
inconsistent or no such consistency can be surmised without first acknowledging 
whether Tashkent’s intention changed. The book actually argues quite persuasively that 
Uzbekistani leadership hoped to lure the United States to the region and therefore 
supported all of Washington’s positions in the United Nations (Ibid: 57-61). Is this then 
not a sign of consistency? 
Another problem lies in the depiction of Tashkent wanting to distance itself 
from Moscow, which makes subsequent analysis ad hoc. For instance, when describing 
Uzbekistan’s accession to the Collective Security Treaty (CST), which could contradict 
that premise, Akbarzadeh (2005: 46) justifies the decision as a sort of last resort: ‘at the 
time, Tashkent felt it necessary to join the only power available in order to protect 
itself.’ It is unclear, however, from what Tashkent needed to protect itself. He states 
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that it was a response to Tajikistan’s Civil War, but this might be overstretching the 
case. The CST was endorsed in Tashkent in May 1992 before conflict in Tajikistan 
became rampant. Instead, the decision to join the CST was part of ongoing negotiations 
pertaining to the future of the ruble zone and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (see Chapters III and IV).15  
The analytical predicament persists throughout the book: ‘in 1999 Uzbekistan 
was still looking for allies to combat Islamic insurgency as well as counter Russia’s 
encroachment into Central Asia’ (Ibid: 48). The United States is thus portrayed as the 
counterpart to Russia and Akbarzadeh (2005: 61) deliberates among other examples 
that ‘Uzbekistan’s pro-NATO orientation was made public in 1994, when it joined the 
outer periphery of NATO by signing up for NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
programme.’ However, all other Central Asian states joined PfP (even Turkmenistan), 
and Uzbekistani forces, like those of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, also participated in 
the CENTRASBAT military exercises that were partially coordinated by the Pentagon. 
As such, within the Central Asian context, Uzbekistan joining PfP is not surprising. 
Regarding accession to the Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova organization 
(GUAM), Akbarzadeh (2005: 48) argues that it was designed to counteract Russia. 
However, it is important to take into account that joining GUAM is also consistent with 
economic policy. At the time, GUAM was regarded as the best means of implementing 
the Silk Road initiative, which proposed new trade routes for the region. 
So, instead of suggesting that Uzbekistani foreign policy was driven by two 
somewhat contradictory exogenous goals - fighting Islamism and disentangling from 
Russia -, it is better to frame it in a more general way, based on preserving general 
autonomy, as mentioned briefly by Aneschi (2010) and Fumagalli (2007a). In sum, it is 
not entirely accurate to portray Tashkent’s involvement in Tajikistan as driven by 
concerns over Islamism, especially because Akbarzadeh (2005: 7-23; 50) concedes that 
internal control and prestige were also important to President Karimov’s 
authoritarianism.  
 
I.2. Looking at bilateral relationships independently 
 
Martin Spechler and Dina Spechler’s (2009) article ‘Uzbekistan among the Great 
Powers’ is one of the most thorough accounts of Uzbekistani foreign relations. Rather 
than adopting a balancing paradigm, their work describes the relations between 
Tashkent and the ‘great powers’ (Russia and the United States) by focusing on each of 
                                               
15 Whilst President Karimov did indeed voice his demand for non-interventionism, he also prioritized 
being part of a loose confederation supported by Moscow. It is perhaps herein that lays the contradiction 
and not in distancing Uzbekistan from Russia. See Chapter IV. 
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their particular internal dynamics. To begin at the end of their article, the two scholars 
surmise that ‘considering its objectives - assuring independent development and 
regime stability - Uzbekistan’s foreign policy must be considered a success’ (Spechler & 
Spechler 2009: 371). Unlike the other works above, their understanding of Uzbekistani 
relations downplays regime survival and, like Gleason’s (2003; 2001: 177-179) work on 
Central Asian economies, focuses on the ideological conceptions of President Karimov’s 
regime. Accordingly, Spechler and Spechler (2009: 353) argue that as ‘one of the larger 
successor states of the former Soviet Union, the Republic of Uzbekistan has been 
especially concerned in its foreign relations to retain the new country’s independence  - 
political, economic, and military.’ Additionally, the article highlights that ‘outside 
observers have little way of determining how Uzbekistan’s foreign policy is made’ (Ibid: 
351).16  
Spechler and Spechler (2009: 354) then posit ‘three main periods of the 
country’s external orientation: (1) from 1991 to 1999, characterized by delinking from 
Russia and a search for alternatives, (2) 1999-2003/5, a time of reliance on NATO and 
the USA, and (3) 2003/5-2008, years in which there has been a return to closer 
economic and political cooperation with the Russian Federation, as well as with the 
People’s Republic of China’. The two scholars explain that the ‘break with the USA 
resulted from accumulated dissatisfaction on the Uzbek side, together with a change in 
American needs and priorities, as well as Russian reengagement. It was not a sudden 
change’ (Ibid: 368). This inference seems analogous to the other works above. 
However, the differences are actually substantial. The two authors focus on a 
combination of factors - namely gradual disappointment, Russian engagement and 
American dissatisfaction - to explain why relations with Washington deteriorated. It 
thus underlines (in)compatibility between both sides and not just Tashkent’s supposed 
exogenous wish to balance or survive.  
Even though Spechler and Spechler’s (2009) portrayal offers a more 
comprehensive take on nearly twenty years of Uzbekistani foreign policy, a number of 
points remain unclear. For one, given that the article focuses on the two great powers, 
more evidence is necessary. For instance, no account is provided of American 
involvement before 1999 and, if there was none (which is not the case), no justification 
is proposed. Moreover, Spechler and Spechler (2009: 364) are too succinct in their 
analysis of the Russian-Uzbekistani relationship in the early 1990s, arguing that ‘in 
short, Uzbekistan saw little benefit, and some threat, from its long-time association 
                                               
16 The article then describes some geographical characteristics of the country, its economic capabilities, 
military power and some of its main policy conceptions, such as territoriality. The latter is one of 
Uzbekistan’s main policies for the region; a pillar that is amply described in Fumagalli’s (2007b) 
excellent article on Uzbekistani multi-ethnic politics. 
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with Russia and cautiously withdrew.’ The story though is more complex and little if 
nothing is mentioned of the problem of Soviet debt, the ruble (issues which Hale (1994) 
highlights) and the disagreements between President Karimov and Moscow’s 
reformists and nationalists.  
It is also unclear why the article posits that ‘Uzbekistan has switched its primary 
foreign orientation several times since 1991, though always reserving its freedom of 
maneuver’ (Ibid: 353). Actually, the narratives presented by the two authors show that 
Tashkent’s relationships with Washington and Moscow had their highs and lows. 
However, if they both argue that ‘freedom to manoeuvre’ and ‘independence’ are the 
underlying goals of President Karimov’s foreign policy, how then could Uzbekistani 
orientation have altered? Perhaps engaging with literature on foreign policy change 
would have offered insight. According to Charles Hermann (1990: 5-6), an 
international orientation change is the most ‘extreme foreign policy change,’ which 
consists of an actor shifting its ‘international role and activities.’ So, while Spechler and 
Spechler (2009) do propound convincingly that Tashkent’s relationships with 
Washington and Moscow were far from being static, adjustments are not necessarily a 
case of orientation change. Following their line of argument, if Tashkent’s aim was 
seeking independence, the end did not change but only the means. Assuming, though, 
that orientation did alter, on which basis then could the authors conclude that 
Uzbekistani foreign policy was successful?  
In addition to the problem of orientation, by also summarizing that policy tilted 
from one to another, the authors imply that it was mostly Tashkent’s decision to 
improve relations. This, however, is not entirely consistent with the story that was 
presented. As indicated above, the discussion in the article evinces that relationships 
changed not just because of President Karimov’s decision-making, but also due to how 
the great powers positioned themselves in the region. In fact, the article argues that 
President Putin’s decision to engage more with Central Asia after 2000 was a key 
reason (Ibid: 367).  
Martin Spechler & Dina Spechler’s (2010) other article extends some of their 
first conclusions. Its title, ‘Foreign Policy of Uzbekistan: Sources, Objectives and 
Outcomes’, suggests a more general discussion on Uzbekistani foreign policy, as 
compared to its 2009 counterpart. The article, however, fails to deliver a 
comprehensive analysis on foreign policy, offering a very brief account of Uzbekistani 
relations with other crucial actors. An important state like Turkey is entirely neglected. 
Germany too is not mentioned (with the exception of a succinct allusion to a speech 
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made by President Karimov).17 Evidently, Uzbekistani-German and Uzbekistani-Korean 
relations are not as eventful as the apparent competition between Washington and 
Moscow, but neglecting them leaves the story entirely incomplete. 
Moving to Annette Bohr’s (1998) monograph on Uzbekistani politics and 
foreign policy, the complexities of the first years of President Karimov’s regime are 
brilliantly detailed. Bohr (1998: 43) argues that Uzbekistan’s foreign policy ‘has focused 
on strengthening national independence, attracting direct investment and building 
political and economic ties with partners in both the West and East.’ This is perhaps 
one of the best summaries of President Karimov’s aims. Unlike other works (see above), 
no mention is made of Tashkent deliberately playing one against the other and 
purposively aiming to deter Moscow. In fact, the author concludes that ‘while aware 
that a good relationship with Russia is crucial for stability, Uzbekistan’s leadership is 
conscious of the dangers that deeper integration poses to its freedom of action’ (Bohr 
1998: 68).  
 Bohr (1998: 44-65) explains some of Tashkent’s main relationships, namely 
with the CIS, ECO, Central Asian Republics, Russia and some non-CIS members. This 
focus on bilateralism seems appropriate since President Karimov tended to neglect 
multilateralism from the start (see Chapter IV). Bohr (1998: 61) then offers an account 
of the problems affecting cooperation: ‘in recent years [the mid 1990s] Uzbekistan has 
been reorienting its economy toward the industrialized West, in the process relegating 
its traditional partner [Russia] to a secondary role.’ This account again seems to suggest 
that the purpose was not to relinquish Moscow; rather the relationship deteriorated 
because Russia was not the only partner Tashkent sought to embrace. Moreover, the 
text then develops the point that the relationship was not stable because Moscow too 
remained distant (Ibid: 61-2). Uzbekistan’s government is also compared to Ukraine’s 
and described as ‘the southern pole of resistance to Russian efforts to exert undue 
influence on CIS member states. Indeed, President Karimov’s disillusionment with the 
CIS appears to have grown with each attempt by Russia to entrench its position as the 
organization’s hegemon’ (Ibid: 44). So, a key factor in explaining the relationship is not 
necessarily the goal to separate from Moscow. Relations, instead, deteriorated because 
of Moscow’s status as primus inter pares. 
 As for other interactions, the narratives are shorter, but demonstrate how 
Uzbekistan’s regime was not wholeheartedly convinced of the approaches adopted by 
                                               
17 This is surprising, given that Berlin is the only foreign actor that has a military base in Uzbekistan. 
Also, the article focuses significantly on the economic dimension and, on that regard, Germany was one 
of Uzbekistan’s main import partners (by far the largest from Europe) throughout the period. For the same 
reason, more insight should have been provided on South Korea – a state with a large stake in 
Uzbekistan’s economy - beyond some small factual examples provided in the text and in two footnotes 
(see Spechler & Spechler 2010: 162; 165; 166). 
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both Turkey and Iran (Ibid: 61-65). Little though is mentioned of actors that invested 
significantly in Uzbekistan.18 Regarding the United States, Bohr (1998: 65; 63) 
deliberates that ‘Uzbekistani-US relations, however, have not always been cordial’ yet 
that it was Washington being ‘uneasy with Russia’s preponderant influence in the 
former Soviet south, in 1995, that altered its assessment of Uzbekistan.’ What is 
insightful about this analysis is that it downplays Uzbekistani interests and, 
alternatively, highlights Washington’s changing perception of the Central Asian 
Republic. In other words, Bohr (1998: 63-65) suggests that the dynamic is gradual and 
not simply a predetermined result of Tashkent’s wish to engage with Washington as a 
response to Russia. Disappointment, quarrels and different worldviews gradually 
shaped each of the relationships and not a deliberate strategy taken from the start.  
Perhaps the only negative issue with Bohr’s (1998) account is that while it 
suggests that there is a political dynamic, it does not show how these issues manifested 
themselves publicly and affected action. At any rate, it is unjust to criticize Bohr (1998), 
and also Melvin (2000) (see below), for not focusing on these processes, given that 
their works are largely monographs, attempting to trace Uzbekistani foreign policy, and 
therefore less concerned with showing how events were shaped by public interaction.   
Like Bohr’s (1998) work, Neil Melvin’s (2000) discussion of Uzbekistani 
relations with the outside world is also a comprehensive analysis. Melvin (2000: 89-
118) focuses on the changing mindset of President Karimov and recognizes the 
difficulty of fully understanding Uzbekistani foreign policy: ‘since independence, a 
complex set of interrelated factors has affected Uzbekistani external policy. Frequently 
these factors appear contradictory and cause problems for developing foreign policy’ 
(Melvin 2000: 90).19 The book then sketches Uzbekistani relations with a diverse set of 
important actors and organizations, namely Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Russia, Turkey, 
Iran, Pakistan, India, the United States, the CIS, the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO) and the Central Asian Union (CAU).  
Thereafter, the author foreshadows Spechler and Spechler’s (2010, 2009) 
inference (see above): ‘external relations can be viewed as the most successful sphere of 
policy developed by President Karimov since independence. Uzbekistan has been able 
to develop its main aim of building links to western industrial countries, particularly 
the United States, while still maintaining a wide variety of relations necessary to 
manage critical regional issues’ (Ibid: 114). 
In his subsequent account of Uzbekistani policies toward Russia, the United 
States and Turkey, the author looks at each bilateral relationship separately. As 
                                               
18 Annette Bohr (1998: 63) identifies them as South Korea, Japan, Germany, France, Britain and 
Indonesia. 
19 Italics added. 
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concerns Russia, Melvin (2000: 100) begins by arguing that ‘as the former colonial 
power in Central Asia, the Russian Federation’s relationship to Uzbekistan has often 
been difficult (…) a central aim of Uzbek policy has been to reduce the role of the 
Russian Federation in Central Asia.’ He shows, in addition, that this goal was not clear-
cut and ‘that Uzbekistan initially adopted a cautiously positive relationship to Russia 
and Russian inspired institutions such as the CIS’ (Ibid: 100). He more or less shows 
that the relationship deteriorated as both sides became engaged in a number of 
disputes over the Duma’s reformist and nationalist policies, the civil war in Tajikistan 
and international equality (Ibid: 101).  
As for interaction with Turkey, Melvin (2000: 104-5) propounds that the 
relationship did not fully blossom after a promising start, mainly due to President 
Karimov’s reluctance in indulging with Ankara’s ‘big brother’ type of schemes and the 
growing influence of Turkish Islamism (Ibid: 104-5). Lastly, a very succinct account of 
Tashkent’s relationship with Washington is offered, whereby the author demonstrates 
that friction over President Karimov’s authoritarianism prevented mutual cooperation. 
Melvin (2000: 108-9) then suggests that the latter’s growing reliability paid off since 
Washington become less reluctant to engage with Tashkent.  
Lastly, Melvin (2000: 114) argues in one conclusion that ‘Uzbekistan’s ties have 
been characterized by frequent reorientations reflecting the contradictory interests that 
have informed Uzbekistani foreign policy’. This is misleading for the same reasons 
discussed for the authors above. As concerns contradictory interests, this is possible, 
but Melvin (2000) gives little insight into what they might be beyond the wish to 
hamper Moscow’s influence in Tajikistan. With regard to ‘frequent reorientations’, it is 
unclear what the author means, since the only change in orientation that was indicated 
in his work was Tashkent’s growing disillusionment with the CIS and Russia’s role 
within it. As for relations with Turkey and ECO members, Melvin’s (2000: 105-107; 
113-114) account does not show a shift, rather hesitant relationships that never 
consolidated.  
 Lastly, it is worth mentioning Henry Hale’s (1994) early work on Uzbekistan’s 
foreign policy orientation. Hale (1994) defines orientation as ‘the degree to which a 
particular state is willing to constrain its own decision-making autonomy through its 
association with another state or group of states as indicated by political and economic 
pacts and other mutual economic ties that some other states actively promote with 
other states’ (Hale 1994: 139). Hale (1994: 136) then identifies three forces guiding 
Uzbekistani orientation, namely its proximity to Russia, and both Islamic and Turkic 
values. The scholar also recognizes the importance of rhetoric and the insistence of 
leadership in defending its own interests (Ibid: 143). Since Uzbekistan had only 
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recently become independent, its foreign policy was still consolidating itself, but Hale 
(1994) manages to illustrate how difficult it is to describe Tashkent’s relationships with 
Turkey, Iran, Russia and the United States. Based on the lack of American interest for 
the region and Tashkent’s scepticism toward Iranian politics and Turkey’s economic 
power, he concludes that Uzbekistan’s regime would either be tied with Russia or 
become a neutral actor in the region (Ibid: 164).  
 
I.3. Summary of the main challenges and positing ‘Self-Reliance’ as the 
main predicate for action 
 
All the above authors offer different insights into several features of Uzbekistani foreign 
policy. A number of challenges were also indicated that are perhaps appropriate to 
recall and summarize: 
- Focusing solely on the United States and Russia is misleading since it pushes inquiry 
toward the idea of inconsistency and (re)alignment, thus ignoring other important 
relationships that may contest that generalization; 
- Adopting a balancing paradigm means that a whole process of interaction tends to be 
ignored; 
- It is important to look into each bilateral relationship from the beginning and 
consider how the manner in which it evolved resulted from a specific publicly contested 
process of interaction that evolved though time; 
- Assuming strict exogenous regime preferences brings upon a number of problems in 
explaining the nature of relationships and how they evolved, especially because they 
cannot be extended to all periods; 
 - Exogenous preferences that determine intent also lead analysis toward a portrayal of 
shifting orientations and inconsistency, rather than seeing such changes as a coherent 
way of asserting self-reliance;  
- If self-reliance is regarded as the main predicate for action, it is easier to acknowledge 
that Tashkent has never actually aligned itself, i.e. it did not cooperate closely with any 
other state. 
  Before delving into the conceptual framework (Chapter II), it is appropriate to 
clarify what is meant by the core notion of self-reliance. As indicated above, most 
authors either tacitly or explicitly agree that Tashkent endorses a vision of political 
independence that has real effects in its external relations - norms that are, in fact, 
amply advertised by President Karimov’s regime. 20  
                                               
20 Besides President Karimov’s frequent public statements concerning foreign policy and international 




I.4. Self-Reliance  
 
To understand the concept of self-reliance, it would be suitable to begin with 
Wolfgango Piccoli’s (1999: 7) excellent summary of Paul Schroeder’s (1976) work on 
alliance formations. The latter argues that states do not necessarily align with another 
power and that they can instead interact by ‘declaring neutrality, whether formal or 
informal; approaching other states on one or both sides to improve relations, but short 
of alliance; trying to withdraw into isolation; and conciliating or compromising with the 
threatening state without capitulating and joining that power in order to keep options 
open and gain time’ (Piccoli 1999). Uzbekistan’s external engagement epitomizes the 
latter inference and many would agree that there is a need to capture Tashkent’s stance 
in the international arena with some kind of typology. For instance, Martin Spechler 
(2008: 31) argues that Uzbekistan’s regime projects an ‘independent’ stance on regional 
affairs, but simultaneously rejects ‘isolationism’. Similarly, Gregory Gleason (2001: 177) 
posits that Tashkent follows a ‘structuralist’ approach that rejects neo-liberal economic 
policies and emphasizes ‘neo-mercantilism.’ Stuart Horsman (1999: 45) portrays 
Tashkent as having an ‘autonomous and pragmatist’ outlook. Lastly, Elena Mogilevski 
(2004: 1) refers to Uzbekistan’s government fulfilling a ‘self-determining’ foreign 
policy. Curiously, some of the concepts can actually be mutually exclusive, depending 
on the theoretical lens that is taken. For instance, if Uzbekistan’s regime is considered 
neo-mercantilist, some could argue that it is ideological instead of pragmatic.21  
For reasons that are made clearer below, self-reliance is the most suitable 
concept for categorizing Uzbekistan’s foreign policy predication. Indeed, Gleason 
(2003: 119) had once indicated that Tashkent endorsed self-reliance as an economic 
policy. The scholar does not offer a precise definition, although he suggests that it is an 
alternative to liberalism, focused on self-sufficiency and gradual reform (Gleason 2003: 
119).  
Perhaps it is useful to look at another interpretation. Self-reliance is the title of 
Ralph Waldo Emerson’s famous essay on individuality. The renowned 19th Century 
Transcendentalist philosopher argued for men to be declared non-conformists:  ‘the 
                                                                                                                                         
Karimov (1992, 1997, 2008). Andrew March (2002, 2003) also offers excellent analysis of President 
Karimov’s works.  
21 Given that being pragmatic is normally connected with practice rather than theory, using it to compare 
or even characterize policies is not the best option, insofar as what may be considered practical for some 
can be cumbersome for others. For instance, protecting an economy might be more logical or practical for 
a mercantilist, yet highly cumbersome for a liberal. Therefore, for comparison purposes, classifying 
worldviews as either ideological or pragmatic is highly deceptive and compromised by the bias of the 
observer. 
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great man is he who in the midst of the crowd, keeps with perfect sweetness in the 
independence of solitude’ (Emerson 1930: 36). Remaining permanently dissatisfied 
with current state of affairs is thus regarded as virtuous, since ‘discontent is the want of 
self-reliance’ (Ibid: 52). Emerson, though, did not mean to promote seclusion. His 
purpose was solely to highlight the dangers of ‘foolish consistency’ and praise 
scepticism toward society’s beliefs and trends. Hence, some of Emerson’s assertions on 
self-reliance may be extrapolated onto international politics. Self-reliant states are 
essentially sceptical non-conformists, reluctantly committing themselves to the 
prevalent ideological, institutional, political and economical system: 
 
Self-reliance is a role based on mistrust of foreign penetration and deep 
scepticism toward the values, institutional arrangements and ideologies of 
the international public sphere. The role tends to make a regime look 
inward and depend on its own ideas and capabilities to assure economic 
performance, preserve authenticity and guarantee manoeuvrability. 
However, while never committing fully to any ideological paradigm or 
international organization, the regime does not wholly reject trading or 
working with international institutions, so long as it does not affect its 
level of autonomy.  
 
The self-reliance typology derives essentially from the English language, 
focusing on independence and mitigating dependency, and is therefore a useful way of 
conceiving Tashkent’s stance in the international public sphere. Stating that it is an 
anglo-saxon term is meant to help generalization, i.e. establish that certain regimes can 
be described as self-reliant if they follow those criteria, regardless of whether they have 
actually used an equivalent term in their language or whether their ideologies or public 
statements can be translated into English as self-reliant.  
Lastly, it is important to be aware that self-reliance is not a new typology in 
scholarly literature. Kal Holsti’s (1982: 4) book on foreign policy-restructuring already 
used  the concept of self-reliance - defined as behaviour centred on keeping external 
economic transactions low; avoiding dependence and commitments which involve 
dependence or support from other states. Later, Holsti (1995: 87) also described self-
reliance as a ‘variation of isolationism’, whereby states diminish threats through 
autonomous deterrence. Curiously, Holsti (1982: 4) also differentiates self-reliance 
from non-alignment, seeing as he considers the latter to be characterized by greater 
foreign penetration. To better contextualize how the typology might capture a number 
of similar behaviours in international politics, the following section briefly sketches 
some potential historical self-reliant states and the origins of their ideas.  
 
I.5. Brief historical sketch of Self-Reliance 
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Marxism and Liberalism, in spite of their differences, tend to propose political and 
economic systems that favour universal human progress, independent of any a priori 
constructed social, political or economic traditions (Freeden 1996: 418; 433-434).  Karl 
Marx, for example, besides feeling ‘happiness through rebellion’ wanted to bring 
‘enlightenment to humanity’ (Priestland 2009: 25). In contrast, approaches located 
between Liberalism and Marxism can be labelled as ‘structuralist’ (Spero & Hart 1997: 
152-155). Such simplifications are very narrow but, for the sake of comparison, it is best 
to think of a ‘structuralist’ paradigm as a loose grouping of ideas that openly contest 
classical Liberalism and orthodox Marxism. This is controversial, especially because 
structuralism can also be classified as socialist or ‘neo-marxian’.22 Yet, if one bears in 
mind the broad limitations of such a comparison, self-reliance may be located within 
the broad structuralist spectrum, opposed to universal progress and mainstream 
political theories. 
 
Extreme Contestation of Liberalism and Communism: the Fascist Political Economy 
 
The Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and the consolidation of the Soviet Union’s power 
institutionalized the ideological alternative to Liberalism within the international 
system. Yet, after the turmoil of World War I and the establishment of Communism in 
the Soviet Union, Fascism soon rejected the those two systems: 
 
When attempting to evaluate classical fascist economic doctrines, it is 
important to understand classical fascists’ aversions to traditional 
concepts of political economy, due to an in built ideological bias against 
materialist arguments and an associated hostility towards structural-
economist interpretations of events in history. Marxism and socialism are 
inherently materialistic, embracing the need to have a highly developed 
understanding and appreciation of the economic side of human existence 
(…) Liberal beliefs also derive from forms of political economy – a term 
which emerged in liberal thought in order to explain the ‘natural’ rise of 
market based individualism (Baker 2006: 209). 
  
 Fascist economies geared themselves for war and emphasized the superiority of 
rural life, i.e. ‘a return to the land and its peasant values’, along with an extreme 
nationalistic overtone in the defence of the nation’s own special abilities (Baker 2006: 
232-235). In short, fascism hoped to ‘transcend both capitalism and socialism’ (Ibid: 
239). Yet fascist political economy, while similar, does not combine all the prerequisites 
of self-reliance. The latter entails the pursuit of economic development – authentic to 
                                               
22 As explained in the remainder of the chapter, many of these very general structuralist approaches were 
adopted in countries whose governments also considered themselves to be Communist. 
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each country’s overall values and characteristics. Also, self-reliance is not necessarily 
revisionist, whereas fascism openly endorses aggressiveness and militarism (Ibid: 227; 




With the end of World War II and the gradual dissolution of the colonial empires of 
many western European states, self-reliance became a political and economical slogan 
in the developing world. The first place to espouse a clearer take on the idea was China. 
Mao Tse-Tung voiced ‘in the late 1950s and early 1960s (…) increasingly assertive 
nationalism as a response not only to the boycott of China by imperialists, but to Soviet 
great power chauvinism’ (Schram 1991: 67). Mao, facing antagonism from the Soviet 
Union as well as the disastrous economical consequences of his 1950s ‘Great Leap 
Forward’, gradually proposed an alternative. So, in 1962, he announced what was to be 
considered the Chinese road to socialism: 
 
In the field of heavy industry especially, we copied almost everything from 
the Soviet Union, and we had very little creativity of our own. At that time 
it was absolutely necessary to act thus, but at the same time it was also a 
weakness - a lack of creativity and lack of ability to stand on our own feet. 
Naturally this could not be our long-term strategy. From 1958 we decided 
to make self-reliance our major policy, and striving for foreign aid a 
secondary aim (Schram 1991: 59).23  
 
 Marx and Lenin had both argued that the only way to develop Communism in 
the Far East would be through ‘Europeanization’, i.e. the adoption of western style 
institutions and economical practices (Schram 1974: 29). However, by 1965, Mao 
declared that Marxism ‘no longer constitutes a universal and immutable fundamental 
theory, but merely one more contribution from the West which must be digested and 
critically made to serve China’ (Ibid: 36). Alongside anti-imperialistic rhetoric, Mao 
developed a new ideology that, whilst still Communist, was no longer orthodox Marxist 
and certainly not liberal. Chinese Zi li geng sheng, which was translated into English as 
self-reliance, literally means to ‘produce even more with one own’s strength’ (Yahuda 
1983: 53). The approach was deeply nationalist and underlined Mao’s scepticism 
toward Moscow and Washington.  
Regarding national security, Beijing endorsed a flexibility axiom, known as 
quan bian, based on the traditional Chinese adherence to realpolitik. Communist 
China would not settle with a fixed set of rules to engage with its neighbours and would 
                                               
23 Italics added. 
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simply adopt the strategy that fit its concerns at each particular moment in time 
(Johnston 1996: 239). In sum, Maoist self-reliance entails ‘an independent outlook, 
self-conscious creativity and above all the determination to avoid dependence’ by 
means of ‘retention of the capacity for self-initiative and independent decision-making’ 
(Yahuda: 52-53). 
  
Self-Reliance as a new Strategy for Economic Development 
 
The Cold War and new global trends, such as self-reliance, would greatly influence 
intellectuals and post-colonial leaders in Africa and Asia (Macginty & Williams 2009: 
10). China had its novel approach as did India when Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru 
proposed Non-Alignment. Even within the Communist camp, Josip Tito too had 
pushed for removing Belgrade’s dependency on Moscow. 
Throughout the 1960s, the developing world demanded a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO). As a response, the United Nations General Assembly 
unanimously declared the development decade (Akinsaya & Davies 1984: 209), since 
many non-industrialized states felt that the prevailing economic order was no longer 
able to cope with global challenges. For that reason, reforms to GATT were demanded, 
as were measures to terminate asymmetrical interdependence (O’Neill 1980: 32).  
For a great majority of Third World indigenous thinkers, Africa and Latin 
America were under neo-colonialist domination (Slvan 1983: 26), thus leading to the 
inauguration of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
in 1964 (Akinsaya 1984: 210). One of the outcomes of UNCTAD’s Algiers summit in 
1973 was the adoption of ‘collective self-reliance’ (Gosovic & Ruggie 1976: 313), which 
then became an official UN development strategy in 1975;24 targeting the problem of 
dependency (Biersteker 1980: 230).  
By 1980 the term became popular and was the title of Johan Galtung’s new 
general economic approach. In his edited volume, Self-Reliance, a Strategy for 
Development, Galtung (1980: 12) proclaimed self-reliance to be incompatible with 
Marxism and Liberalism. Moreover, the paradigm called for ‘authenticity’ and context-
specific strategies for development (Mutombo 1980: 111). As such, self-reliance was 
considered compatible with the rising nationalism of many post-colonial states, by 
rejecting strict adherence to Western style approaches, although Galtung (1980: 23-27) 
                                               
24 See Helen O’Neill’s (1989: 35-35) transcription of the strategy: ‘cooperation (in trade and in industrial 
and infrastructural planning) between the developing countries themselves needs to be strengthened so 
that, through a policy of “collective self-reliance”, the “peripheral” countries can reduce their excessive 
dependence on countries of the “centre”’. 
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was careful in underlining that self-reliance did not imply isolationism, self-sufficiency 
nor autarky.  
Besides theoretical extrapolations, self-reliance was adopted by several newly 
independent states throughout the 1960s and 70s. For example, President Julius Nyere 
of Tanzania declared in 1967 that his country would pursue its own version of socialism 
(Bismarck & Cranford 1979: 3-14). Such, practices became commonplace in Africa, as 
Kenya too engaged with a similar concept designated as Harimbi (Mbithi & 
Rasmusson 1977: 15) 
Besides post-colonial countries, some Communist states deviated from 
Moscow’s ideological grip and sought to implement their own specific methods for 
governance and growth. In 1969, Nicolae Ceausescu delivered a marathon speech in 
which he propounded a new socialist path based on Romanian national qualities 
(Priestland 2009: 407]. Similarly, President Enver Hoxha of Albania developed greater 
ties with Maoist China and officially adopted self-reliance as the regime’s slogan 
(mbeshtetja ne forcat e veta) (Backer 1982: 355). Tirana defined self-reliance as an 
inward policy that, while not rejecting international trade and ‘sincere’ socialist foreign 
aid, was aimed at guiding all levels of economy toward greater savings, limited waste, 
research and development (Turku 2009: 88). Burma too, after the 1962 military coup, 
adopted a policy known as the Burmese Way to Socialism (Aung-Thwin et al 1992). 
North Korea is another interesting example, mainly because of how it disdained 
foreign influence and emphasized military expansionism. These norms became part of 
Kim Il-Sung’s Juche Idea, which he espoused in 1967 at the People’s Supreme 
Assembly:  
 
The Government of the Republic will implement with all consistency the 
line of independence, self-sustenance, and self-defense to consolidate the 
political independence of the country (chaju), build up more solidly the 
foundations of an independent national economy capable of insuring the 
complete unification, independence, and prosperity of our nation (charip) 
(Lee 2003: 106). 
 
 Kim Il-Sung, mistrusting what he considered great power meddling, 
maintained that he was against flunkeyism, i.e. a kind servile to the bigger powers.25 
The Juche idea, according to Kim Il-Sung, was the only way North Korea could pursue 
both national independence and socialism (Lee 2003: 106). The new political doctrine 
insisted on security, fear of aggression and the need for preparing against armed 
conflict (Turku 2009: 71-77) and was thus both strongly nationalistic and militaristic, 
with some overtones of fascist political economy.  
                                               
25 See Exposition of the Juche Idea (1983). 
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 Self-reliance, in spite of its different manifestations, is one manner of capturing 
how Uzbekistan’s regime gradually positioned itself in international politics. It is 
important to be aware though that not all of the actors mentioned above would 
acknowledge being described by a single typology. Clearly, North Korea’s Juche idea is 
not wholly analogous with Tanzania’s self-proclaimed self-reliance. Evidently, self-
reliance might be translated differently into each language and assume quite distinct 
connotations. However, for the study herein, it is worth emphasizing again that self-
reliance is simply a term in English language that captures key public manifestations 
favouring defence autonomy, mercantilism, strong economic and financial 
protectionism, unilateralism, economic development and international equality (see 
definition above). It is therefore one way of generalizing and comparing similar 
practices in international politics and, more importantly, understanding how President 
Karimov gradually positioned himself in the international public sphere.  
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II. Role Theory: Framework and Methodology  
 
II.1. Focusing on process 
 
Roles are one way of conceptualizing the politics of the public sphere independent of 
intent. Such an assumption, however, is not to downplay the importance of intent, since 
the latter is important for understanding instrumental reasoning or cases of 
manipulation and deception (intent means essentially the purpose of action – see 
Introduction). Indeed, ‘if speakers said what they meant, then there would be little 
room for speech act theory and discourse analysis’ (Stubbs 1983: 147). So, social science 
and humanities delve greatly into the question of intent so as to assess intrinsic 
preferences and volition.26  
While acknowledging the importance of inferring preferences, the following 
discussion will steer away from fully decoding reasons for political action by simply 
taking literally what actors say and do. For reasons that are explained below, the core 
thesis is that cooperation or conflict arises in the public sphere as the roles of different 
actors clash and become either compatible or contradictory through time. 
The hypothesis might suggest that this is a study of (mis)perception seeing as it 
is based on ideational convergence between distinct actors. Still, studies of perception 
are intricately connected to intent, since misperception arises when the rationale for 
the other’s action is incorrectly deduced.27 Roles and their real implications, on the 
other hand, discount inner motivations and derive from interaction in the public 
sphere. They are unavoidable and what binds them to political relationships is that 
once something is advocated in public, that claim has to legitimated throughout 
interaction; otherwise the actor gradually loses public credibility.28  
                                               
26In short, different approaches take a variety of core assumptions regarding the intent of actors which, 
alongside reasons for action, is usually the building block of many theories. Max Weber (1947: 88-112), 
for instance, starts the Theory of Social and Economic Organization with ‘definitions of sociology and 
social action’ where he discusses the problems of interpreting meaningful action that can be ‘overt or 
purely inward.’ Standard economic textbooks are more categorical in their premises, assuming that 
human agents are utility maximizers subject to certain budgetary constraints. Other authors, like 
Alexander Wendt (1992: 395) would avoid such categorical assumptions and assume that individuals act 
on the basis of meanings they have toward those objects. Moreover, Paul Ricoeur (1981: 43; 213-214) too 
begins his discussion of identity by defining hermeneutics as a ‘theory of operation of understanding’ the 
nature of intention, action and their meanings. 
27 For instance, Mary Buckley and Sally Cummings (2001: 3), in their work on perception, argue that ‘the 
conceptual lens, paradigms or frameworks through which political actors view reality in turn affects their 
understandings of the behaviour of others and their reactions to it.’ Hence, a study of perception looks at 
volition and attempts to understand how the other sees the world. It is therefore slightly inward focused 
and tries to portray the intrinsic conceptions that one might have toward an object. 
28 As Michael Brecher et al. (1969: 89) argued, even in the case of dissimulation, decision-makers are 
likely to be prisoners of their own articulated images since systematic deception leads to credibility 
problems.  
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In order to develop these assumptions, the Chapter will begin by developing the 
idea of narratives and thereafter address the specific methodology for inferring roles. 
The concept of narrative is framed in section II.2, followed by an explanation of how 
roles give meaning to action (section II.3). In that section roles will also be 
differentiated from the widely used concept of personal identity in order to connect the 
former with the public sphere. This will then allow for separating role from intent and 
introduce public credibility and its impact in the international public sphere. The last 
section indicates how roles and narratives are operationalized (II.4). 
 It is worth mentioning that many of the concepts proposed hitherto are not the 
product of a singular theory. They in fact incorporate a number of contributions from 
sociology and international relations. Such an attempt may strike as haphazard, 
although it should be regarded as a pluralistic endeavour opposed to ‘rationalism’, i.e. 
reducing social behaviour to the interplay of exogenously determined preferences.29 
Accordingly, the framework is based on the contributions of hermeneutical philosophy, 
symbolic interactionism and constructivism - namely the works of McCall and 
Simmons (1966), White (1984), Wendt (1999; 1992), Ricoeur (1992; 1981), Ku (2000), 
Harnisch (2012; 2011a,b); all of whom focus on issues of identity and processes of 
social interaction, rather than on mechanistic models of reaction to external stimuli.  
Despite the similarities in a number of works it is important to be aware that 
these contributions are not perfect substitutes. Symbolic interactionism – a theoretical 
framework spawned from sociology – is not analogous to Ricoeur’s hermeneutical 
philosophy. The latter focuses on issues beyond the sociological such as textual 
interpretation. For that reason, a brief digression into the current state of role theory is 
appropriate. This hiatus may then clarify the ontological/epistemological differences 
between a number of scholars and shed light on how this thesis is situated in the 
current academic debate. 
 
Brief introduction: Role Theory in International Relations and Social Science 
 
Role theory came to life as a theatrical analogy (Biddle 1986: 68) because, essentially, 
all actors in a play perform roles. This literary metaphor implies that the theory focuses 
on ‘patterned and characteristic social behaviours, parts or identities that are assumed 
by social participants, and scripts or expectations for behaviour that are understood by 
all and adhered to by the performer’ (Ibid). Realizing its potential, Kal Holsti (1970) 
                                               
29 See Wendt (1992: 391-394) for a brilliant discussion on the differences between ‘rationalist’ and 
‘constructivist/reflectivist’ schools of thought. 
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was the first scholar to apply role theory in international politics. In his 1970 seminal 
paper ‘National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy’, Holsti argued that: 
 
Historians, officials, and theorists of international relations often 
characterize foreign policy behaviour by terms which suggest patterned 
or recurring decisions and actions by governments. Typical 
classifications would include “non-aligned”, “bloc leaders”, “balancers” 
and “satellites.” When we classify a state as “non-aligned” we imply that 
in a variety of international contexts and situations, its diplomatic-
military actions and decisions will be consistent with the “rules” 
subsumed under the general category or class of states called “non-
aligned”’ (Holsti 1970: 233). 
 
Building on Holsti’s (1970) opening argument, Stephen Walker (1987a: 2) 
posited that understanding foreign policy through role theory is useful because the 
latter describes, organizes and explains behaviour. This line of argument derives from 
the tacit assumption that foreign policy is driven by ideas and shaped by particular 
expectations (Bengtsson & Elgstrom 2012: 94; Le Prestre 1997a: 4).   
A more systematic point in favour of studying roles is that they shape national 
interests, thus revealing  national orientations (e.g. Krotz & Sperling 2011: 214; 
LePrestre 1997a: 5; Chafetz et al. 1996: 733; Hermann 1987: 125; Wish 1980; Holsti 
1970). Another frequently cited benefit is that role theory allows for bridging the gap 
between agency and structure, given that roles are, on one hand, ideational constructs 
provided by a particular structure, and, on the other hand, enacted by agents (Breuning 
2011: 16). Thereafter, some have even suggested that roles may be applied to all levels 
of analysis - from actor specific foreign policy to more general international relations 
(e.g. Walker 1987a,b; Holsti 1970).   
While it is important to be aware of the promise of role theory for international 
relations, its history predates Holsti (1970), as it was developed in the 1950s, 60s and 
70s by a number of psychologists and sociologists.30 Much the same as in international 
relations, role theory did not culminate in one theory, but in a blend of assumptions 
and approaches (Harnisch 2011a: 7-8; Nabers 2011: 75; Thies 2009: 4).  
While, in any case, classifying complex works is never wholly accurate, one may 
still infer the general assumptions that differentiate a number of scholarly 
contributions. Accordingly, Dirk Nabers (2011: 4) proposed four general approaches for 
applying role theory: symbolic interactionism, organizational theory, structuralism and 
functionalism. Traditional role theorists of international relations were mostly 
influenced by the latter two, in that they assumed roles to be script based formulae that 
                                               
30 For a detailed account of the main scholarly contributions of Role Theory to Social Psychology, see 
Bruce Biddle (1986). 
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cause action (e.g. Holsti 1970; Wish 1980; Walker 1987c; Shih 1988; Chafetz et al 1996; 
LePrestre 1997a). For that reason, those scholars were either directly or indirectly 
influenced by the works of classical functionalist sociologists, like Talcott Parsons, 
Robert Merton and Neil Gross, who described behaviour as result of either positive or 
negative reinforcement (McCall & Simmons 1966: 6-7). Additionally, a structuralist-
functionalist account tends to focus on ego roles such as relatively stable preferences 
and beliefs that are taken to be triggers of foreign policy (e.g. Wish 1980, Holsti 1970).  
Our concern herein, however, is to avoid the functionalist-structuralist type of 
analysis and focus mainly on the contributions of symbolic interactionism, whereby 
action is less diagrammatic and more spontaneous.31 This approach is based on the 
assumption that ‘mechanistic conformity to a role script is observed only in unusual 
circumstances, as in tightly structured organizations in which roles in this sense are 
formally defined (…) [Alternatively] individuals involved must somehow improvise 
their roles within very broad limits’ (McCall & Simmons 1966: 7). If roles are conceived 
in such a strict deterministic manner, it would not be possible to show how meanings 
change and gradually became contested through time.  
Recent scholarship has gradually adhered to the importance of socialization and 
so avoided some of the structural accounts that were prevalent in role theory’s 
inception (e.g. Harnisch 2012; Nabers 2011; Thies 2012, 2001).32 This thesis thus 
proposes that roles provide a kind of conceptual model that gives meaning to action, 
but nothing more (the concept of meaning to action will be better developed below). 
Roles cannot wholly predict what will be one’s response to external stimuli; they only 
contextualize the level of conflict and cooperation evinced in interaction.  
 
II.2. Imposing Narratives: ‘Emplotting’ as Explaining and Understanding 
Action 
 
Narrative serves to ‘transform a list of historical events that would otherwise be only a 
chronicle into a story narrative. In order to effect this transformation, the events, 
agents, and agencies represented in the chronicle must be encoded as “story-elements,” 
that is to say, characterized as the kinds of events, agents, and agencies’ (White 1984: 
20). Consequently a narrative, which is imposed on a particular set of occurrences, is 
not simply ‘a product of a theory nor as the basis for a method, but rather as a form of 
                                               
31 For an excellent introduction to symbolic interactionism and its connection to Role Theory, see 
Sheldon Stryker’s (1980) book. 
32 This criticism has tended to be voiced by European scholars (Thies & Breuning 2012), thereby 
revealing an Atlantic divide on ontology and epistemology.  
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discourse which may or may not be used for the representation of historical events’ 
(Ibid: 2).  
That said, narratives have multiple purposes in inquiry. On one hand, they may 
be the object of inquiry, whereby they are subject to interpretation. On the other hand, 
they are also a means of organizing a particular set of occurrences. This chapter is 
concerned mainly with the latter use, in that it proposes to impose a story on various 
interlinked incidents. The verb impose, though, has to be read with caution, because 
the goal is not to recreate one ‘true’ story, but simply sketch an alternative take on a 
process of bilateral interaction. 
The manner of imposing a narrative is not random and unstructured. Narratives 
depend on emplotment, which provides meaning to a particular set of events and, more 
importantly, is a particular type of explanation (White 1984: 20-21). According to 
Ricoeur (1992: 143), emplotting ‘reverts the effects of contingency, in the sense of what 
could have happened differently or which might not have happened at all, by 
incorporating it in some way into the effect of necessity or probability exerted by the 
configuring act.’  Prior to developing the concept of role, however, it is important to 
clarify how emplotment is a specific type of explanation. 
 
The dialectic of Explanation and Understanding 
 
Present day social science is fixated on Max Weber’s apparently irreconcilable 
dichotomy of explaining (Erklaren) and understanding (Verstehen) (e.g. Hollis & 
Smith 1990). This consolidated distinction has, nonetheless, been subject to varying 
degrees of contestation. Patrick Jackson (2010: 18-23), for example, basing himself on 
Max Weber, argued that both are in fact not mutually exclusive. His claim presupposes 
that science depends on the goal and not just the method; and so understanding and 
explanation are equally ‘scientific’. Paul Ricoeur (1981; 1976) offers another 
interpretation, by positing that explanation and understanding are dialectic, i.e. 
mutually dependent. 
The dialectical interpretation stems from Ricoeur’s (1981) ideas regarding 
interpretation (hermeneutics) and the human sciences as themselves hermeneutical.  
His analysis is too complex to summarize fully herein, yet it is important to be aware of 
its key points. According to Ricoeur, explanation is not just causal in the Humean 
sense, i.e. ‘a regular sequence of antecedents and consequences with no inner logical 
connection between them’ (Ricoeur 1981: 218); rather explanation unfolds a number of 
propositions and meanings, whereas understanding occurs if the whole is built into one 
synthesizing act (Ricoeur 1981; 1976: 72). Ricoeur (1981: 217) clarifies this point by 
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comparing his thesis to Levi-Strauss’s (1955) structural explanation of the myth. He 
argues that Levi-Strauss’s explanatory study already presupposes an understanding of 
what is to be a myth, and that his explanation is actually both insufficient and even 
insipid if left by itself, given that it is only in the act of understanding that the whole is 
comprehended (Ricoeur 1981: 211).  
The dialectical conceptualization reveals that while understanding and 
explaining are both useful concepts, insisting on their distinction stems from a 
particular way of conducting science based on Humean causal explanation. Cause, 
according to Ricoeur (1981: 214), may also be construed as ‘an expression, or a phrase, 
which allows us to consider the action as this or that.’ Ricoeur (1981, 1976) therefore is 
not just criticizing one strict way explaining but also proposing an alternative. 
 Other authors discussed below would probably agree with Ricoeur’s argument. 
For instance, Alexander Wendt (1999: 165) and both George McCall and Jerry 
Simmons (1966: 47-48) argue that not all effects are causal in the typical ‘scientific 
sense’, rather constitutive or interactive. In light of this, McCall and Simmons (1966: 
47-48) stipulate that social (inter)action cannot be conceived as a product of 
independent objects. Instead, interaction is the combination of equally dependent 
objects, none of which can be fully isolated to explain the effect. As a result, in some 
circumstances, it might be best to avoid explaining social action in the strict linear 
sense posited by Hume. 
  
Explanation through emplotment in a Narrative 
 
In theory, a classic explanation of causes based on antecedent independent conditions 
is rather straightforward to operationalize. Independent and dependent variables are 
set, and causal explanations are tested to rule out mere correlation. Given the 
predominance of that tradition, Ricoeur’s conceptualization seems counter-intuitive, 
but imposing a narrative requires precisely an interweaving between explanation and 
understanding.  
Understanding is disclosed once a set of events is conceived as a whole, much 
like when one is immersed in reading, inasmuch as each sentence is construed as part 
of a larger picture. A particular choice of emplotment imposes a choice of story-type, 
which endows events with meaning (White 1984: 20), whereby the latter refers to a 
contingent relationship between objects in a narrative (Epstein 2008: 7). This 
alternative manner of sequencing action should not be regarded as completely 
idiosyncratic, since, much like scientific explanation, emplotment may also be 
validated, even though one is tempted to dismiss such a methodology as guesswork. 
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Hence, the ‘truthfulness’ of a narrative lies in emplotment subscribing to a 
correspondence criterion: 
 
Not only must the singular existential statements that comprise the 
“chronicle” of the historical account “correspond” to the events of which 
they are predications, the narrative as a whole must “correspond” to the 
general configuration of the sequence of events of which it is an account. 
Which is to say that the sequence of “facts” as they are emplotted in order 
to make a “story” out of what would otherwise be only a “chronicle,” must 
correspond to the general configuration of the “events” of which the “facts” 
are propositional indicators (White 1984: 17-28). 
 
 Recognizing that constructing narratives is subject to validation is similar to 
Jackson’s (2010: 18-23) alternative view of science - that validating a work should be 
based on the overall assumptions and coherency of the argument, rather than on how it 
abides by a universal methodology. 
 
II.3. Roles as Predicate-Processes of Action in the Public Sphere 
 
Roles explaining action 
 
Ricoeur (1992: 144), quoting Claude Bremond, defined role as ‘the attribution of some 
possible, actual, or completed predicate-process to a subject-person.’ McCall and 
Simmons (1966: 66) also propose a similar conception: ‘a plausible line of action 
characteristic and expressive of the particular personality that happens to occupy the 
given position and represents that person’s mode of coming to grips with the general 
expectations held toward someone in his position.’ These two conceptions of role 
assume that it predicates or shapes action, but not that it necessarily causes it in the 
Humean sense (see above). So roles can act as a form of emplotment, since they provide 
meaning to the narrative, shaping and delimiting the scope of action: 
 
In this attribution we see the narrative solution to the problem of 
ascribing action to an agent (…) The reference in the very definition of 
“role” (...) situates the role within action dynamics (…) On the basis of 
this definition of elementary sequence, it becomes possible to draw up a 
full repertoire of roles, by taking into account a series of enrichments 
bearing on both the subject-person and the predicate-process (Ricoeur 
1992: 144). 
 
Perhaps it is important to emphasize that roles are not material entities in 
themselves and do not exist beyond the context of interaction. In the light of the 
definitions, roles should simply be regarded as heuristic tools that subsume a number 
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of characteristics pertaining to both the subject-person and the action. This, however, 
does not make them irrelevant, as will be made clearer below, because they provide 
meaning to action in a narrative, and contribute to ascertaining the actor’s public 
credibility.  
That said, in this thesis action is broadly defined as what the actor does. 
Consequently, it is not restricted to just physical behaviour. John Austin’s speech act 
theory demonstrated how the act of speaking is also action, since certain verbs do more 
than just the locutionary (the act of saying) (Kaplan 2003: 30). Undeniably, besides 
kicking, hugging and running, ‘in speaking the actor does things; it achieves certain 
concrete practical results. However, it also positions itself in relation to the other 
speaking actors, it marks itself in a particular way’ (Epstein 2008: 13).  
According to Ricoeur (1981: 203-206), action is also like a text since it is (1) 
fixated; (2) autonomized; (3) relevant; and (4) an open work. For reasons of space it is 
not possible to develop fully Ricoeur’s perspective on action and so it is best to focus on 
the first two core concepts (1 and 2). Action being fixated implies that it leaves its 
‘marks on time’, which means that ‘action itself, action as meaningful, may become an 
object of science, without losing its character of meaningfulness, through a kind of 
objectification similar to the fixation which occurs in writing’ (Ricoeur 1981: 203). 
Thereupon, Ricoeur (1981: 206) argues that action leaving its mark is the 
‘autonomization of action’ similar to text: ‘in the same way that a text is detached from 
its author, an action is detached from its agent and develops consequences of its own.’ 
He then develops the claim by highlighting the differences between simple action 
segments and complex actions, the latter of which leave segments ‘so remote from the 
initial simple segments, which can be said to express the intention of the doer, that the 
ascription of these actions or action-segments constitutes a problem as difficult to solve 
as the authorship in some cases of literary criticism’ (Ricoeur 1981: 206). What this 
means, essentially, is that unlike a simple dialogue, where one can gradually ascertain 
the original meaning of the speaker, action may become a written text that ‘is out there’, 
thus not subject to the original intent. In fact, unless one is able to dialogue with the 
intervening actors, intent becomes a matter of ‘guessing’.33   
 Of course, interaction does not become meaningless and random. When action 
is emplotted by roles within a narrative, the meanings of action become restricted and 
so roles explain by ‘predicating’ a relatively stable ‘line of action.’ In other words, they 
constrain the possible reasons for action being as such, thereby delimiting the possible 
origins of intent. The following example may clarify some of these points. After 
                                               
33 According to Ricoeur (1981), guessing need not be random and unstructured. As mentioned above, 
processes of guessing need to be validated, meaning that some inferences are obviously better than others 
in explaining action. 
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witnessing an individual assisting an elderly woman cross the street, one could report 
the event in a narrative as ‘the Good Samaritan helped the old lady cross the street.’ The 
Good Samaritan is the role ascribed to both the action and to the actor who helped the 
old lady; or according to Ricoeur and Bremond, Good Samaritan established meaning 
by providing a complete predicate-process to a subject-person. Role therefore also 
subsumes the characteristics pertaining to that action itself. The role hints at the 
latter’s intention but does not reveal it, i.e. one is still unaware of why the individual is 
a Good Samaritan or why he or she helped the old lady in the first place. That choice 
depends on the nature of the lady herself, the particular setting and how the individual 
conceptualized the situation in that particular moment in time. If one was aware of all 
the circumstances and knew the Good Samaritan intimately, both privately and 
publicly, one could probably surmise the intent.  
 
The difference between role and identities 
 
A crucial characteristic of the foregoing example is that ascribing a role seems like 
fixing an identity upon an individual. Identification is, in fact, a key process in any type 
of interaction since one has to classify things in order to act (McCall and Simmons 
1966: 64-65).34 By identifying a predicate-process, a role is in itself an identity. 
However, it is not the identity commonly used in many works of social psychology and 
sociology. In other words, it is not a personal identity, derived from identifying one ‘in 
terms of categories referring to unique individuals’ (McCall and Simmons 1966: 64-65). 
This is an important distinction, because roles allocate meaning to action and do not 
necessarily result from ego conceptions or selfhood.35  
Many scholars connect selfhood to identification and by extension to the term 
identity. McCall and Simmons’ (1966), for example, propose the concept of ‘role-
identity’; defined as ‘the character and the role that an individual devises for himself as 
an occupant of a particular position’ (McCall & Simmons 1966: 67).36 Consequently, 
‘role-identity’ encompasses ‘his imaginative view of himself as he likes to think of 
                                               
34 Identification is meant as ‘to be able to make apparent to others, amid a range of particular things of the 
same type (…)’ (Ricoeur 1992: 27). 
35 Ricoeur’s hermeneutical philosophy alongside symbolic interactionism may clarify what is meant by 
this distinction. Central to symbolic interactionism is the work of George Mead who developed the 
notions of ‘Self’, ‘Me’ and ‘I’ (Harnisch 2012, 2011b: 39; McCall & Simmons 1966: 53-57). ‘Self’ 
happens as an actor learns to take the role of the other and examines his or herself from the other 
perspective (Harnisch 2011b: 39). Mead’s analysis does not exactly parallel Ricoeur’s (1992) but there 
are commonalities (Ezzy 1998: 246). Ricoeur (1992) proposes somewhat similar conceptions of selfhood 
(ipse) and sameness (idem). The latter is ‘a relation of relations’ that allows for one to identify a character 
as being the same’ (Ricoeur 1992: 116-118). The former (ipse), conversely, is related to one’s own 
subjective dimension and so inward focused. 
36Italics added. 
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himself being and acting as an occupant of that position’ (Ibid). Hence, role-identity is 
in fact similar to other ego identities applied by prominent role theorists, seeing as it 
includes one’s own self-conception.37 
 However, roles, according to the definitions above, are not identities in a 
personal or inward sense. This explains why Peter Burke and Judy Tully (1977: 883) 
proposed dividing McCall and Simmons’ (1996) concept ‘role-identity’ into two: 
identity as ‘the internal component of role/ identity’ and role as ‘the external 
component.’  
Evidently, one cannot ignore that roles do have an impact in personal identities 
and vice-versa, whereby personal identities provide the actor with a framework for 
interpretation of the social position that roles supply an actor with; and, on the other 
hand, actors create plans and perform activities according to the boundaries of their 
roles, which then reinforce their identity (Nabers 2011: 82-83). However, because this 
thesis is not looking into self-perception it is important to distinguish between the two 
widely used concepts. 
 
Roles, Public Sphere and Public Credibility 
 
The question that arises naturally, then, is why is a role important for emplotting a 
narrative and studying politics? The reason is that action, like text, develops meaning 
beyond the original intent of the actor (see above), eventually being subsumed under a 
number of roles. Hence, an actor might either wittingly or unwittingly develop a set of 
composite roles that may or may not coincide with one’s personal identity or selfhood. 
Unlike beliefs or intrinsic preferences which cannot be observed directly (see 
Introduction), roles provide meaning to public action – action that is out there - no 
matter the intent. For that reason, even though roles are a sort of heuristic, they are not 
negligible because the public sphere has real impact.  
The public is a ‘nominal construction about boundary and membership’ (Ku 
2000: 225). Agnes Ku (2000: 226) conceptualizes the public sphere as something that 
                                               
37 For instance, some scholars define ‘role conceptions’ as a covert expectation that is intrinsic and 
constitutive of an actor or an attitude (Biddle 1979: 154). Holsti (1970: 230-241, 244-245) applies 
‘national role conception’ to international politics, which encompasses norms and definitions of ego, such 
as values, orientations, interests and goals. Wendt (1999) was aware of the terminological complexities, 
between identities and roles, and so developed a stricter taxonomy: (1) ‘type identity’, which refers to a 
label placed on people or groups who share common characteristics and is based on intrinsic properties; 
(2) ‘role identity’ which also ‘depends on other and is derived from occupying a position in a social 
structure; (3) ‘collective identity’, which ‘takes relation between self and other to its logical conclusion, 
identification’, combining role identity with type identity (Ibid). Crucial to Wendt’s (1999) 
conceptualization is therefore ‘identification’ which is intricately connected to selfhood. Hence, Wendt’s 
(1999) process of identification is a sort of holistic undertaking that subsumes both ‘type’ and ‘role 
identities’, thereby leading to the recognition of self. 
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‘underlines the existence of a realm of political life where citizens of a particular 
community come openly to define and contest the cultural and moral meanings of 
politics, public life, and citizenship.’ Hence, it should be regarded as ‘communicative 
institution belonging generally to the public domain of citizenship, or more 
particularly, to civil society’ (Ibid: 227). 
It is important to recall that the modern concept of public sphere dates back to 
Jürgen Habermas’s (1989) seminal book Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere. This work traces the rise and fall of the public sphere as an institution of 
rational-critical dialogue. Perhaps one problem in his influential thesis is that while it 
portrays the various dichotomies existing in ‘the state/public versus market/private 
distinction and the public versus mass distinction (…) [it] undertheorizes the 
conceptual pair of publicness (openness) versus secrecy’ (Ku 2000: 216-217). 38 Since 
Habermas’s analysis delves only briefly into that pivotal distinction of this work, Ku’s 
(2000) understanding of the public sphere is an excellent way of conceiving roles as 
part of a non-private domain where meanings are visible and open to contestation. 
Regrettably, her conception is heavily centred on the domestic state level and especially 
on those states where citizenship warrants for open political debate. Indeed, not all 
states match this criterion.  
Nevertheless, the concept of public sphere is still useful if extended to global 
politics. According to Manuel Castells (2008: 78, 80), the international public sphere is 
a sort of space ‘not subject to any particular sovereign power but, instead, is shaped by 
the variable geometry of relationships between states and global non state actors. 
Consequently, the public sphere shapes the actions of traditional states in the 
international arena (Ibid: 80). Although the public sphere is greatly shaped by the 
media (Ibid: 79, 89-90; Ku 2000: 227, 231), it is a heurist concept that acts as a 
‘cultural/informational repository of ideas and projects that feed public debate’ 
(Castells 2008: 79).  
The concept of civil society in a global environment consists of the specific civil 
actors in a particular country (1); international non-governmental organizations (2); 
social movements that shape globalization by seeking to promote, for example, 
international justice (3); and, lastly, ‘the emergence of spontaneous, ad hoc 
mobilizations using horizontal, autonomous networks of communication’ (Ibid: 85-86). 
Consequently, the public sphere has effects that are very much real in international 
politics, since public debates reveal or galvanize crises pertaining to the efficiency of the 
                                               
38 For a detailed description of some of the main criticisms of Habermas’s work on the public sphere, see 
Nick Crossley and John Roberts’s (2004: 10-17) excellent edited introduction to the topic. 
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distribution of goods, legitimacy, identity and equity (Ibid: 82-83). Therefore, even 
those who are not ‘globalized’ face scrutiny from the public sphere (Ibid: 81).  
 By expanding the concept of the public sphere to the international, it is possible 
to propound how politicians are restricted by their own roles.39 Ku’s (2000: 236) idea 
of public credibility - defined as an ‘evaluative claim by the public of citizens, of moral 
status and moral authority about particular actors, institutions, or the whole 
government on the basis of their public presentations and performances’- is the key 
reason why politicians cannot fully escape the consequences of their own autonomized 
actions. Public credibility may, therefore, be extended to role theory. As already 
discussed, no matter the intent, action is evaluated according to past actions subsumed 
under a number of roles, which in turn are observed and discussed by a public, both 
domestic and international.   
 
Roles and Role Conflict within the Public Sphere 
 
By connecting roles to public credibility, it is now possible to develop a few interesting 
propositions of role theory. On a first note, it is important to be aware that each role 
has a counterrole (Stryker 1980: 58). For instance, in the case of the Good Samaritan, 
its meaning derives partially from the existence of a semantic opposite. 40  
Individuals are capable of several complex actions and therewith have multiple 
roles which constitute an aggregate role set (Thies 2001; 2009: 5), which then requires 
a degree of role cohesiveness. In other words, two or more roles have to be more or less 
coherent with each other; otherwise the character becomes strained (Backman 1970: 
314). Indeed, cohesiveness, or a lack thereof, means that roles are consistently 
contested within a particular context, leading to other counter or complementary roles 
(Harnish 2011a: 8; Cantir & Kaarbo 2012). Naturally, contestation reveals the most 
interesting corollary of role theory, which is conflict, i.e. contradictory meanings 
between different roles.  
Role conflict is classified under two distinct types: intra-role conflict and inter-
role conflict. The former pertains to role divergence within a particular role set and the 
latter to incongruence between the roles of two different characters (based on Harnisch 
                                               
39 It is perhaps important to mention that this chapter purposively endorses ‘public credibility’ rather than 
‘legitimacy’, which I believe is a broader concept including tradition, charisma, emotional empathy, 
rational discussion and legality. For more on the origins of legitimacy, see Weber (1947: 133-133). 
40 The idea of all roles being what they are not is an interesting way of capturing the complexities of 
meaning. Given that roles are linked to performance, signifying action with one role may imply that other 
domains are marginalized. Roles are therefore one way of conceiving Judith Butler’s (1993: 187-222) 
identification of the real: a role can be one, but not the other, which may lead to marginalization.  
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2011a: 8; Barnett 1993). With regard to the inner role set, its stability is based on 
avoiding the following situations: 
- Role ambiguity - when the specificity of a role is low; 
- Role malintegration - when multiple roles do not interlock; 
- Role discontinuity - when different sequential contexts require disjointed roles; 
- Role overload - when too many role expectations exist. 
Yet, while delving into intra-role conflict is important for evaluating internal 
coherency, the more interesting case for interaction is inter-role conflict. Returning 
therefore to the example of the Good Samaritan might be appropriate. Imagine that a 
politician publicly promised to implement legislation for assisting the elderly cross the 
street. In this case, Good Samaritan would seem again to be an appropriate way of 
identifying both the actor and his promise. Thereafter, the audience in the public 
sphere would observe whether subsequent action is congruent with the role of Good 
Samaritan. Of course, role theory does not deliberate which specific action will be taken 
after the promise since it is not concerned with volition and personal identity. It merely 
points out that there is now an open space for contestation and thus further action. If 
the promise was never kept, and the actor keeps reaffirming Good Samaritan-like 
promises, conflict becomes more probable. However, even if the vow is broken, the 
story continues, for one has to justify oneself with even more words (Heathershaw 
2009: 10). This is likely to be captured by the public sphere leading to further 
contestation and negative public credibility, to which the actor has to pay heed. Another 
case of role conflict may simply originate from bilateral interaction. If a Good 
Samaritan faces an Evil-doer, meanings are publicly malintegrated and so for inter-role 
conflict to subside between the two actors, both have to locate less disparaging roles; 
thereby leading to a continuous process of adjustment in interaction. 
 The example reveals that coping with public credibility is essentially a process of 
‘legitimation’ (McCall & Simmons 1966: 95),41 whereby the actor is gradually forced to 
cope with situations of conflict. McCall and Simmons (1966: 95-99) and Sebastian 
Harnisch (2012: 56) thus propose a number of ways of dealing with a rise in inter-role 
conflict:42  
                                               
41 It is important to mention that McCall and Simmons’s (1996) mechanisms for legitimation are much 
broader. According to McCall and Simmons (1996: 95), crises in legitimation are ‘to be found in the ever-
present discrepancy between the role-identity itself and the role-support earned from various audiences by 
a particular role-performance.’As mentioned earlier, this chapter is not concerned with the issue of either 
‘role-identity’ or ‘selfhood’ and therefore the coping responses that were selected avoid introspection. 
Nevertheless, actors still legitimate their statements because these actions are out in the public sphere and 
affect public credibility, regardless of their own imagination. 
42 These responses are similar to Harnisch’s (2012: 56) proposals for gradual change in action through 
‘role learning’. However, much like McCall and Simmons’s (1966) theory, they are responses closely 
related to one’s own imagined identity. Still, Harnisch’s (2012: 56) alternative is also worthy of being 
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- Selectively tailor the audience’s response to one’s action, whereby the norms 
of ‘propriety and polite discourse (…) dictate that we “nicify” the responses 
to the person’; 
- Withdraw from the interaction; 
- Enact another role within a role set; 
- Resort to scapegoating and thus blame someone else for rising role conflict; 
- Resort to disavowal of a performance by claiming, for example, that the 
former statement was not wholly serious and simply an instance of humour; 
- Condemn the audience that does not support the action. 
 
A Narrative of bilateral relationships: Cooperation vs. Conflict 
 
Given the importance of inter-role conflict and cohesion, the concept opens up the 
possibility of cooperation in a way similar to how Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane 
(1985) defined it. Both argued that cooperation is not harmony or ‘complete identity of 
interests’, but the result of actors adjusting ‘behaviour to the actual anticipated 
preferences of others’ (Axelrod & Keohane 1985: 226). Likewise, given that roles 
subsume actions autonomized in the public sphere, cooperation becomes visible if 
actions do not question the roles of the other; avoiding thus the problem of public 
credibility. In other words, cooperation comes about when actors adjust their actions in 
the public sphere according to the roles of the other; allowing for increased 
compatibility. 
Even though Axelrod and Keohane (1985) mentioned preferences, their 
conceptualization is still appropriate when modified to role theory. For that reason, 
narratives emplotted by roles may recreate how cooperation or conflict occurs gradually 
through time.  
 
II.4. Narratives and Inferring Roles: Methodology for Uzbekistan’s 
bilateral relationships 
 
As indicated in the Introduction and Chapter I, this dissertation:  
                                                                                                                                         
mentioned. The scholar proposes the following lines of action: the first is ‘Ego vs. Alter’, which means a 
shift between the ‘I’ and ‘Me’ segments of a role. This is essentially a dramatic change when the actor is 
facing a potentially new situation and the ‘I’ segment of the role tends to reject previous social obligations 
and ‘constructs itself as prior or above the obligations of society to an alter-oriented orientation.’ A 
second shift, labelled ‘Significant vs. Generalized’, can occur when the actor decides to interact with 
other significant or generalized others, being essentially a variation of the scope of experience (Harnisch 
2012: 56). Finally, ‘Strong vs. Weak Internalization’ alternations refer to situations when the actor may 
move from a heavily internalized or committed role to a less committed one (Ibid: 56). 
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- proposes four narratives for describing Uzbekistan’s bilateral relationships with 
Russia, the United States, Germany and Turkey, and for depicting how conflict, 
cooperation and rapprochement came to be;  
- pertains to evaluating whether President Karimov propounded self-reliant roles in the 
international public sphere.  
In view of these two goals, the remaining sections of this Chapter set out this 
thesis’s methodology for both constructing narratives and inferring roles. 
 
Selecting the actors and the events for the narratives 
 
The aim is to impose narratives of relationships based on the way events were 
articulated in the international public sphere. For that reason, open parliamentarian 
meetings, senate hearings, opinion articles, transcripts of television appearances, 
interviews, summits, speeches and legislation are all used to recreate events. More 
importantly, the lists of all articles used for inferring President Karimov’s role set are all 
indicated in Appendix I. 
What determines the presence of actors in the narrative is whether their actions, 
such as speeches, gesticulations or legislation were given headway by the global media 
and thus obtained visibility in the international public sphere; all of which can be 
obtained by the news reports and accounts of international organizations. 
Consequently, for the United States, Russia, Germany and Turkey, any individual or 
organization is likely to be a character within the narrative, so long as they have some 
sway in the international public sphere. For obvious reasons, it is more likely for the 
foreign ministers, heads of state and government to have larger roles in each narrative. 
As concerns Uzbekistan, President Islom Karimov’s own public roles will be a 
central element of most narratives – an assumption that is not farfetched for two 
reasons: Mr Karimov has been in power since 1989 and has thus been Uzbekistan’s 
constant representative; he also plays a decisive role in Uzbekistan’s centralized politics 
and foreign policy (Kazemi 2003: 208; Luong 2004; Spechler & Spechler 2010: 159). 
Nevertheless, other actors in Tashkent’s political establishment may also be portrayed, 
so long as they are in the spotlight of the international public sphere. Their actions, 
though, are all emplotted according to President Karimov’s role set. This may be a 
strong assumption, but it is important to be aware that Uzbekistani officials rarely, if 
ever, contradict their President’s public assertions.43  
. 
Inferring the roles of actors in the United States, Russia, Germany and Turkey 
                                               
43 Interview source (2009-2012). See Appendix IV for information regarding sources.  
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As concerns Washington, Moscow, Berlin and Ankara’s foreign policies, there are 
ample secondary sources available for determining their specific role sets (see 
introduction for why those particular actors were selected). So, inferring roles for these 
actors is less complex than for Uzbekistan. Subsequently, in order to contextualize the 
stories, each narrative is preceded by a brief introduction on the key roles of those 
countries. These, then, shall be used to emplot their actions toward Uzbekistani 
leadership.  
 
Inferring Uzbekistan’s roles: circularity and spoken word as the unit of analysis 
 
Inferring roles for Tashkent can be a conundrum, simply because it is a twenty year old 
independent Republic that only very recently started interacting in the international 
public sphere.44 As the foregoing analysis demonstrated, the relationship between roles 
and action is reciprocal. Roles are derived from action, but the former provides 
meaning to the latter. Therefore, a simple way of both inferring and applying roles 
would be to observe President Karimov’s speech acts, infer his roles and then emplot 
the narrative diachronically. This is the actual approach that is adopted, even though 
some might categorize it as circular (Muller 2011: 57; Le Prestre 1997a: 12). 
Circularity, in any case, need not be a problem and is actually welcomed. Much 
like the reading of a text, roles and actions within a narrative are part of a general 
hermeneutical circle: ‘the reconstruction of a text as whole necessarily has a circular 
character, in the sense that the presupposition of a certain kind of whole is implied in 
the recognition of the parts. And reciprocally, it is in construing the details that we 
construe the whole’ (Ricoeur 1981: 211). So, roles are indeed inferred from actions, 
which reciprocally predicate actions within the whole narrative. Harnisch (2012: 58-
62), for example, applies role theory to three case studies but does not specify how the 
roles were obtained. Consequently, action and roles are more or less conflated 
throughout his depiction, whereby roles name action and vice-versa. This, however, is 
perfectly acceptable herein since the aim is not to make sense of Humean causality or 
ontological priority; the goal is simply to deliver meaning to a whole process of 
interaction (Ricoeur’s understanding – see above).  
That said, the object of analysis is solely President Karimov’s spoken word 
(speeches, interviews and remarks at conferences), since it is both directed toward a 
public sphere, and the way in which actors justify and position themselves in relation to 
                                               
44 Scholarship on Uzbekistani foreign policy exists, even though, this thesis disagrees with a number of 
assumptions regarding the study of Uzbekistan’s international relations (see Chapter I). 
 51
others (see discussion above). So even if legislation or other actions are useful for 
determining roles, they would still have been justified and deliberated by spoken word. 
It is also important to mention that unlike some scholars who focus just on foreign 
policy statements (e.g. Holsti 1970, Wish 1980, LePrestre et al. 1997), this inquiry 
assumes that, despite the differences existing between domestic and international 
politics, leadership has to avoid role contestation within both spheres. So, any type of 
statement may be important for role inference. 
 
Rhetoric and intra-role coherence: evaluating self-reliance 
 
To infer roles, it is necessary to delve into how the themes of statements are combined 
and interrelated. In fact ‘it is only as bundles that these relations can be put to use and 
combined so as to produce a meaning’ (Levi-Strauss 1955: 431). The paragraphs in each 
speech are the unit of analysis, all of which are labelled by a theme or topic, based on 
how it compares to the speech as a whole. In those cases in which scripts are not 
divided into paragraphs, the speech is split into units according to its main themes. 
 Ascertaining themes allows for finding categories of ideas in President 
Karimov’s speeches and overall rhetoric. Thereafter, to grasp the meaning of the 
paragraphs and their importance to the speech as a whole, instances of ‘strategic action’ 
are sought for. ‘Strategic action’ is essentially action ‘oriented toward a goal but not 
necessarily planned to detail or strictly instrumentalist’ (Wodak et al. 2009: 32). 
.According to Ruth Wodak et al. (2009: 33), there are six cases of ‘strategic action’: 
- Constructive strategies, in which leadership promotes a certain kind of national 
identity;  
- Strategies of justification in which leadership legitimates its past actions for a 
common national perception that has been tainted;  
- Strategies of transformation, which transform aspects of identity into another 
conceptualized form;  
- Dismantling or destructive strategies, which seek to disentangle an existing 
construct; 
- Strategies of sameness, which create a temporal or spatial homogeneity; 
- Strategies of difference (dissimilation), seeking to create temporal or spatial 
heterogeneity. 
Based on these strategies, it is possible to observe how Uzbekistani leadership 
set forth its epistemology and ontogeny in the public sphere, i.e. the rules for 
ascertaining truth and declaring the objects about which it is possible and meaningful 
to speak (Sapsford 2006: 262). This allows for constructing broad ‘repertoires’ based 
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on the themes that appear to be consistent throughout President Karimov’s speeches 
(Ibid: 267), from which roles are inferred. Once roles are classified, the overall 
coherence of the role set is evaluated according to role ambiguity, malintegration, 
discontinuity and overload so as to locate the potential for intra-role conflict. 
The speeches, transcripts and statements made by President Karimov from 1989 
to 2010 were obtained from the Nexis database and are all indicated in Appendix I.  It 
is important to bear in mind that the statements are all translations into English, which 
is a suitable way of standardizing them into distinct repertoires. In fact, it is only by 
assuming first that translating themes is possible that one can then conceive of public 
interaction between actors speaking different languages. So, it is worth recalling that 
the purpose herein is not to focus on specific meanings or linguistic cohesion - the 
formal links between clauses and sentences (Nunan 1993: 21) –, rather to look into how 
themes delivered publicly can be grouped into roles, and then to evaluate whether they 
follow the general premises of self-reliance as an English language typology. Evidently, 
public manifestations are not private political discussions, where special expressions, 
metaphors and inside jokes tend to be more predominant. Consequently, their 
translation, while not revealing the complexity behind different meanings, makes 





A chronological approach divided into five periods is adopted to analyze President 
Karimov’s spoken word: 1989-1993, 1994-2001, 2002-2005, 2006-2008 and 2009-
2010. The reason for breaking down the analysis into different periods is twofold: on 
one hand, it facilitates the task of analyzing large amounts of material; on the other 
hand, it allows for evaluating the possibility of radical changes in rhetoric, which might 
corroborate whether alignment and/or orientation shifts actually occurred as some 
scholars proposed (see literature review of chapter 1). 
The first period contains statements made by Islom Karimov prior to 
Uzbekistan’s independence. He became Secretary of the Uzbekistan’s Communist Party 
in 1989 - the highest political position in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (UzSSR). 
Therefore, references to that period in time are useful to indicate how he positioned 
himself in the public sphere. That period ends in 1993, which is the year Uzbekistani 
authorities were forced to issue their own currency and formally disentangle 
themselves from Russia (Hale 1994). Therefore, the time span of 1989 to 1993 seems to 
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be a suitable time period for capturing the public meaning of President Karimov’s first 
acts.  
Spechler and Spechler (2009: 354) then consider the 1991 to 1999 and the 1999 
to 2003/2005 time periods as the occasions Tashkent delinked from Moscow and 
relied on Washington. Alternatively, this thesis proposes a slightly different time span: 
the first extending from 1993 to 2001 and the second from 2002 to 2005. The latter 
corresponds to the so called rise and fall of Washington’s influence over Tashkent, 
starting from establishment of the Karshi-Khanabad (K-2) base in 2002 and ending in 
demobilization after the Andijan crisis of 2005. According to some authors, after 
American ascendance, Uzbekistani leadership sought to re-link itself with Russia until 
2008 (see literature review in Chapter 1).  After this brief pro-Russian period, President 
Karimov authorized NATO’s Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to cross through 
Uzbekistan in 2008 and so rapprochement with Washington soon became more visible. 
These time intervals correspond, more or less, to the periods in which Uzbekistani 
leadership altered its supposed alignments.  
 
Content analysis: purpose, coding and reliability 
 
Content analysis might also reveal some interesting points and is subjective, much like 
discourse analysis, since it relies on a series of presuppositions regarding the choice of 
categories and coding (LePrestre 1997: 12). Notwithstanding the limitations, content 
analysis, based on the frequency count of written works, speeches and interviews of 
leadership, is a suitable approach for obtaining information (Brecher et al 1969: 89). 
More specifically, it offers an alternative take on the exogenous content of leadership’s 
speeches and how they evolved over time (LePrestre 1997: 11). Hence, content analysis 
can signal situations of changes in roles, which are crucial for emplotting the narrative. 
It is just used for description and not for unravelling meanings (Kesby 2009: 11).  
A systematic methodology for classifying roles was presented by Naomi Wish 
(1980) based on Michael Brecher’s et al. (1969) complex foreign policy analysis 
framework. According to Wish (1980) role conception may be divided into thee key 
variables: Status, Motivational Orientation and Substantive Issue-areas. Status refers 
to the capabilities leadership attributes greater absolute advantage. Motivational 
Orientation reveals the general attitude toward political and international affairs. 
Substantial Issue-area indicates which themes were discussed. The categories which 
constitute each of these variables are indicated below on table 1 and it is important to 
mention that substantial issue-areas are not mutually exclusive. For example, it is 
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perfectly possible for President Karimov to articulate in each paragraph issues 
connected to both economics and security. 
 
 Table 1: Role Conception 
-Status 
a) Capabilities To which endowments does leadership attach greater absolute 
advantage, such as human resources, natural resources or economical 
system, military and  local culture. 
b) Position toward Others How does leadership perceive its relative position toward other 
entities, i.e. is it a lesser partner, an equal one, or a superior one. 
- Motivational Orientation 
 
c) Wish to Expand Leadership wishes or not to expand into the international arena. 
d) Competitive/Cooperative motivations If leadership wishes to expand into the international arena 
competitively or cooperatively.  
e) The amount of change proposed The amount of change leadership wishes to see in the domestic and 
international arenas. 
- Substantive Issue-areas 
f) Economic Discussion on economic resources, growth, development, reform and 
macroeconomic  data. 
g) Security Discussion of military issues or national security threats 
h) Other Discussion of issues not related to economics or security, such as 
culture, history, environment, justice and education 
i), j) Political i) Promotion or j) inhibition of political or ideological principles 
related to democracy, constitutions, authoritarianism, elections, rule 
of law, governmental officials, parties and the role of the state 
k), l) Universal Values k) Promotion or l) inhibition of issues related to racial harmony, 
universal justice and  human rights  
m) Unilateral Oriented Issues related to international politics emphasizing own interests, 
zero-sum games, nationalism and pursuit of own goals. 
n) Multilateral or Integration Oriented Issues related to international politics emphasizing the need for 
multi-lateral approaches, bi-lateral cooperation and deeper 
engagement. 
 
Source: Wish (1980: 538-540)  
 
The paragraphs of each speech are the unit of analysis and detailed information 
on both the coding procedures for each of the role conception variables is available in 
the Appendix II. Lastly, content analysis should guarantee reliability, i.e. yield the same 
results from identical phenomena regardless of the circumstances of application 
(Krippendorff 1980: 129-130). In order to allow for minimum reliability, an inquiry 
should be reproducible, that is allow for the investigatory processes to be repeated 
using different coders (Ibid: 131-132). Owing to time and budgetary limitations, it is not 
possible to duplicate procedures by applying different coders, but the results of content 
the analysis are all indicated in Appendix III. 
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III. Inferring roles and role cohesion from 1989 to 2010 
 
 
Following the methodology of Chapter II, bundles of thematic relationships were 
inferred by focusing on the instances of strategic action employed by President 
Karimov from 1989 to 2010. This type of rhetorical analysis revealed three different 
group-types of repertoires related to technocracy, cultural authenticity and prestige, 
from which fifteen consistent roles were then located (the findings are summarized in 
table 2 of section III.6 of this Chapter). 
 The inferences have a number of interesting implications, showing that a 
relatively coherent public rhetoric was employed by President Karimov from the start. 
This suggests then that the public orientation did not shift (on definitions of orientation 
see Chapter I). In fact, self-reliance seems to be a suitable way of capturing President 
Karimov’s overall role set from 1989 to 2010, given his persistent call for defending 
international equality and seeking genuine independence.  
On the other hand, the discussion below does show that strategic actions were 
fluid. The rhetoric emanating from Uzbekistan’s leader was dynamic and actually far 
from following a univocal trend. President Karimov gradually shifted his emphasis, 
particularly around the period of the Andijan crisis, decreasing technocratic rhetoric 
and concentrating on authenticity.45 For this reason, any narrative on Uzbekistani 
relations cannot ignore the effects of both the Andijan crisis and the Colour revolutions 
on Mr Karimov’s rhetoric, particularly on how these occurrences revealed a degree of 
growing intra-role conflict within the relatively stable role set. This means then that the 
relative consistency of the two central roles (seeker of genuine independence and 
defender of equality) is not a sign of a wholly stable political rhetoric. While President 
Karimov was able to face difficult situations without seeming entirely inconsistent, he 
still had to adapt to a number of discontinuities that gradually revealed role 
malintegration (see Chapter II for the main concepts of role theory). 
 To show how the roles subsume the key strategic actions of President Karimov, 
sections one (III.1) through five (III.5) describe the repertoires found for each period of 
analysis. Lastly, section six (IV.6) deliberates on the pivotal roles, their overall 
coherence, cases of intra-role conflict and how self-reliance seems to capture the 
essence of President Karimov’s role set. 
 
III.1. Repertoires from 1989 to 1993 
                                               
45 Nick Megoran (2008: 26) provides a detailed description of how Uzbekistan’s leader underlined 
national sources to development as opposed to universal scientific laws, particularly after the 2005 
Andijan crisis. His work, and Sarah Kendizor’s (2007) article on local poetry, are excellent descriptions 
of Uzbekistani discourses and the impact of the Andijan crisis on domestic politics. 
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Three general repertoires were inferred for the 1989-1993 period: (1) control of 
economic development for the sake of stability; (2) genuine independence and pursuit 
of international relations on an equal basis; (3) defending the image and culture of the 
Uzbeks. These three interconnected themes allow for inferring ten roles: 
- Expert on economic issues; 
- Protector of stability;  
- Protector of Uzbekistan’s great image; 
- Defender of Uzbekistan’s international equality; 
- Seeker of genuine independence; 
- Technocratic  leader;  
- Developer of Uzbekistan’s economic future;  
- Undisputed authority; 
- Definer of Uzbek authenticity;  
- Voice for a de-ideologized transition. 
 
Control of economic development for the sake of stability 
 
Economics was by far the most referenced issue-area during the period (see Appendix 
III for a frequency count). More importantly, though, it was built as an incontestable 
concern, to the point that the public discussion of any other subject-area was rendered 
futile. In fact, no other statement during Uzbekistan’s rise to independence summarizes 
the preponderance of economics as well as President Karimov’s slogan ‘the priority of 
economics over politics must be assured.’46  
Andrew March (2003) argues that President Karimov sought to establish a ‘pre-
political consensus’ to ensure legitimacy. In other words he imposed an ontogeny 
whereby gradual economic development was constructed to be both incontestable and 
unavoidable.47 Scholarship has also emphasized Mr Karimov’s job in Gosplan as a 
factor in shaping his predominantly economical worldview (Lewis 2008; Bohr 1998; 
Carlisle 1995a,b). His background and experience in the area certainly led him to 
become Minister of Finance of the Uzbek SSR in 1986. His term in office was short 
                                               
46 See for example ‘Uzbekistan; Karimov defends his policies against accusations of strong-arm tactics’ 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 June 1993. 
47 March (2003: 317) refers to President Karimov’s book dedicated to economic reform (Uzbekistan—
‘sobstvennaya model’ perekhoda na rynochnyye otnosheniya; Uzbekistan - its own model of transition to 
market relations), citing five principles for development: (1) economics has priority over politics; (2) the 
state is the main reformer; (3) all reform must occur under the rule of law; (4) the state underlines the 
importance of strong social protection; (5) the transformation to a market economy must be thought out 
and gradual. 
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lived, however, given that in that same year, the notorious ‘Cotton’ or ‘Uzbek Affair’ 
reached a new height. Mr Rafiq Nishonov was made the new Secretary General of the 
Communist Party of the Uzbek SSR (CPUzSSR) with the task of tackling corruption 
(Carlisle 1995b: 195; Critchlow 1990). Islom Karimov, being connected to the previous 
establishment, was relocated to the governorship of the Qashqardaryo region,48 which 
turned out to be another short-lived tenure.  
After the violent conflicts in the Ferghana Valley between Uzbeks and 
Meshketian Turks, Moscow apparently mitigated its confrontational attitude and 
decided to replace Mr Nishonov quickly. Islom Karimov was chosen, becoming General 
Secretary of the Communist party of the Uzbek SSR on June 23 1989. Naturally, his 
nomination to the most powerful position in the Soviet Republic showed that Moscow 
was concerned with how rapid reform was negatively affecting the region. It was thus a 
sign that perhaps the pace of change had to decrease in order to assuage local 
powerbrokers.49  
Once in office, Secretary General Karimov conveyed a number of self-lauding 
slogans to the public, praising his own credentials as an experienced economist. When 
discussing the country’s agricultural problems, he evinced his own skills and insight 
with clear-cut remarks: ‘for me as an economist this [agricultural reform] is clear.’50 
Moreover, he strategically differentiated himself from rival reformist appeals by 
emphasizing that politicians should be aware of economics: ‘I personally find it hard to 
deal with politicians who fail to consider the economic consequences of each step they 
take.’51  
Indeed, while he consolidated his leadership, he applied economicist rhetoric to 
almost all situations in the surrounding political landscape. For instance, nearly two 
years after the violent crisis in the Ferghana Valley, the now President Karimov 
highlighted that the root cause had been social-economical instability,52 thereby fitting 
nicely with the analogies and slogans he was using at the time: ‘each person is now 
viewing the situation [the political crisis] through a prism of wellbeing [sic]. Uzbeks 
                                               
48 It is important to note that Rafiq Nishonov had already been implicated in a controversial conspiracy to 
remove Sharof Rashidov from power in 1969  - the former patron of Islom Karimov’s political network 
and the Secretary General of the Communist party of the Uzbek SSR, from 1959 to 1983 (Allworth 1990: 
304-305; Vaisman 1995: 115-116). 
49 Many Uzbekistani politicians and businessmen had their status and financial livelihood menaced by 
Secretary Gorbachev’s reformist policies (Vaisman 1995: 196). Mr Karimov was a member of those elites 
and so his appointment signals a retreat from the transformative policies taken during the Perestroika 
period. 
50 ‘President of Uzbekistan interviewed’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 April 1991. 
51 ‘Uzbek President tells “Pravda” he is looking for cooperation, not aid’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 7 August 1993. 
52 ‘President of Uzbekistan interviewed’ op. cit. 
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have a saying: a hungry man hears music with his stomach.’53 This bit of popular 
wisdom was a response to the economic crisis in the region. Glasnost and Perestroika 
brought grave economic concerns to many former Soviet citizens, undermining the 
future of Soviet cohesion. Hence, Mr Karimov centred his focus on the immediate 
economic grievances and its effects on stability: ‘who will be swept away first and 
foremost when the population’s indignation at spiraling [sic] prices comes to a head, 
when the present shortage of food products grows even more acute?’ As he became 
President of independent Uzbekistan in December 1991, he adamantly differentiated 
himself from the ‘shock therapy’ policies of Yegor Gaidar, accusing him of perverting 
stability and of instigating problems, instead of solving them (see Chapter IV). 54  
President Karimov did also call for economic development and thus change, but 
only through careful supervision and control. In one instance he stated that ‘firmness, 
an authoritarian approach, if you wish, in realization of the chartered policy is needed 
in the transition period.’55 Obviously, this appeal is nothing other than a rejection of 
economic freedoms. What is also revealing about the example is that President 
Karimov apparently had no qualms in admitting publicly that Uzbekistan was 
endorsing authoritarianism, claiming that political oppositions are useless unless 
constructive: ‘an [constructive] opposition will defend not personal interests, but 
convictions, [and not] a policy and decisions which correspond to the interests of this 
or that party.’56 Even regarding the press, President Karimov had no inhibitions in 
showing his immense scepticism toward their liberties and biased opinions: ‘like it or 
not, there are no absolutely independent newspapers. No one will change my mind in 
this regard.’57  
In sum, during a backdrop of general reform in the Soviet Union, President 
Karimov built his career challenging the rising reformist trends. So, based on his 
strategies of construction and differentiation, it is possible to subsume this general 
repertoire under five roles: expert on economic issues; protector of stability; 
technocratic leader; developer of Uzbekistan’s economic future; undisputed authority; 
and voice for a de-ideological transition. 
 
Genuine independence and pursuit of international relations on an equal basis 
 
                                               
53 ‘Speaking of borders means breaking up Central Asia’ Official Kremlin News Broadcast, 15 May 1992. 
Italics added. 
54 For President Karimov’s views on Yegor Gaidar and Russia’s shock therapy, see: ‘Speaking of Borders 
Means Breaking up Central Asia’, op. cit. 
55 ‘Uzbekistan; Karimov defends his policies…’ op. cit. 
56 ‘Interview with Uzbek President’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 June 1991. 
57 Ibid. 
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In September 1992, President Karimov celebrated the one year anniversary of 
independence with a huge festival, where he proclaimed the beginning of Uzbekistan’s 
greatness: ‘one year of independence is only the beginning of a great path. Our life 
itself, the passing events, are confirming the correctness of the path taken by us, the 
tasks we have placed ahead of us [sic]. We are building the foundations and pillars of an 
independent Uzbek state.’58 There is nothing particularly strange about a politician 
promoting the future of his state. What is interesting about the latter statement is that 
Uzbekistan was already independent at the time. So why mention the ‘pillars of an 
independent Uzbek state’ and not just the ‘pillars of an Uzbek state’? This apparent 
tautology is not random and by the end of the speech it makes perfect sense: ‘the aim of 
our policy consists in a genuinely independent Uzbekistan.’59  
What is then the difference between independence and genuine 
independence?60 As is made clear in a number of statements by President Karimov, 
genuine independence seems to be more than just formally recognized independence. It 
calls, instead, for disentanglement from dependence: ‘we [the Uzbek people] must in 
our own territory and in external political and economic relations be self-reliant and 
tackle all issues solely in the interests of our people.’61 Furthermore, he stated in 1993 
that ‘as a representative of Uzbekistan I want to say that we have no nostalgia [for the 
Soviet Union]. We will not return to the past. For us the only way is forward- only 
forward.’62 This last point is somewhat ironic because, before and immediately after 
independence, President Karimov had been in favour of continuing with a Soviet 
Union-like system (a point that is more evident in Chapter IV). Nevertheless, once 
becoming independent, Mr Karimov was less constrained in lambasting against the 
region’s Soviet past. Uzbekistan’s President remonstrated against the fact that Moscow 
had implemented a limited model of development for Uzbekistan, based almost 
                                               
58 ‘Karimov addresses the Republic on Independence Day’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 
September  1992. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Even though the intricate meanings within the Uzbek language are not the concern herein (see Chapter 
II), Uzbek lexicology offers an explanation, given that there are two words commonly used for 
independence: Mustaqillik and Istiqlol. According to a popular dictionary available in contemporary 
Uzbekistan: ‘it is possible to attain full independence after having carried out the whole meaning of 
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exclusively on agriculture and cotton exploitation. Still, he was careful in not delinking 
the country from the Soviet Union and Russia, even though he didn’t hesitate in 
underlining his wish for a particular type of independence: ‘Uzbekistan links its future 
to a union federation, but this federation must be such that we must see our own 
interest and see those matters we delegate to the union will definitely be tackled.’63 As 
the future of the Soviet Union was being negotiated, Uzbekistan’s leader demonstrated 
that he was hoping for a reformed and less centralized Soviet federation and so 
consistently underlined Leninist principles of self-determination - a trend that, at the 
time, was otherwise commonplace in the Soviet Union.64  
Uzbekistani leadership also insisted on not being regarded as a lesser partner – 
a notion that soon became associated with the idea of international equality and 
disentanglement. Equality in the international public sphere was related to realpolitik 
and President Karimov’s public views regarding relative gains.65 In one interview he 
stated that: ‘if you look at it through the prism of imperial thinking, we are happy that it 
[Russia] is growing weaker. The principle which we uphold is full independence and 
sovereignty of each state.’ President Karimov, notwithstanding, assures his audience 
that he does not fully endorse weakening Russia, so long as the relationship is equal: ‘I 
am against weakening relations [with Russia]. We are bound to stay with Russia in 
many complex situations which we expect to encounter on the road to independence 
(…) these relations must be equal in all respects.’ However, in other circumstances, 
President Karimov made it clear that he was everything but naïve regarding the so-
called ‘imperial way of thinking’ of his potential rivals: ‘no matter how much this treaty 
[the CIS Military Treaty] of the four republics is disguised, it is nothing other than an 
attempt of the stronger, potentially strong republics to dictate their conditions to 
others.’66 It would thus seem that the only way to solve the selfish urges of more 
powerful states would be to guarantee that all remain on equal footing.  
The issue of defending equality and seeking genuine independence is connected 
to non-interference and maintaining the status quo in Central Asia. This became 
especially clear when conflict escalated in Tajikistan: ‘my view on this [on maintaining 
borders intact] is unequivocal. Uzbeks live there [in Tajikistan]. We will be with them, 
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body and soul, we will protect them, but Uzbeks now reside within Tajikistan and are 
citizens of Tajikistan. They must obey its laws and Constitution.’67  
It is also worth mentioning that President Karimov did give special prominence 
to obtaining international investment and reaching out to other partners. Evidently, 
these types of appeals did not match well with his other public demonstrations 
concerning dependency and equality, but he praised, for example, the fact that in the 
1920s and 1930s many young people from Uzbekistan went to Germany to study. 68 Yet, 
despite evincing some good-will, he also placed strict conditions on international 
engagement: ‘I would have wanted the interest shown in the republic to have been 
global so that contacts are solid and de-ideologized.’69 The reference to ‘de-ideologized’ 
should be read carefully and was in fact another key slogan. As Mr Karimov’s appeals 
for technocratic authoritarianism became more predominant, he went as far to argue 
that politics or issues not directly related to economic growth were merely ideological, 
portraying himself, either consciously or unconsciously, as a de-ideologized figure. 
Consequently, the importance given to equal and non-dependent economic relations 
allows for inferring three roles: defender of Uzbekistan’s equality; seeker of genuine 
independence; and de-ideologized voice for transition.  
  
Defending the image of the Uzbek people and inculcating authentic spirituality  
 
The notion of equality is also tied with defending the international image of Uzbekistan. 
During the period, President Karimov remonstrated against a number of portrayals 
made by foreign journalists, especially those from Russia, whom he accused of 
defaming Uzbeks. For example, he proclaimed in 1989 that ‘whoever they may be, to 
whichever nation they may belong, [they] must and will be subjected to severe 
punishment so that no one will ever again think of casting a shadow over the good 
name of the Uzbek People, of whom genuine internationalism, good will, goodness of 
heart and hospitality are characteristic traits.’70  
Mr Karimov also highlighted that the Uzbeks had been historically exploited 
and that their warm hospitality had been distorted by external forces.71 In some cases, 
he was quick to underline how the Soviet Union had contributed to repressing Uzbek 
culture, given that ‘everything was banned: ‘religion was persecuted, mosques closed 
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down, everything that was national, deeply national, was suppressed.’72 As an 
alternative, he argued in 1991 that the Uzbeks had a new chance for building a great 
future: ‘currently in the republic the national arts and crafts are being actively 
recreated, in one word, overcoming the aftermath of decades and the artificially 
cultivated theory that we had entered socialism bypassing capitalism [sic].’73  
Furthermore, he lauded openly Uzbekistan’s so-called ancestors. In 1992 he 
opened the anniversary of independence speech with a strong allusion to Uzbekistan’s 
contribution to culture: ‘the current festival will reflect the great achievements of our 
forefathers such as Imam Bukhari, [word indistinct] Termezi, Akhmet Yasavi, Amir 
Temur, Alisher Navoi and many other dozens of our forefathers.’74 So, it would seem 
then that the emphasis given to cultural authenticity during the period can be 
subsumed under two roles: protector of Uzbekistan’s great image; and definer of 
Uzbek authenticity.  
 
III.2. Repertoires from 1994 to 2001 
 
President Karimov’s repertoires for the previous period called for control of economic 
development for the sake of stability. However, from 1994 to 2001, conflicts in Central 
Asia induced a slight change to the theme. As Tashkent’s experience with independence 
progressed, the concept of Control was better defined and a broader notion related to 
preserving security was adopted publicly. However, the content remained more or less 
the same, as shown below.  
Three general themes persevered: (1) preservation of security for the sake of 
controlling development and stability; (2) genuine independence and pursuit of 
international relations on an equal basis; (3) defending the image of the Uzbek people 
and inculcating authentic spirituality. The way in which President Karimov continued 
justifying these repertoires means that no significant alterations were found in the roles 
discussed above. Instead, four additional roles were inferred:  
- Voice for a non-militaristic Central Asia; 
- Mercantilist entrepreneur; 
- Bridge to joining other markets; 
- Fomenter of defence autonomy in Central Asia. 
 
Preservation of security for the sake of economic development and stability 
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President Karimov expanded the concept of economic stability by juxtaposing it to 
border security. By publicly emphasizing control and security, President Karimov was 
able to construct and justify the need for safety. In August 1999, he stated during a 
Parliamentary Session that ‘our principal strategic goal remains unchanged, the same. 
It is to build a free and democratic state based on a market economy and to lay firm 
foundations for a civil society. Simply speaking, it is to achieve the high living standards 
and quality of the developed countries without blindly copying their model of 
development and experience.’75 This aim did not differ from the conclusions already 
surmised, but in other situations President Karimov conditioned freedom to a human 
need for peace: ‘What do human beings want? They want freedom. What do human 
beings want? They want to see happy lives for their children. They want their beliefs to 
come true. It is a natural thing, no matter what their nationality. That is why I should 
say that it has become like a disease to understand and perceive that peace has become 
an ordinary thing or rule of our everyday lives, as if peace has fallen from the sky, from 
the moon without difficulties.’76 The statesman has to ensure that the country’s borders 
are impervious to any kind of attack: ‘since today we want to build a free, stable and 
prosperous life, the most vital guarantee is to ensure the security of our country and 
inviolability of our borders.’77 Border security is related to perceived foreign threats, 
whilst controlling stability is a means of triggering economic growth,78 and so debating 
or even doubting the expert analysis of Uzbekistan’s leader is sidelined, as his rhetoric 
carves a pre-political consensus that cannot be disputed.79 Accordingly, he continued 
propounding the following supposedly incontestable priorities: ‘the first is security. The 
second is humanitarian issues [sic], that is the issues concerning a human being, and 
creating humane conditions [sic]. The third issue is economy. The fourth issue is 
ecological matters.’80 By now, President Karimov begins to somewhat contradict 
himself, since he had previously mentioned the priority of economics over politics (see 
discussion above). 
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Preserving security is compatible with very gradual reform and so in 1994 he 
persisted with the usual slogan: ‘in Uzbekistan we operate in accordance with the 
popular saying: “Don’t destroy your old home before you have built a new one.” In 
other words we have taken the constructive path rather than destroying what we had 
created.’81 Furthermore, the task of maintaining security is argued to be a sort of 
technocratic undertaking, i.e. de-ideologized and thus not contestable: ‘let nobody seek 
any sort of politics here. There is the only one policy here: security, security and again 
the security and tranquillity of those people who live in our land (…) That is why 
everyone is bound to create all necessary conditions to ensure that our borders are 
inviolable.’82 As previously analyzed, ideologies are ‘strategically destroyed’ as 
economics is set to be superior to politics.83 Additionally, he reinforced his supposedly 
unbiased credentials by declaring that even when the communist Uzbek SSR existed he 
was not ideological: ‘incidentally, I myself did not attend party school.’84  
Many of these rhetorical repertoires are a public response to the turbulent 
1990s context, particularly to the crises in the Caucasus and, more importantly, to the 
civil wars in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. As concerns the Caucasus, President Karimov 
showed how stability was put into question when ideology permeated politics: ‘in 1989-
1990 there was a danger in Uzbekistan that incompetent people would come to power 
on the crest of the democratic wave, as happened in the Caucasus.’85 President Karimov 
was referring to the former Presidents of Azerbaijan and Georgia, Abülfez Elçibey and 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The former was a poet and the latter a philosopher and so both 
were considered unsuitable for the type of technical management needed in a 
statesman.  
Security also became the pervasive topic once the war in Tajikistan escalated, as 
President Karimov linked the violence in Dushanbe to undesirable instability: ‘go and 
see the situation in Tajikistan, show on the TV how people live there, shooting in the 
streets, killing people in the entrances of buildings, innocent people are being killed (…) 
we have become indifferent to some extent. So bad and evil things are happening 
around us, one can see instability everywhere.’86  
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Beyond acute political quarrels and military interventions,87 President Karimov 
showed an intense dislike for Mirzo Ziyo, the Tajik Minister of Emergency Situations, 
who had been a member of United Tajik Opposition (UTO). Mr  Ziyo was connected to 
Juma Namangoniy and Tohir Yo’ldosh - the leaders of the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU), who had fled from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan before eventually 
moving to Afghanistan (Akbarzadeh 2005: 41; Jonson 2006: 113).88 
 The IMU’s perceived threat was systematically underlined by President 
Karimov. He portrayed the organization as extremist; responsible for the December 
1997 killing of security officials; and for orchestrating the February 1999 terrorist 
attacks in Tashkent. While those responsible for the latter hostilities remain in 
dispute,89 the IMU did lead two incursions onto Uzbekistan’s border in the summers of 
1999 and 2000. For that reason, Chechnya and Afghanistan were gradually portrayed 
by CIS leadership as harbours of terrorism and a menace to the world at large.  As a 
matter of fact, the prominent discourses of Islamic terror - so prevalent in the United 
States and Europe after the 11 September attacks - were already, in the 1990s, a key 
feature of President Karimov’s rhetoric: ‘they are not the representatives of a certain 
country or a party or movement. These are criminals who have committed various 
crimes in their countries and are at present hiding from punishment. They speak 
various languages - Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik, Afghan and even foreign languages. Their 
aims are terrorism, taking hostages, violence, encroachment upon the constitutional 
system of states.’90  Many of these terrorists were described as jealous of Russia and 
Uzbekistan’s stable regimes91 and also products of the situation in Afghanistan: ‘we 
have genuine information that these centres are based in Afghanistan. Today we have 
grounds to state that there are similar centres in Pakistan, and we know their 
whereabouts.’92  
In spite of President Karimov’s public concerns over the conflicts in Afghanistan 
and Tajikistan, they were not the only targets of his rhetorical attacks, since Russia too 
was constructed as untrustworthy. For example, President Karimov mentioned that 
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altercations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were instigated by Russian secret 
services93 and that Moscow had selfish goals for Central Asia: ‘we must openly 
acknowledge Russia's presence in the Central Asian region and also Russian interests in 
the Central Asian region, and not to play any games here. Yes, Russia had its interests, 
has and will have them in this region.’94  Overall, this friction between Tashkent and 
Moscow is explained in greater detail in Chapter IV.  
Returning again to border security, President Karimov continued arguing for 
stability and connecting it to national independence: ‘if I am an independent state, if I 
have declared before my own people that we are independent, if we are masters of our 
fate and if our future is in our hands, then why should our borders be protected by 
foreign forces? What will the forces protecting the borders demand?’95 Undoubtedly, 
protecting borders without recourse to external assistance tied nicely with the concept 
of genuine independence. For that reason, Mr Karimov continued propounding the 
roles described above, although he was more adamant about defence autonomy for the 
whole region. All in all, this public concern can be reduced to the role of fomenter of 
defence autonomy in Central Asia. 
 
Genuine independence and pursuit of international relations on an equal basis 
 
President Karimov continued calling for respect of sovereignty, equality and 
independence from supra-national organizations. More than once he argued that: ‘I 
would like to reaffirm that Uzbekistan does not interfere in other states’ internal affairs, 
that it is for the development of international cooperation, that it wants to build 
partnership with other countries on an equal footing [sic] and that it is for settling all 
sorts of conflicts or disputes only through peaceful political and lawful means.’96  
An issue-area that increasingly became connected to the topic of sovereignty 
was President Karimov’s rejection of any military blocs such as NATO or the Collective 
Security Treaty’s Rapid Response program: ‘Uzbekistan does not join and will not join 
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any military and political blocs. This is against the common goals and tasks that are 
effectively enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan. We do not want 
old times returned again.’97 He further endorsed non-militarism as he voiced the need 
to avoid expansionism and aggression: ‘it should be noted that the defence doctrine 
outlined by the republican leadership is purely defensive in nature and displays the 
peaceful policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan.’98 
 It is clear that many of these interpretations of sovereignty and non-militarism 
correlate with seeking genuine independence and defending equality, given that Mr 
Karimov continued emphasizing the importance of being treated equally by whomever 
he engaged with. For example, during a CIS summit he stated that ‘relations between 
the CIS countries should be built on the basis of equality and these relations should be 
mutually profitable (… ) this means that one big country should not rule over other 
countries.’99 The last part of this statement seems clearly aimed at Moscow. In other 
circumstances, however, President Karimov was careful in not disdaining Eurasia’s 
largest country by admitting that Russia was a partner, so long as equality was 
preserved: ‘our bilateral treaty with Russia has been and remains effective. We have 
been friends and will maintain friendship henceforth. But I wish Russia to see 
Uzbekistan as an equal partner.’100  
As a contrast to Russia, President Karimov did show some enthusiasm for 
integration with Central Asian Republics, 101 by appealing briefly in the mid-1990s to 
Turkestan being ‘Our Common Home’.102 Still, this very vague ambition of a ‘Turkestan’ 
somewhat contradicted his more unilateral stance. Equality was in fact the consistent 
slogan emanating from President Karimov’s rhetoric and ‘Turkestan’ was barely if ever 
publicly mentioned by the turn of the century. Indeed, besides condemning the CIS, he 
also showed scepticism toward the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO): 
‘another thing which does not suit us and which we have always protested against is 
that trade and economic issues have become secondary issues and the organization 
ECO is mainly being used for political ends (...) The countries which feel themselves 
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big, above all, countries like Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, are trying to exert their 
influence as much as possible on other member countries.’103  
Integration therefore was not a key public concern, even though President 
Karimov conceded that the CIS was necessary for the sake of economics: ‘not a single 
state in the Commonwealth of Independent States will be able to achieve genuine 
independence on its own, without economic cooperation.’104 Even regarding economics, 
though, he consigned strict conditions to such relations, reminiscent of classic 
mercantilism: ‘I said this about a thousand times, and I would like to repeat it again: a 
country has a future, is able to achieve progress and positive results and get stronger 
only if it earns more money in foreign currency than it spends buying things, that is, if 
exports exceed imports.’105  
Not all though were sceptical retorts, as President Karimov did actually show 
interest in increasing economic links with the West, especially with the United States: ‘I 
would like to make an official statement to the effect that Uzbekistan is interested in 
seeing our relations with the United States strengthened and grow. We are also 
interested in seeing American business, and American capital, take its rightful place in 
the Uzbekistani market.’106 This clear-cut appraisal was in part related to the wish to 
obtain technology and thus become a ‘civilized country’: ‘I want to (…) take advantage 
of this opportunity to let you all know that [we intend to] (…) orient ourselves to 
modern technology.’107 However, it is important to be aware that he did restrict 
expanding contacts with the West. Trade was not to be totally open and by the late 
1990s he deemed imports to be detrimental to the economy: ‘we, above all, should fill 
our market with domestically produced goods, instead of importing them. It is 
necessary to produce what we do not have and, if there are opportunities inside the 
country, we should produce the goods which we are importing now.’108  
Lastly, it is relevant to mention President Karimov’s public concerns over 
transportation links. The topic is not entirely associated with equality; yet it slightly 
contradicted his otherwise autarkic outbursts. In 1999, Mr Karimov confessed publicly 
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to his Ukrainian counterpart that he very much envied Ukraine’s access to the sea109 
and therefore showed some concern for linking his country to organizations like GUAM 
(this topic will be better discussed in Chapter V): ‘GUAM is an organization of states 
around the Black Sea. From the point of view of communications and routes we are 
eager to reach that region and the world market in general. Our joining GUAM will help 
us greatly in achieving that our goal.’110  
Overall, President Karimov continued calling for a cautious type of engagement, 
focused mainly on relative gains and economic mercantilism. To a degree, he was also 
enthusiastic about building links with other countries in order to fulfil his ambitious 
‘civilized’ programme for domestic development, thereby propounding three more 
roles: voice for a non-militaristic Central Asia; mercantilist entrepreneur; and bridge 
to joining other markets. 
 
Defending the image of the Uzbek people and inculcating authentic spirituality 
 
The repertoire of defending the image of the Uzbek people and inculcating authentic 
spirituality became more prominent in the late 1990s, as President Karimov held 
himself responsible for safeguarding the traditions of Uzbekistan and its image abroad: 
‘I think much about preserving the dignity of the Uzbek people, the Uzbek nation and 
keeping that dignity high, never bowing to anyone and carrying out an independent 
policy is my major duty as a leader, I think [sic].’111 This call for prestige seems to have 
been partially aimed against Russian assertiveness, especially its pan-slavic 
manifestations: ‘all these games around a so-called union of Belarus, Russia and 
Yugoslavia: everyone, even the uninitiated, has no difficulty in understanding that Mr 
Slobodan Milosevic is playing his own game.’112  
It seems obvious though that the appeals to fomenting culture and spirituality 
conflate somewhat with his core premise of technocracy, i.e. of not blending politics 
with economics. However, he tackled this apparent contradiction by arguing that 
‘ideology’ of authenticity is apolitical by necessity: ‘as known, we rejected the false 
communist ideas which contradicted our national features and centuries-old traditions 
and customs. But, undoubtedly, one cannot allow a vacuum in the world of ideology; 
otherwise ideas absolutely alien to us and our aspirations will try to occupy that empty 
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ideological space.’113 He expanded this idea of an ideological vacuum by arguing that ‘if 
there is ideology, there is a goal and there is a motivation. And then we can unite people 
(…) That is why this issue is the most pressing one. It is spring here now. Tomorrow 
summer will set in the Batken events of last year.’114 Batken was the location of the IMU 
incursions of August 1999 and so it was within the context of increased border 
insecurity that President Karimov asserted the need for greater national spirituality. In 
sum, the persistence of spirituality and its reinforced articulation gave a stronger 
emphasis to Mr Karimov’s roles of protector of Uzbekistan’s great image and definer 
of Uzbek authenticity.  
 
III.3. Repertoires from 2002 to 2005 
 
The aftermath of 11 September 2001 was a complex time period for Tashkent. The 
security challenges of the 1990s were certainly difficult to manage but, after 2001, 
Uzbekistan’s government was increasingly scrutinized by the international public 
sphere.  President Karimov became widely recognized as one of the symbols of the war 
on terror and therewith a ‘target’ of the Bush Administration’s increased enthusiasm 
for democratization, especially after the Colour revolutions. However, of all possible 
challenges, nothing was as shattering to Mr Karimov’s public credibility as the Crisis of 
13 May 2005.115 After an organized prison-break and popular protests in the Ferghana 
Valley city of Andijan, Uzbekistani security forces surrounded the local square and 
violently confronted the populace, resulting in the death of 187 people, according to 
government sources (Human Rights Watch adds a few ‘hundreds’ to that tragic 
number). 
Unlike the 1990s, when he set the foundations of his role set, President Karimov 
was now increasingly on the defensive, especially with Washington. Yet, in spite of the 
changes in the international public sphere, Uzbekistani leadership maintained its core 
rhetorical repertoires, adapting them only slightly to the time: (1) preservation of 
security for the sake of controlling development and stability and avoiding 
revolution; (2) genuine independence and pursuit of international relations on an 
                                               
113 ‘Uzbek head answers newspaper questions on national ideology, religion, policy’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 8 June 2000. 
114 ‘President Karimov calls for “well-defined national ideology”’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 
April 2000. 
115 Depictions of the Andijan uprising are available in some sources.. For different perspectives, see Shirin 
Akiner (2005) and Galima Bukharbaeva’s (2005) accounts as well as the following reports: ‘Uzbekistan: 
The Andijon Uprising’ Crisis Group, 25 May 2005, available at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/uzbekistan/B038-uzbekistan-the-andijon-
uprising.aspx, accessed April 2010; and ‘Preliminary findings on the events in Andijan, Uzbekistan, 13 
May 2005’ OSCE, 20 June 2005, available via http://www.osce.org/odihr/15653, accessed April 2010. 
 71
equal basis; (3) defending the image of the Uzbek people and inculcating authentic 
spirituality. This means then that the roles did not change; merely that discontinuity 
instigated a gradual shift in rhetoric: from provider of stability to protector of 
Uzbekistan’s image and definer of authenticity. 
 
Preservation of security for the sake of controlling development, ensuring stability 
and avoiding revolution 
 
President Karimov increased his democratic rhetoric throughout the period, although 
he described reform as an end rather than a process. This meant that he did not 
actually forsake authoritarian technocracy and thus concede to immediate and total 
change. However, Mr Karimov frequently mentioned adopting a ‘western’ type of 
political system: ‘we are trying to use the experience of Western countries [sic]. We are 
drawing closer to their standards.’116 Pro-democratic stances, though, have to be read 
with caution. While political matters related to reform were discussed more in this 
period than in others, they were still far from being the main subject matter. 
Democracy was simply depicted as a goal for the future: ‘the priority in domestic policy 
is the liberalization of all spheres of life, which has great significance.’117 So, albeit 
democratic rhetoric, President Karimov persisted with gradualism and invoked the 
usual adagio of caution and control: ‘I’m concerned about the people’s problems. We 
used to have two slogans, if you remember: First, don't pull down your old home before 
building a new one. Do you remember this? Second, reform is not for the sake of it, but 
for people.’118 In short, stability and the ability to control the pace of events119  remained 
the key pillars of his rhetoric, and so the ‘Colour Revolutions’ became especially 
threatening. 
In October 2003, Azerbaijan faced widespread protests over fraudulent 
presidential elections (D’Anieiri 2006: 339; Way 2008: 29). Soon after, deception and 
repression failed in Georgia, and large demonstrations in November 2003 led to the 
collapse of President Shevardnadze’s regime. Then, almost a year later, discontent over 
forged presidential elections led to the Orange Revolution, culminating in the election 
of pro-western candidate Viktor Yushchenko. It is important to bear in mind that 
Western backed NGOs, along with Russian interference, played a key role in those 
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outcomes, particularly in Ukraine (Kuzio 2005: 429-494; Tudoroiu 2007: 329). 
Kyrgyzstan was the last in this apparent wave of governmental changes, as regional 
elite dissatisfaction along with pressure from informal networks contributed to 
President Askar Akaev’s ousting in February 2005 (Cummings & Ryabkov 2008: 249).  
 These challenges to stability were taken seriously by President Karimov, who in 
2004 had no qualms in describing the potential dangers spawning from revolution:  
 
We know that at all times revolutions are usually based on violence and 
bloodshed, and they are used as weapons to destroy everything created by 
the ancestors mercilessly. Dogmatism, no matter in what form it shows 
itself, be it religious dogmatism or communist dogmatism, they ignore 
everything, act against their own principles, and carry out their activities 
proceeding from a Bolshevik principle which says ‘You are either with us 
or against us’. We are confident that it is impossible to export democracy 
and different models of open societies. It is also impossible to import or 
push through a universal project of state construction from outside.120  
 
By underlining the threats associated with political change, President Karimov 
revamped his credibility as an apolitical leader and provider of stability. Like before, he 
did not avoid the issue of authoritarianism and also defined pro-democratic discourses 
as another type of extremism: ‘Uzbekistan has always been against all forms of 
radicalism. We in Uzbekistan have always been against it. Even now, we are 
irreconcilable fighters against fundamentalism, which has many forms. We are against 
religious fundamentalism, we are against Communist fundamentalism and, if you like, 
we are against democratic fundamentalism. We are for an evolutionary path of 
development.’121  
With the times becoming clearly averse to Uzbekistan’s regime, President 
Karimov did not conceal that he deserved his own token share of merit in a post-11 
September world. Uzbekistan’s leader professed that his regime had consistently 
warned the world about the problems sprouting from Afghanistan and the dangers of 
Islamic extremism: ‘it was only then after the New York tragedies that people started to 
realize and say: Oops, but Karimov's words proved to be right.’122  
Obviously the apparent elimination of the Taliban threat between 2002 and 
2005 – along with the death of Juma Namangoniy, in December 2001 - could have 
raised doubts about security remaining a pivotal concern. However, President Karimov 
rarely demonstrated optimism, especially after Uzbekistan was subjected to two 
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terrorist attacks in March and July 2004. In the first incident, a series of planned 
attacks took place in Tashkent, but doubts remain about whom was responsible for the 
incidents. Tashkent, though, took the initiative and publicly blamed them on Islamic 
militants, namely the Hizb ut-Tahrir and another unknown Islamic group called 
Jamiyat (Islamov 2004). Thereafter, as fifteen individuals connected to those incidents 
were being trialled; the second event took place in June, when two bombers attacked 
the Israeli and American Embassies and killed Uzbekistani policemen.123 These 
incidents were again portrayed as the results of extremism, although uncertainty 
remains about the origin and aims of the culprits.  
The attacks empowered President Karimov’s public concerns and he, once more, 
lambasted against the dangers of extremism: ‘there are forces with evil intentions 
among neighbouring and distant countries. These forces are jealous of our peace, 
peaceful life and the hard work of building a new society, and they cast evil eyes on us 
in such a dangerous situation. They are not afraid of committing subversive and evil 
acts. The existence of such forces requires us to maintain our vigilance and boost our 
independence.’124 He thus continued showing his public disdain for instability. 
Naturally after the Andijan Crisis, this authenticity rhetoric reached its peak and Mr 
Karimov did not hesitate in blaming the media and foreign encroachment for the 
insurgency.125   
     
Genuine independence and pursuit of international relations on an equal basis 
 
Despite the complicated times, Uzbekistani leadership continued supporting 
engagement with the outside world: ‘we are not arrogant. As president I am ready to 
warmly welcome any investor, a person who is capable of doing something, a 
businessman. I personally do not need it. You should understand that President 
Karimov does not need it personally. However, it is necessary for the country, our 
homeland, our people, our future, our children, to make our country prosperous and to 
make our future better than our present.’126 Alongside this public show of support for 
trade and foreign direct investment, he confessed his disappointment toward the 
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geographic isolation of Uzbekistan and also Tashkent’s inability to develop alternative 
transportation routes.127  
Still, he seems always to have remained cautious about his country’s 
international engagement, by not refraining from defending equality: ‘“we are not 
second to anyone in the world” keeps appearing on the TV screen every day (…) We will 
not be second to anyone. We were not second in the times of Amir Temur Tamerlane, 
medieval conqueror and now the times of Amir Temur have come.’128 In fact, no other 
event conveyed his public concern for genuine independence and equality than the 
international crisis brought by Andijan: ‘they want to establish an international 
commission for an investigation and come to Uzbekistan in order to investigate 
whether it was an act of terror (…) Uzbekistan is a sovereign state; it has its own gates 
and door steps, also let us say it has its constitutional system, elected government and 
elected president. It is a whole state and how could a commission from outside 
come?’129 
On economic policy, President Karimov’s mercantilist appeals collided with 
some concessions he had made about reform, particularly concerning the 
implementation of currency convertibility that had been ratified under the ‘Declaration 
on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework between the USA and 
Republic of Uzbekistan’.130 He therefore conceded that he was sceptical of the interests 
of Western companies and international organizations: ‘if business trends were more 
favourable and Uzbekistan had these billions, primarily due to its own resources, and 
commercial opportunities were somehow more appropriate we would not need any 
credits in order to ensure the convertibility of our national currency. Since even today 
no one pledges to give us billions. They simply talk.’131 So, President Karimov praised 
those who were not necessarily following Western models like China: ‘China has 
achieved a higher level in the field of computerization (…) this is the goal of China. It is 
not possible to live by growing and selling cotton. Do you know when I got fed up with a 
phrase “Hey look, it is fine with us?”’132  
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Defending the image of the Uzbek people and inculcating authentic spirituality 
 
President Karimov gradually centred his rhetoric on authentic Uzbek culture and 
mentality. By the end of 2005, he was particularly adamant in differentiating his 
country from an intrusive west: ‘English intelligence officer said in his time that the 
East is the East and the West is the West. I will not go into details but he said 
something to the effect that the West and the East would never come together. It was 
said back in the 19th century.’133 He seems to have justified these distinctions by the 
fact that he was not treated equally (see discussion above): ‘for how long will we be a 
backward country? I would like to repeat, as president, as leader I have set a goal before 
me. We have never been second to anyone and we will not be second to anyone.’134  He 
even criticized the OSCE for being badly adapted to Uzbekistan’s unique cultural 
circumstances: ‘I must say one more thing. Uzbekistan is in Asia and let everyone 
remember this. We are members of not only the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, but we are members of Islamic states’ organizations as well (…) 
We are also Muslims and 85 per cent of our population is Hanafite Muslim (…) you are 
forgetting, for example, take Ukraine, it is in Europe, or Georgia, it is also in Europe. 
Where is Uzbekistan? Look at the map. Is Uzbekistan, the city of Tashkent, not the gate 
of the East?’135 
All in all, it would seem that between 2002 and 2005, President Karimov altered 
some of his cautious welcoming of the West by evincing disenchantment and greater 
apprehension. Based on Uzbekistan’s supposed exceptionality, he justified the use of 
condescending rhetoric toward the West, especially during the Colour revolutions: ‘I 
doubt that a repetition of the Ukrainian or Georgian scenario would be possible in 
Uzbekistan (...) The citizens themselves would not want this, and that is much more 
important.’136  
 
III.4. Repertoires from 2006 to 2008 
 
From 2006 to 2008, security and stability continued to be one of the key elements of 
President Karimov’s rhetorical repertoires. The period also saw a transformation of the 
manner in which those concepts were articulated, as President Karimov switched his 
rhetoric from technocratic stability to cultural authenticity. In other words, he 
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recreated his role of guardian of Uzbek authenticity by securitizing it; a transformation 
that was not entirely novel, inasmuch as it was the continuation of a trend that had 
become more prominent in late 2003 and that reached a peak after the Andijan crisis. 
Nevertheless, the shift was short-lived. While world financial markets collapsed in 
2008, President Karimov began refocusing on economic stability, much like he had 
done throughout his whole tenure in office. He even published a book in 2008, 
propagating his economic recipes and how Uzbekistan had managed to avoid the 
world-wide recession. Another topic that became more prominent was Central Asia’s 
ecosystem, particularly the issue of water. As described below, President Karimov 
underlined that hydrological resources could neither be side-lined nor forgotten in 
regional politics.  
Overall, the repertoires themselves did not change substantially. Instead two 
themes focusing more on cultural authenticity became prominent: (1) defending the 
image of the Uzbek people for the sake of stability and development; (2) genuine 
independence and pursuit of international relations on an equal basis. 
 
Defending the image of the Uzbek people for the sake of stability and development 
 
Throughout much of this period President Karimov sidelined some of his usual 
technocratic or apolitical slogans and focused more on Uzbek ‘spirituality’: ‘if we wish 
to achieve our great goals, above all, we should focus on spirituality. Spirituality and 
again spirituality [sic]. And from this point of view, we should be vigilant and 
watchful.’137 This public appeal was now presented as a securitized precondition to all 
other objectives, such as preserving stability and allowing for economic development. 
However, President Karimov was careful in underlining that he himself had not 
changed: ‘I have remained the same as I was in 1991. And I think that all of you 
understand well that those who voted for me took into consideration exactly this [fact], 
that is, the path which we have started will never end.’138  
The stronger focus on Uzbek ‘spirituality’ throughout the period raises doubts 
about the consistency of his rhetoric. For instance, unlike in the immediate post-
independence period, in which President Karimov coined instability as the result of 
social-economic crises (see previous discussions), by 2007 he described it as the 
product of dangerous ideologies: ‘first of all, we should fight underlying causes for and 
the foundation on which terrorism stands. And I am sure that the terrorist ideology is 
sometimes produced on an assembly line. In this case, Hezb-e Tahrir [sic] is an 
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ideological basis for international terrorism.’ The argument of course is not entirely 
new, since in the 1990s he had already called for developing Uzbek authenticity (see 
previous discussion). The difference though resides in the rhetorical emphasis:  
 
We attach special significance to this [education] in Uzbekistan (…) be 
aware of your roots, know your history, nation and be proud of your 
history and belonging to this nation. All this education is not only for us to 
occupy a worthy place in the international community in the 21st century 
(…) but also in order to wean young people off the ground where they 
[religious movements] can infect young people with terrorism, fanaticism 
and other ‘-ism’s [sic] which are equally unacceptable for us.139   
 
To clarify the connection between Uzbekistan’s authentic culture and security, 
President Karimov discussed systematically how he felt the former sprout from external 
threats: ‘we are living in a very complicated world. Somebody wants to defeat us. If they 
want to defeat us, how will they do this? First of all, they will destroy the economy. Last 
year you saw the [Andijon] events (…) An information war against us started in the 
world, humiliating us and saying that there are problems here and there. This was 
aimed at tarnishing our reputation.’140 Obviously, the importance of reputation is very 
much related to Mr Karimov’s basic role of protecting Uzbekistan’s prestige. Therefore, 
he argues for citizens to be aware of ‘foreign centres, [that are] taking the advantage of 
ideological vacuum in society.’141 
 Indeed, the late 2004 trend of differentiating Uzbekistan from the West 
continued: ‘your values are not acceptable to us because 85 percent of the Uzbek 
population is Muslim.’142 Moreover, Uzbekistan’s so-called ancestors were given public 
prominence, particularly Amir Timur, whom he idealized as an ideal statesman.143 The 
West, in contrast, was portrayed as a false beacon of democracy, since the tolerance it 
propagated was apparently fake: ‘they should not only look at the countries, which are 
stepping onto the new path of democracy, with evil eyes, but, if they really consider 
themselves as democrats, they should help and support us, if you like.’144  
  By 2008, though, technocracy seems to have regained its former prominence in 
President Karimov’s rhetoric. Uzbekistan’s leader focused again on the issue fomenting 
economic growth and establishing a democratic society, such as in December 2008, 
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when he praised the resilience of Uzbekistan’s economy and the model applied since 
the beginning: ‘during the process of transition from the administrative-command 
system to the market system of management, we chose an evolutionary approach and 
the path of carrying out reforms step by step, being guided by a vital concept that one 
should not destroy the old house until he builds a new one.’145  
Naturally it is impossible to ignore the context behind President Karimov’s 
assertions. On one hand, the recession brought by the sub-prime crisis spread across 
financial markets and affected the world economy, particularly the West and, on the 
other hand, Uzbekistan’s relationship with the United States improved. In January 
2008, Admiral William Fallon of US Central Command visited Tashkent to discuss a 
new supply route for NATO troops.146 Mr Karimov then visited Bucharest in April 2008 
to participate in a NATO summit,147 and, soon after, the EU removed part of its 
sanctions.148 Consequently, President Karimov’s rhetoric is linked to the changes in the 
international public sphere – an issue that is better addressed in the narratives of the 
following Chapters. 
 
Genuine independence and pursuit of international relations on an equal basis  
 
The emphasis on authenticity throughout most of the period did not, however, change 
President Karimov’s repertoires on international relations. He continued to argue for 
participating in external affairs: 
 
we consider as another important factor to live in harmony with the world 
community while implementing all our good hopes and aspirations, as well as 
vital plans; to further develop friendship and mutually beneficial relations with 
all our near and far neighbours; and to gain deserved prestige and trust in the 
international arena. We will not spare our efforts to expand all-round practical 
relations with our foreign partners who have stood shoulder-to-shoulder with us 
and expressed trust in our nation’s potential and future. In this regard, we 
consider as our priority task to develop relations that meet mutual interests, to 
serve for maintaining peace and stability in our region and the world as a 
whole.149 
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In spite of the good-will, topics related to self-sufficiency and defence autonomy 
continued being iterated: ‘who is respected in the world? The world respects people, 
nation or a state which trusts in its own strength, capacities and power and which is 
able to demonstrate them. It respects people or nation which is prepared to protect and 
feed itself, to build its future and to pursue its comprehensive independent policy 
without being inferior and bending its head to anyone.’150  
Mitigating dependency was made explicit in President Karimov’s appeals for 
attaining energy self-sufficiency,151 and increasing Uzbekistan’s gold reserves.152 With 
the economic crisis expanding in 2008, Mr Karimov legitimated his mercantilist and 
protectionist policies by underlining that Uzbekistan had avoided recession: ‘we should 
note that it is not difficult to see and observe that many countries' not well-thought-out 
[sic] policy towards external debt has made their economies weak, dependent on 
external factors, and unprotected from dangerous situations.’153 
 Besides international political economy, President Karimov boosted his non-
militaristic status by making frequent allusions to violence escalating in Afghanistan: 
‘the dynamics of the development of the situation in Afghanistan show, with 
increasingly more obviousness [sic], that by using armed forces and military means as 
well as increasing militarization alone, it is impossible to resolve the problem of 
Afghanistan.’154 Subsequently, in April 2008, at the NATO Bucharest Summit, 
President Karimov argued for an alternative. He put forth his previous 1990s 
suggestion of having each of Afghanistan’s neighbours -alongside Russia, the United 
States and now NATO - tackle insecurity: ‘taking into consideration the contemporary 
realities, it would be necessary to transform the contact group which operated until 
2001 from 6+2 into 6+3 bearing in mind the compulsory participation of the NATO 
representation in this negotiation process.’155  
Lastly, it is perhaps relevant to mention President Karimov’s greater public 
concern with environmental issues. Although this is not specifically connected to 
international equality, it had rhetorical repercussions in regional politics. As Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan became more assertive in their wish to develop hydroelectricity 
(Weinthal 2006: 11), Mr Karimov voiced his strong scepticism toward Dushanbe’s plans 
                                               
150 ‘Uzbek leader says all work to focus on raising life standards’ op. cit.  
151 On autarky, see ‘Uzbek leader warns of foreign influence at his Cabinet speech’ op. cit. 
152 On gold reserves, see President Karimov’s declarations in ‘Uzbek leader says Afghan situation has 
“extremely” negative impact on security’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 8 October 2008. 
153 ‘Uzbek leader says economy protected from financial crisis’ op. cit. 
154 ‘Uzbek leader voices concern over Afghan security’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 28 August 2008. 
155 ‘President attends Partnership for Peace NATO summit’ Uzreport.com, 4 April 2008. 
 80
for constructing the Roghun Dam.156 He demanded that they should first obtain 
international approval157 and underlined the negative consequences of environmental 
degradation in the Aral Sea.158 So, the relevance given to environmental issues and the 
way in which Uzbekistan sought to guarantee an eco-friendly Central Asia shaped the 
role of protector of Central Asia’s environment.159 
 
III.5. Repertoires from 2009 to 2010 
 
The smaller sample of statements for this period means that it is harder to make an 
overall sketch of President Karimov’s rhetoric. The complex blend of technocracy and 
Uzbek authenticity was still evident, thereby making it difficult to isolate the main 
roles. Mr Karimov was still having difficulties in ascertaining public credibility, leading 
inevitably to a conundrum: were Uzbekistan’s economic achievements capable of being 
generalized under a so-called ‘civilized’ status among the world’s powers, or was 
Uzbekistan’s model of development designed to shelter its culture and prevent it from 
being compared to others? The question remained unanswered and so the friction 
within this complicated repertoire persisted in the years to come. 
 
Defending the image of the Uzbek people for the sake of stability and development 
 
The difficulty of understanding the predominant rhetorical theme throughout this short 
period derives in part from Uzbekistan’s improved relationship with the United States 
and how this clashed with the appeals for cultural differentiation. At the time, President 
Karimov praised Washington and its influence: ‘we learnt from the experience of the 
USA, when we set up the Senate, gave its name and elected 100 people to its 
membership (...). I think we must study and familiarize ourselves with these issues and 
apply them in our country.’160 Lauding the United States evinces how Uzbekistani 
leadership revamped the topic of political reform. For instance, in November 2010, 
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President Karimov delivered a 12,000 word speech to Parliament, detailing new 
constitutional reforms:  ‘it is necessary to draft and adopt the legislative acts that after 
the example of the developed democratic countries stipulate establishment of legal 
mechanisms (...) The delegation of relevant authorities to the bodies of justice (…) shall 
permit to create an effective mechanism of checks and balances in the system of law-
enforcement and supervisory bodies of the country, which ensures observance of law 
and rule of law in the course of their work [sic].’161 In the latter statement, no other 
reference to the American political system is clearer than the allusion to its checks and 
balances. Even in 2009, during parliamentary elections, President Karimov praised the 
democratic robustness of Uzbekistan’s system.162  
It would seem that President Karimov’s greater involvement with the United 
States triggered a gradual change in rhetoric (see above). However, the steady 
transformation was not novel in the argument, merely in the emphasis, insofar as the 
state remained the main supervisor of change. 
As the economic crisis gained momentum, President Karimov explained that 
Uzbekistan had escaped recession because of the model of gradual transition it had 
implemented since independence: ‘life experience has proved on more than one 
occasion that no-one and nothing can replace the regulation of economic and financial 
relations, the use of state's role in choosing priorities to find a way out of crisis 
situations, the role of the state that presents the interests of the majority of the 
population, and the conduct of strong social policy and long-term national strategy 
[sic].’ 163 Moreover, President Karimov continued rejecting any sort of shock therapy 
and alluded to the growing success of China’s cautious approach: ‘why am I comparing 
the Chinese and Uzbek models? Because they are similar in many ways.’164 
 On the other hand, President Karimov also claimed that he was propounding 
Uzbekistan’s exceptionality and spirituality: ‘naturally, we all respond to this question 
that on the focus of our aspirations there lays a dream to bring up our children 
physically and spiritually healthy, being inferior in nothing and to no one, see their 
happiness and prosperous future. Indeed, isn’t it the core essence of our life?’ 165 He 
continued, therefore, describing a number of threats to Uzbekistan’s way of life: 
‘various attacks are ever gaining strength aimed against national identity, centuries-old 
values of our people, and mercenary aspirations are being manifested to secure the 
                                               
161 ‘Address by President Karimov at the joint session of Legislative Chamber and Senate’ UzReport.com, 
15 November 2010. 
162 ‘Uzbekistan marks constitution day, President addresses the nation’ Uzreport.com, 8 December 2009. 
163 ‘One should not fetish market relations’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 22 May 2009.  
164 ‘Leader says living standards rising in Uzbekistan…’ op. cit. 
165 ‘Uzbekistan marks constitution day, President addresses the nation’ Uzreport.com, 8 December 2009. 
 82
minds and souls of our youth, and certainly, all these impel us to greater vigilance.’166 
As will be discussed below, reconciling cultural authenticity with technocracy is difficult 
- if not impossible, thereby leading to intra-role conflict. 
  
Genuine independence and pursuit of international relations on an equal footing 
 
President Karimov’s notions of defending equality, as in all the other periods, were not 
subject to any degree of change: ‘the reason for this is the fact that we have never been 
inferior to anyone in anything, and undoubtedly, shall be second to none in securing 
our cherished goal to build a free, independent and prosperous life, inshallah.’167 
Equality correlated with a mercantilist outlook, focused on genuine independence (non 
dependence), obtaining technology and exporting manufactured goods.168 
Other pervasive themes were non-interventionism and non-militarism. As 
concerns the former, the ‘Kyrgyz Revolution’ of 2010 led to a response from President 
Karimov, who declared that he would not interfere in his neighbour’s affairs,169 even as 
the violence targeted Uzbek minorities in Kyrgyzstan’s south. Nevertheless, he made a 
surprising appeal at the UN Millennium Goals Summit for the Kyrgyz events to be 
subject to international inquiry;170 in effect contradicting his claim for respecting 
Uzbekistani sovereignty during the Andijan Crisis.  
Lastly, non-militarism, became especially connected to Afghanistan and 
Russian policy for Central Asia (the latter topic is developed in Chapter IV), in that 
President Karimov continued declaring Uzbekistan’s neutrality in Afghan conflicts171 
and for the application of his multilateral 6+3 initiative.172 Indeed, amid the discussion 
on NATO withdrawal, President Karimov demonstrated some apprehension regarding 
the region’s future.173 
  
III.6. Role coherence and intra-role conflict from 1989 to 2010 
 
                                               
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid. 
168 ‘Leader says living standards rising in Uzbekistan despite global crisis’ op. cit.; and ‘Global crisis 
negatively affects Uzbek exports’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 14 February.  
169 ‘Uzbek leader says no revenge to be allowed for Kyrgyz violence’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19 
June 2010. 
170 ‘Address by H.E. Mr. Islam Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, at the Plenary Session’ 
29 September 2010, available at: http://www.gov.uz/en/press/politics/6612, accessed: September 2010. 
171 ‘Uzbek leader says remained neutral during Afghan conflict’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19 
December 2010. 
172 ‘Uzbek leader focuses on Afghan security during Russian counterpart’s visit’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 29 January 2009. 
173 ‘Uzbek leader says remained neutral…’ op. cit. 
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The above analysis reveals that President Karimov publicly set for himself fifteen roles, 
all of which classified under three distinct group-types: technocracy; cultural 
authenticity; and prestige (see table 2 below).  
The key role that appears in all group-types is defender of Uzbekistan’s 
international equality (see table 2). It has a technocratic connotation by virtue of its 
economic focus, in that it calls for interaction based on relative gains. It is also 
associated with Uzbekistan’s authentic culture, historical past and, by extension, its 
prestige, as made evident in the call the slogan ‘Uzbekistan is second to no one’. 
Accordingly, no way of life has greater value and no historical narrative can be grander 
than Uzbekistan’s own experience. 
Seeker of genuine independence is not as all-encompassing as defender of 
international equality, but it has a number of repercussions on the technocratic and 
prestige group-types. On one hand, as the name suggests, it is explicitly associated with 
mitigating economic dependence and achieving defence autonomy. On the other hand, 
it purports to augmenting Uzbekistan’s world status, given that being ‘respected’ or 
being among the ‘civilized states’ is only possible for those who defend their own 
borders, export manufactured goods and decrease their level of imports. So, the fact 
that seeker of genuine independence and defender of international equality overlap 
means that they have a number of ripple effects in President Karimov’s role set. Before 
discussing in greater detail how these two pivotal roles are interconnected and whether 
they are coherent with each other, it is worth pointing out a few of the conflicts existing 
between and within the three group-types. 
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Table 2: Role Set Coherence174 
 Technocratic  Cultural Authenticity  Prestige 
Expert on economic issues     
Protector of stability     
Defender  of  international equality Defender of  international equality Defender of  international equality 
Seeker of genuine independence   Seeker of genuine independence 
Technocratic  leader     
Developer of Uzbekistan’s economic future     
Undisputed authority     
Voice for a de—ideologized transition     
Mercantilist entrepreneur      
Bridge to joining other markets     
Voice for a non-militaristic Central Asia    
 Definer of Uzbek authenticity  
   Protector of Uzbekistan’s great image 
    Fomenter of defence autonomy in Central Asia 
    Protector of Central Asia’s environment 
 
 
Intra-role conflict between role group-types 
 
Whilst technocratic-based roles pertain to the idea of achieving higher economic 
development, culturally authentic roles subsume the ideas of spirituality that were 
many times invoked to differentiate Uzbekistan from pernicious ideologies and even 
from the West (see above). In order to look at the degree of intra-role conflict between 
group-types, it would be best to revisit the dilemma President Karimov was facing after 
the Andijan crisis: were Uzbekistan’s economic achievements capable of being 
generalized to a so-called ‘civilized’ status among the world’s powers, or was 
Uzbekistan’s model of development designed to shelter its culture, preventing it from 
being compared to others?  
This dilemma pertains to the problem of role malintegration (see Chapter II), 
whereby technocratic themes hardly match counter-authenticity roles. In other words, 
                                               
174 While the classification is mostly self-explanatory, it is important to clarify why some roles were 
placed under certain group-types. Describing Voice for a non-militaristic Central Asia as technocratic has 
much to do with how President Karimov equates technocracy with non-political issues. When he 
propounded topics concerned with non-militarism, they were usually connected to avoiding greater 
militarization, which he argued deflected attention from economics and internal stability. On the other 
hand, Fomenter of defence autonomy and Protector of Central Asia’s environment are categorized as part 
of the prestige group-type because President Karimov barely structured a programme on those subject-
areas. For instance, while defining authenticity implied the deliberate appeal for ‘Uzbekness’, such as 
promoting family and local traditions, fomenting defence autonomy was a vague appeal with no actual 
practical implementation. Likewise for Protector of Central Asia’s Environment, as no concrete action 
plan was delivered. Hence, the roles of Fomenter of defence autonomy and Protector of Central Asia’s 
environment are largely slogans attached to President Karimov’s prestige as Uzbekistan’s head of state, 
rather than signifiers of an actual technocratic or authentic programme. 
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either President Karimov proclaimed himself to be a supposedly unbiased, apolitical 
leader (a man to do business with) or a cultural purifier. This role conflict evidently 
causes confusion regarding the source of Uzbekistan’s prestige, meaning would it be its 
economic prowess or its cultural authenticity? 
It is worth cautioning that portraying technocratic and cultural roles as 
contradictory is perhaps overstating the case, inasmuch as it may  simply be a case of 
role competition, wherein different roles compete in time and space, but are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive (Backman 1970: 315). In fact, James Rosenau (1987: 57-
72) argued that leaders who define various role scenarios are able to deal promptly with 
a variety of complex situations. Similarly, Cameron Thies (2009, 2001) proposed that 
leaders can endure critical situations if they define multiple roles for themselves. 
Therefore, the variety of roles expounded by President Karimov allowed for him to deal 
with role discontinuities (different sequential contexts which require disjointed roles – 
see Chapter II).  
No other discontinuity was as prominent as the Andijan crisis, where his roles of 
provider of stability, protector of Uzbekistan’s image and undisputed authority were 
all under intense scrutiny. In this case, both McCall and Simmons (1966: 95-99) and 
Harnisch’s (2012: 56) discussions on role conflict offer insight (see Chapter II). They 
would agree that President Karimov coped with the rising difficulties by gradually 
changing the level of commitment from technocracy to authenticity. Moreover, the 
effects on public credibility and role conflict contributed to President Karimov altering 
his scope of interaction, as he became less reluctant to improve his relationships with 
China and Russia (the latter is better demonstrated in Chapter IV).  
Despite the ‘complementarity’ existing between cultural authenticity and 
technocracy, they are still inherently contradictory. Clearly, in the early 1990s, he had 
defined himself mainly as a technocrat, but then, from 2002, his more defensive stance 
resulted in Uzbekistan’s exceptional status and prestige becoming more prominent, 
which certainly allowed him to cope with credibility problems, but at the cost of 
revealing intra-role incoherency. So, role malintegration became more explicit, 
irrespective of the ability to cope with new challenges. 
 
Intra-role conflict inside role group-types 
 
The differences between groups are not as stark as table 2 suggests and, in fact, a 
degree of conflict can also be found within technocratic roles. This conflict derives from 
the general role ambiguity of seeker of genuine independence since, in one case, it 
constitutes the role of mercantilist entrepreneur and, in the other, it calls for obtaining 
 86
technology from abroad. President Karimov was quite vehement that Uzbekistan would 
not be able to develop if it remained outside international markets (see discussion 
above). Consequently, the contradiction is somewhat evident, as it is difficult to 
reconcile mercantilism with the appeals for bridging other markets. 
 
Intra-role conflict between defender of Uzbekistani international equality and seeker 
of genuine independence 
 
Defending equality and seeking genuine independence are more or less mutually 
dependent roles (see discussion above),175 since apparently it is through genuine 
independence that Uzbekistan reaches equality, and it is also by professing that it is 
‘second to no one’ that it becomes genuinely independent.  
In spite of the assumed coherence between these two persistent roles, however, 
there is a degree of malintegration between the rhetoric of international equality and 
genuine independence. The argument itself is counterintuitive: defender of equality 
suggests an end; and seeker of genuine independence a process. In practice, demanding 
the simultaneous fulfilment of an end and a process is rather unfeasible. Either 
Uzbekistan is moving toward genuine independence, and so it is not yet equal among 
other ‘civilized’ states, or it is in fact an equal and therefore requires no further 
incremental progress. This problem inevitably contributed to public credibility 
problems, especially after the Andijan crisis. And yet, as shown above, the two loosely 
defined roles did allow President Karimov to adapt to discontinuities over time by 
alternating his commitment to different group-types. 
 
Role coherence through self-reliance 
 
In spite of President Karimov’s role set seeming largely conflicting, it is consistent with 
the overall conception of self-reliance. Indeed, when delving into the intricacies of each 
role, many are mal-integrated, as is the case with his core roles of defending 
Uzbekistan’s equality and seeking genuine independence. Still, the scepticism toward 
the international environment, the avoidance of dependency, the emphasis on 
economic development and the concern with authenticity, all reveal a public 
                                               
175 Both roles are more or less analogous with the ‘Independence Idea’ (Mustaqillik Mafkurasi), which 
was explicitly endorsed by President Karimov’s regime in the mid-1990s (Muminov 2010: 148-149). 
However, given how his thesis is concerned with classifying general public themes rather than 
understanding their distinct local origin, the fact that President Karimov never publicly declared that he 
was following an ideology meant that Mustaqillik is not central to the discussion herein. This is not to say 
that Mustaqillik and Tashkent’s Ideological Centre are irrelevant. The meaning of the word and its 
repercussions are certainly important to understanding the origins of political discourse in Uzbekistan. 
For more on Mustaqillik, see I. Muminov (2010) and Andrew March (2003, 2002). 
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commitment to autonomy and a strong reluctance to engage fully with the international 
public sphere. Although the justifications varied across time, President Karimov’s roles 
were relatively constant. Defending international equality and seeking genuine 
independence never ceased to be invoked, and while the two may be questionable 
political programmes, Uzbekistan’s president did not deviate substantially from his 
original positions.  Perhaps even more interesting to observe is that throughout his 
nearly twenty years in office, he paid considerable attention to his credibility in the 
international public sphere, by constantly legitimating his roles (for legitimating acts in 
role theory, see Chapter II). 
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IV. The Uzbekistani-Russian Relationship 1991-2010 
 
The near twenty-year relationship between Uzbekistan and Russia was characterized by 
distinct moments of cooperation and conflict. As concerns Moscow, various ideas on 
foreign policy were visible in a variety of statements and internal debates (Allison 
2004: 283), which allows for a number of roles to be inferred. Yet, even during 
President Putin’s era - as a number of more stable and longer-term goals were endorsed 
- it was unclear whether Moscow developed ‘a regional strategy for Central Asia that 
would integrate Russian security, political, energy and economic interests’ (Ibid). So, 
the relationship was fluid, open-ended and fundamentally political in that meanings 
and discontinuities all played an important part. 
Despite a degree of ambiguity and intra-role conflict regarding foreign policy, 
Moscow did display distinct phases of external engagement that are more or less 
capable of being categorized: uncertainty in the early 1990s, when Russia divorced 
itself partially from the Soviet Union and looked more toward the West; the rise of the 
so-called Primakov doctrine in 1996, which sought to reignite interest for the ‘near 
abroad’, i.e. Eastern Europe and Central Asia; the Putin age after 2000, characterized 
by steadier leadership and clearer security and economic goals (Laruelle 2009: 29-32). 
For these reasons, Jean-François Thibault and Jacques Levésque (1997: 20-22) argue 
that Moscow’s roles are determined by three distinct and often conflicting roles, namely 
the Western outlook of the Kozyrev era, Eurasianism, and Neo-Communism. Their 
inference agrees more or less with Stephen White’s (2000: 230) depiction of Russia’s 
foreign policy debate in the 1990s - between those who supported foreign minister 
Kozyrev’s honeymoon period with Washington and others who were sceptical toward 
engaging with the West. It also captures the economic recovery after 2000, in which 
Moscow pursued a number of economic projects, particularly in the energy market 
(Newnham 2011: 137; Baghat 2007: 163; Tompson 2004: 117). Increasing prosperity 
coincided with the beginning of President Putin’s term in office. Moscow then 
consolidated a number of new concepts on foreign policy, namely: ‘Europeanism’; 
‘securitisation’ of both international terrorism and Chechen separatism; preserving 
‘autonomy’; ‘normalizing relations with partners’; and constraining other ‘great powers’ 
(Sakwa 2004: 275-279). Evidently, it is worth insisting that all these pursuits were not 
always coincidental and, as Allison (2004: 283) pointedly observed, they hardly 
resulted in a univocal strategy. For instance, rapprochement with the ‘near abroad’ 
could sometimes be at odds with Moscow’s own goals for monopolizing energy supplies 
in Eurasia (see below).  
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Naturally, some of those roles affected Russia’s relationship with Uzbekistan. 
The two states were actually never able to settle a variety of disputes throughout their 
twenty-year relationship. President Karimov’s self-reliant role set - focused on seeking 
genuine independence, protecting stability, defending equality and Uzbekistan’s 
image – was never fully compatible with Moscow’s paternalism regarding Central Asia, 
its security pursuits and even its occasional neglect of the region.  
Overall, the central emplotting feature of the following narrative is President 
Karimov’s persistent appeal for being an equal among equals which, alongside his role 
of defending Uzbekistan’s image, barely ever fomented an environment conducive to 
consistent cooperation. As shown below, President Karimov began positioning his 
political career as a supporter of a relatively reformed Soviet Union, one in which 
equality among each Republic and stability was respected. Moscow, however, 
distanced itself initially from these appeals, which eventually contributed to reinforcing 
President Karimov’s self-reliant roles. The friction, then, became more acute as 
Moscow debated a number of roles, some of which had imperialistic connotations, 
especially during the wars in Tajikistan and Afghanistan.176 Still, not all was inter-role 
conflict, seeing as compatibility was also observable during the early Putin era, when 
Moscow adjusted to the region and boosted President Karimov’s prestige and 
technocratic roles. Eventually, this led to gradual rapprochement, although, after 2006, 
Moscow’s public ambitions in becoming an energy hub and security provider for the 
region collided with President Karimov’s calls for seeking genuine independence. Role 
conflict thus became a predominant feature of the relationship after 2008, given that a 
number of unresolved issue-areas brought about discontinuity. The relationship was 
thus characterized by mutual inter-dependencies, in that events in Russia reinforced 
and constructed part of President Karimov’s public repertoires, which, in turn, affected 
Moscow’s policies for the region.  
 
IV.1. The beginning 1989-1993: the ruble, debt, bilateralism and 
Uzbekistan’s image  
 
In the summer of 1993, President Karimov gave an interview in which he reflected 
upon the end of the Soviet Union. He confessed that a confederation of sovereign states 
would have been the natural result if events had not got out of control: ‘everything had 
come down to a confederation being formed on the base of the union [sic]. But by the 
evolutionary path, without upheavals, in a civilized fashion [sic]. The Emergency 
                                               
176 See, for example, Roy Allison (2004: 280) for a brief depiction of Mr Chubais’s fascination for a 
Russian-based liberal empire. 
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Committee [i.e. the August coup leaders] broke up everything and urged on destructive 
processes.’177 He also took the opportunity to pay a small homage to the former 
Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Uzbek SSR, Sharof Rashidov, whom 
he portrayed as an unfair target of the reformist fashions of the time.178 
 These comments reveal the extent to which President Karimov had committed 
himself to stability and Mikhail Gorbachev’s renewed Soviet Union.179 Additionally, one 
cannot ignore how the statement evinces a sort of public grievance against both 
Moscow’s reformists and how Uzbekistan had been depicted during the notorious 
‘Cotton Affair’.180 The interview thus sketches well the way in which Mr Karimov’s 
career skyrocketed during the end of the Soviet Union (see Chapter III). Both the 
circumstances of his appointment and his public qualms against Perestroika created 
the ideal setting for a career based on opposing accelerated change and defending 
Uzbekistan’s image and international equality.  
 
Reform and President Karimov’s public position regarding the future of the Soviet 
Union  
 
Before independence, President Karimov positioned his rhetoric in favour of curtailing 
Moscow’s influence in Uzbekistan’s internal affairs without, however, questioning the 
Soviet Union’s economic stability. He therefore gradually invoked the slogan of 
equality among the Union’s states,181 but did not endorse changes that could have 
ended in economic upheaval.  
At the time of Perestroika and Glasnost, one of Mr Gorbachev’s more pressing 
concerns was to reform the USSR’s 1977 constitution (White 1991: 139).182 This issue 
became relevant as the Baltic countries struggled for independence and especially after 
the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian SSR declared sovereignty over the 
whole of the Soviet Union on 12 June 1990. Tashkent reciprocated a few days later, on 
20 June, by proclaiming both its own sovereignty183 and appealing for a decentralized 
                                               
177 ‘Uzbekistan; Karimov defends his policies against accusations of strong-arm tactics’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 12 June 1993. 
178 Ibid. 
179 For more on the issue of sovereignty and the renewed Soviet Union, see Mohira Suyarkulova (2011: 
131-132), who argues that the governments in Central Asian favoured most of Mr Gorbachev’s plans, but 
that they were not in favour of relinquishing sovereignty. 
180 See James Critchlow (1991) for an excellent account of the Cotton Affair and the main issues affecting 
the relationship between Moscow and Tashkent in the 1980s. 
181 On President Karimov’s interpretation of equality within a renewed Federation, see the following 
interview: ‘President of Uzbekistan interviewed’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 April 1991. 
182 This was a highly contested issue at the time, especially after Mr Yeltsin declared Russia’s sovereignty 
over the whole of the Soviet Union in June 1990. In any case, Lithuania had already declared 
independence the year before, soon followed by the remaining Baltic states. 
183 ‘Congress of CP of Uzbekistan’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 December 1990.  
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union.184 President Karimov, nevertheless, remained prudent in public, arguing that he 
was against breaking all formal ties with Moscow. Hence, he declared that Uzbekistan 
was not pursuing defence sovereignty and complete independence.185 Also, unlike the 
trends spurning from the Caucasus (except for the Azerbaijan SSR) and the Baltic 
countries, he endorsed the referendum on a new political treaty, the results of which 
revealed that 93.7% of the Uzbek SSR’s voter turnout was in favour of Mr Gorbachev’s 
plans.186   
In August 1991, as events were apparently leading to a reformed union treaty, 
Mr Gorbachev went on holiday. However, Moscow’s leading conservative faction then 
seized the opportunity and organized a coup. Uzbekistan’s leader was, at the time, 
visiting India (Suyarkulova 2011: 144; Carlisle 1995b: 196); but, as the coup’s failure 
became apparent, he returned to Tashkent and, along with his Kyrgyz counterpart, 
declared independence on 31 August 1991.  
This claim to independence, while seeming to be a sudden shift, was in fact a 
coherent position, given the demise of the coup. President Karimov persisted with 
invoking the protection of stability and technocratic leadership (see Chapter III). So, 
the call for independence publicly differentiated Tashkent from the conservative 
backlash, but did not question his public commitment to Soviet Unity, so long as his 
country’s sovereignty was respected (see Chapter III). Subsequently, he backed Mr 
Gorbachev after the coup and his renewed attempt to create a Union Treaty of 
Sovereign States (Suyarkulova 2011: 144).  
Nonetheless, the political game faced discontinuity after President Boris 
Yeltsin’s success in curtailing the coup (White 2000: 32). Russia’s President, probably 
convinced that USSR was no longer feasible, supported independent Ukraine and 
refused to sign the new Union Treaty on 24 November. Soon after, he met with the 
Presidents of Ukraine and Belarus and designed a separate treaty agreement on 8 
December, effectively creating the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This 
turn of events was condemned by President Karimov. Indeed, President Yeltsin 
proposed a rapid and nationalist change, which confronted Mr Karimov’s roles of 
protector of stability and de-ideologized leader. As a result, he declared that the 
                                               
184 ‘Second day’s debate on Gorbachev’s report’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 September 
1989. 
185 ‘President of Uzbekistan interviewed’ op. cit. 
186 In spite of the strong support for the Soviet Union and the narrative that subsequently came about that 
Central Asian Republics hoped to maintain the Soviet status quo, it is important to recall a number of 
President Karimov’s statements favouring sovereignty (see discussion in Chapter III and IV). Also, the 
fact that the question in the referendum itself called for a ‘sovereign’ republic or one with ‘equal rights’, 
meant that Tashkent was especially committing itself to a reformed union (Suyarkulova 2011: 141-142), 
where equality was kept, as well as economic stability. So, the status quo was more nuanced than just an 
attempt at continuity.  
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creation of the CIS was a ‘hot-headed decision’ led by the three ‘Slavic’ Republics and 
which, as a result, could have contributed to ‘balkanizing’ the Soviet Union.187 Retorts 
aside, the Soviet Union was effectively delegitimized after the creation of the CIS.  
 
The need for bilateralism and the rhetoric of reform 
 
With the end of the Soviet Union, President Karimov remained somewhat consistent 
with his previous roles, by simply switching his rhetoric on the Union to the CIS space. 
He campaigned for protecting stability and keeping the ruble zone.188 These public 
commitments, however, brought about a degree of intra-role conflict. Given that he 
persistently declared the need for defending Uzbekistan’s equality, it is difficult to 
reconcile economic integration between two different and unequal partners. 
Subsequently, the relations between Russia and Uzbekistan suffered, partially due to 
Tashkent’s contradicting roles, but also because of Moscow’s public unwillingness to 
commit to Eurasian schemes (Laruelle 2009: 30; Thibault & Levésque 1997: 20-22)   
Evidence of President Karimov’s calls for defending equality was made clear in 
his endorsement of bilateralism. In October 1991, both Presidents Yeltsin and Karimov 
ratified a barter agreement - the first bilateral treaty between the two newly 
independent Republics.189 The two heads of state then met again in 1992 to prepare the 
legal basis of their relations, formalized under the ‘Friendship Agreement’ of 30 May.190 
In practice, the agreement downplayed the importance of the CIS as a binding 
multilateral framework. At the time, President Karimov admitted that ‘[the CIS] is a 
necessity and a mechanism acceptable for all independent states which helps to 
preserve the civilized relations and contacts between the CIS states and to go to long-
term bilateral relations [sic].’ According to President Karimov’s own words, the CIS was 
downplayed as a sort of goodwill summit for promoting bilateral cooperation, rather 
than a strong multilateral body. Consequently, bilateralism would soon become his 
public modus operandi, seeing as it was perhaps the best way of defending equality 
without having it becoming diluted in a large organization led by Moscow.  
                                               
187 ‘Uzbekistan; Karimov defends his policies against accusations of strong-arm tactics’ op. cit. 
188According to Michael Kaser (1997: 28-31), the pro-ruble policy may have been motivated by a wish to 
continue receiving the large subsidies of the Soviet era and even the free-ride on Russia’s monetary 
expansion. Related also to the question of currency was the need of coordinating the Soviet Union’s debt 
in the early 1990s. In fact, it was not just with currency that President Karimov was concerned, but also 
the problem of debt. In late 1991, Mr Karimov opposed signing an agreement with the Paris Club, which 
planned the partition of the Soviet Union’s claims and debts. This problem was quickly solved, though, 
when Tashkent agreed that Moscow would service its external debt in exchange for a transfer of claims 
(Nadmitov: 7). 
189 Tashkent settled to supply cotton to Russia’s textile industry in exchange for machinery. 
190 ‘Karimov’s visit to Moscow; Friendship Treaty signed’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 
1992. 
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However, defending equality was hardly compatible with preserving an 
economic union, i.e. protecting the stability of economic arrangements. As negotiations 
over the future gained momentum, reformists in Moscow opposed the type of economic 
linkages existing with the former Soviet Union. Personalities with growing influence in 
Moscow like Yegor Gaidar, Boris Fedorov, Anatoliy Chubais and Aleksandr Shokhin 
were all against maintaining the ruble zone (Dabrowski 1995: 25). Their concerns were, 
in part, political as most felt Russia’s future lay in the West and not among its ‘lagging’ 
southern neighbours. Yet, besides their different visions, the reformists’ roles also 
sanctioned a sudden transition to a market economy, a measure to which President 
Karimov was vehemently opposed. Basing himself on his credentials as both a 
stabilizer and technocratic expert, President Karimov campaigned for maintaining 
economic stability and not shaking the foundations of the system. He publicly opposed 
Yegor Gaidar, the father of Russia’s ‘shock therapy’, accusing him of leading Russia into 
disarray and of dragging Soviet States into impoverishment.191  
Eurasianists in Russia were at the time the minority and so the ruble zone 
gathered little public support. However, President Karimov appealed to this small 
segment of Russian society as well as to his own domestic constituency: ‘there is much 
more to it [the ruble zone] than that. I would like to explain one simple thing, that is, to 
me exit from the rouble zone is not simply losing whatever economic links that we 
currently maintain with Russia (…) Among the people living in Uzbekistan are two 
million Russian-speakers. These are people who see Russia as their true homeland, and 
it only takes us to bring in our own currency for them to feel, quite simply, that they are 
being cut off from their homeland.’192  
The future of the economic union was in a state of flux, but events would soon 
appear to be on President Karimov’s side after signing the ‘Agreement on a Uniform 
Monetary System and Unified Money, Credit, and Currency Policy in the States Using 
the Ruble as a Legal Medium of Exchange’ on 9 October 1992. President Yeltsin was 
paying heed to the calls of Eurasianists, and so the ruble would remain the legal means 
of exchange in the CIS. President Karimov showed also his public commitment to the 
new arrangement by lambasting against Kyrgyzstan when it decided to leave the 
monetary union in early 1993.193 
 However, shortly after the agreement, President Yeltsin showed increasing 
uncertainty. Reformists in Moscow changed the ruble zone’s policy in July 1993 and the 
                                               
191 ‘“Speaking of Borders means breaking up Central Asia” Islam Karimov Speaks in an Interview with 
Foreign Journalists’ Official Kremlin News Broadcasts, 15 May 1992. 
192 ‘President Karimov on Independence Day; speaks on Russia’s regional role’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 17 September 1993. 
193 ‘Press Conference by CIS leaders on results of Moscow Meeting (President Hotel)’Official Kremlin 
News Broadcast, 14 May 1993.  
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Russian Central bank unilaterally announced that notes printed before 1993 would no 
longer be legal tender, meaning they were ascribed as debts to be paid by Central Asian 
states (Hale 1994).  
The decision seems to have had a strong public impact in Tashkent. Even as late 
as 2001, President Karimov reflected upon its repercussions and how it had threatened 
stability: ‘Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev [the President of Kazakhstan] and I were 
among those who were categorically against being pushed out of the rouble zone. If you 
remember, this happened in 1991-1993 when Russia introduced its new currency, they 
used to send their old banknotes and we did not know how to deal with them [sic]. You 
know even removing them from circulation is not a simple process, all these huge piles 
of currency and notes which have poisonous consequences [sic]. They gradually 
introduced their new currency and sent their old currency to us and we distributed 
them as salaries then they registered them as our debt. We objected and asked what 
they thought they were doing.’194   
In the end, it was simply not possible to merge President Karimov’s call for 
economic stability with defending equality - ambiguities that were then reflected in 
subsequent negotiations. Moscow demanded the IMF model, whilst its counterparts 
desired a one country one vote system (Dabrowski 1995: 20-21). President Yeltsin, 
though, seems to have been somewhat sensitive to the situation in Central Asia and 
backtracked again by proposing the creation of a Monetary and Economic Union in 
August 1993. President Karimov then adjusted his actions by authorizing national 
economic policy to be coordinated alongside Moscow.195 However, he then refused 
transferring 40 tonnes of gold to Russia (Hale 1994: 149) and so no agreement was 
reached. Losing almost all macroeconomic sovereignty was perhaps too much given 
how much he had rested his public credibility on defending equality and seeking a 
degree of genuine independence.  
The discontinuity, though, did bring new opportunities. Forsaking the ruble 
zone meant that President Karimov would no longer have to compromise on being the 
domestic undisputed authority and could thus become less constrained in propounding 
self-reliance. 
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IV.2. Disentanglement to a degree (1994-1999): diverging concerns over 
Tajikistan and Afghanistan and protecting Uzbekistan’s image 
 
After the end of the ruble zone, Moscow and Tashkent strengthened their relations by 
signing several bilateral accords: the 1994 Strategic Agreement, a Trade Accord in 1998 
and other legal treatises dealing with the 1992-1993 credits to Uzbekistan. Although a 
degree of bilateral cooperation existed, the number of treaties signed did not reflect any 
special level of public trust existing between the two parties. Indeed, by 1999 the 
relations of the two countries hardly deserved an optimistic appraisal. 
President Karimov, once abandoning the ruble zone, publicly endorsed more 
self-reliance. The electoral successes of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy’s party in 1993 and then 
of the Communist party in December 1995 brought about a degree of public grievance 
from Tashkent, given their nationalist rhetoric.196 Both parties conflicted overtly with 
President Karimov’s technocratic-centred roles, based on protecting stability and de-
ideologized politics and reinforced his role of defender of Uzbekistan’s great image. 
Still, it would be the civil wars in Tajikistan and Afghanistan that unravelled a strong 
level of public distrust between the two countries, as President Karimov accused 
Moscow of conspiring against Uzbekistan’s international equality. 
 
The problem of Moscow’s imperialist rhetoric 
 
Despite rivalries and friction, Presidents Karimov and Yeltsin were not publicly willing 
to break relations throughout the whole period. Uzbekistan’s leader actually appealed 
to Moscow. He called for the Russian government to become a more reliable partner 
and galvanize bilateral trade, which was entirely compatible with his role of bridge to 
other markets and voice for de-ideologized transition.197 Indeed, Mr Yeltsin, whose 
foreign policy had now gradually adhered to the concept of engaging with Central Asia 
(Laruelle 2009: 31; Allison 2004: 281), travelled to Tashkent in October 1998. The 
official visit and President Yeltsin’s proposal for a ten-year trade accord were portrayed 
by the press as an attempt to diminish tension.  198 
Even though these efforts did not lead to rapprochement (see below), it is 
interesting to observe that President Karimov enjoyed lauding Mr Yeltsin’s personal 
qualities. For instance, after signing the 1998 trade accord, Uzbekistan’s President 
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praised the Russian head of state for always being opposed to ‘chauvinism’ and 
grandiose ‘imperialism’.199 Moreover, he mentioned that he had personal respect for the 
Russian President, deriving from the latter’s moderation.200 This was a resounding 
show of support for Mr Yeltsin who, curiously, at the time, arrived in what seemed to be 
an intoxicated state at Tashkent airport. Reporters revealed that Mr Karimov was even 
forced to prevent Russia’s President from falling on the ground.201  
The show of respect was probably induced by President Yeltsin’s reluctance to 
fully endorse Russia’s growing nationalism,202 which was compatible with Mr 
Karimov’s role of defender of Uzbekistan’s image. It is important to mention that, in 
the 1990s, President Karimov was visibly sceptical of his Russian counterpart, who had, 
during his presidential election, portrayed Russia’s southern neighbours as backward 
(Laruelle 2009: 30). Such declarations along with uncomplimentary journalistic 
reports were frequently denounced by Mr Karimov.203 Evidently, Mr Yeltsin’s dynamic 
style opposed Mr Karimov’s technocratic approach to politics; yet as both the 
Communist and Liberal democratic parties gained influence in Moscow, Uzbekistan’s 
leader became a stronger supporter of the Russian President, which allowed for 
boosting his roles of protector of stability and undisputed authority. After Mr 
Zhirinovskiy’s electoral success in December 1993, President Karimov stated that 
‘chauvinistic sentiments are on the rise in Russia now. We should not like them to 
become predominant because they pose a certain threat to Uzbekistan.’204 
Furthermore, when Gennady Zyuganov, the secretary of the Communist party, called 
Mr Yeltsin a drunken, President Karimov intervened on behalf of Russia’s President: ‘if 
Zyuganov calls his president an alcoholic, then what kind of order will there be in the 
state, just tell me that. He is your president, who was elected, as you like to boast, in a 
democratic way.’205  
Furthermore, Russia’s growing nationalistic pride was portrayed as a threat to 
Uzbekistan’s genuine independence and international equality. For instance, Tashkent 
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criticized Foreign Minister Nikolay Kozyrev’s suggestion of using force to protect ethnic 
Russians abroad and the Duma’s decision to consider the Belovezhskaya Puscha 
agreements illegal.206 So, as the debate over Russian nationalism and imperialism 
persisted, President Yeltsin responded to the politicization of chauvinism by publicly 
dismissing the imperial aims of Russia in December 1997 and appealing for 
Uzbekistan’s cooperation.207 Still, as shown below, these adjustments and small 
instances of role compatibility between the two leaders were not enough to ameliorate a 
number of other tense bilateral issue-areas that came under the public spotlight. 
 
Russia and Uzbekistan’s interventionist policies: clashes over Tajikistan and 
Afghanistan 
 
At the surface level, everything would suggest that Moscow and Tashkent shared 
similar concerns over stability. According to President Karimov, the conflicts in 
Chechnya were linked to Tajikistan and Afghanistan and the growth of Islamic 
fundamentalism: ‘after the events in Dagestan and in Russia in general, it has become 
obvious that there are common centres, which are powerful, have strong financial 
resources, and are extremely well organized (...) I am firmly convinced that the savage 
appearance of international terrorism is today taking cover behind religious concepts, 
sacred to many people.’208 Consequently, both Moscow and Tashkent were sometimes 
able to demonstrate public unity as the crises escalated,209 but full role compatibility 
was hindered by other parallel events, which increased bilateral friction.  
Initially, with factional confrontations in Dushanbe escalating, Moscow and 
Tashkent became active in promoting the Kulabi and Leninibadi groups to power. 
President Karimov supported the popular front led by Sanjar Kenjayev (a Tajikistani 
national from the Leninibadi region) in fighting against the United Tajik Opposition 
(UTO) (Akiner 2001: 21; Jonson 2006). The war gained visibility in the international 
public sphere as twenty-four Russian border troops were killed in Tajikistan in July 
1993, eventually inducing President Yeltsin to become more involved in the conflict and 
declare that Tajikistan’s border would be regarded as Russia’s border too (Neumann & 
Solodovnik 1996: 92). This was far from being compatible with President Karimov’s 
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public positions, seeing as he called for seeking genuine independence and defending 
equality for both Uzbekistan and its neighbours. In fact, just a few months earlier, he 
had stated to be personally against Central Asian countries requiring external 
assistance to defend themselves: ‘let me just stress that Tajikistan should not expect 
somebody else to come and defend it. Every people must defend themselves and every 
state if it is a sovereign and independent state.’210 President Karimov argued for 
demilitarizing the region and thus objected to Russian border troops remaining on the 
ground (see Chapter III).  
Once violence in Tajikistan mitigated in 1994, Uzbekistani and Russian 
authorities managed to exclude the UTO from Tajikistan’s late November elections. The 
outcome, however, was not favourable to Tashkent given that the leninibadi candidate 
they supported lost, and Emomalii Rahmon, a kulabi, won (Neumann & Solodovnik 
1996: 94). Power sharing was still a contested issue and a compromise was settled in 
Moscow in April 1997, whereby President Rahmon agreed to allocate thirty per cent of 
his government to members of the UTO. Despite the successful negotiation, Tashkent 
refused to be one of the guarantors of the agreement, even though it did not publicly 
divulge the reasons for the decision.211 As an initial response to this settlement, 
Tashkent removed its own peacekeeping force from Tajikistan in November 1998 and 
clarified its position by demanding Russia to do the same: ‘we used to have our 
battalion in Tajikistan. Currently a reconciliation process is underway in Tajikistan. All 
the members of the Tajik opposition in Afghanistan have returned. So now they should 
come to an agreement, conduct elections and restore peace. Why, now, should our 
battalion stay there?’212 As President Karimov’s appeals were ignored, and as a 
subsequent military intervention resulted in failure,213 he accused Russian intelligence 
of fomenting hostilities between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.214 
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 Role incompatibility also became more visible once the civil war in Afghanistan 
escalated. Reports at the time showed both sides clashing over whom to support. 
Initially, Tashkent assisted General Rashid Dostum, who controlled the Junbesh-i 
Milli-yi Islami (National Islamic Movement) in Afghanistan’s north (Rubin 2002: 275-
276).215Alternatively, President Yeltsin supported his Afghan counterpart, Burhanuddin 
Rabbani. This lack of convergence eventually came out in 1994, when the Russian press 
speculated about Tashkent’s decision to hinder Russian supplies from reaching Mr 
Rabbani’s frail government in Kabul.216  
 It would seem that, by the end of 1998, President Karimov was publicly sceptical 
of Russia’s roles for the region. As President Rahmon consolidated power, Uzbekistani 
leadership saw its own factions lose influence and, according to some elements in the 
Russian press, this was the reason for Tashkent not renewing the Collective Security 
Treaty (CST) in 1999.217 Nevertheless, President Karimov made it publicly clear that his 
position concerning CST resulted from Moscow not coming to Uzbekistan’s aid once 
the Taliban were able to control Afghanistan’s north: ‘we were witnesses of those times 
when twice the Taleban [sic], the most militant so far, to put it mildly, section of the 
groups fighting in Afghanistan, captured the north of Afghanistan and were virtually on 
the bridge, the railway bridge linking, via the Amudarya River, the territories of 
Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Who came to help us? (…) We asked simply for missiles 
for the volley fire installations so as to cut the bridge off in case those in the north went 
out on the bridge in a state of euphoria. We were told that tomorrow a special train 
would set off. I am telling from the source, I was told by Mr Viktor Chernomyrdin who 
spoke to me on the telephone on the Sunday. And we kept on waiting.’218 Clearly, the 
way President Karimov depicted all those events reinforced his roles of seeker of 
Uzbekistan’s genuine independence and defender of equality. 
 
Increasing economic self-reliance 
 
As the promise of the ruble zone faded (see above), President Karimov gradually 
embraced economic self-reliance, based essentially on his appeals for a type of 
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mercantilist entrepreneurship and seeking genuine independence. After 1994, and 
especially during the Tajikistani peace negotiations, Uzbekistani officials rarely signed 
CIS agreements on border management, military training and economic cooperation. 
This was particularly evident as a customs union was discussed for the CIS. 
 In April 1994, Russia and Belarus took the first steps towards an economic 
union, which was then implemented in 1995 and soon joined by Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Tashkent, though, refrained from participating (Lawson & 
Erickson 1999). Instead, President Karimov actually became one of the economic 
union’s main critics, arguing that forced integration would hinder Uzbekistan’s ability 
to diversify exporting partners.219  
Economic rhetoric aside, President Karimov also claimed that a customs union 
would undermine Uzbekistan’s international equality.220 Indeed, it would seem that 
Uzbekistan’s President was wary of Russia’s actions within the CIS and questioned 
whether Moscow was sincerely determined in pursuing economic integration. Several 
incidents at the time would seem to confirm his public position, seeing as Russian 
businesses dumped goods into Belarusian markets and Moscow’s economic power 
forced Kazakhstan to tackle debilitating terms-of-trade (Ibid). Subsequently, President 
Karimov remained consistent with his role of seeker of genuine independence and 
lambasted against the creation of a Customs Union in March 1999. He suggested, 
instead, that all CIS member-states should seek to implement a free trade zone.221  
 
Unresolved issue-areas: Debts and TAPO 
 
Besides disparaging concerns over regional influence, nationalism and trade, a number 
of important issues remained unresolved throughout the 1990s, which effectively 
contributed to bilateral friction. Indeed, most of these topics challenged President 
Karimov’s own roles of defending equality, seeking genuine independence and 
pursuing mercantilism. One such problem was the financial debt Uzbekistan 
accumulated in the early 1990s, when the ruble zone was being negotiated. The subject 
was solved initially in March 1997, when Uzbekistani negotiators agreed to have their 
debt restructured and pay a total of 500.6 million dollars (Islamov 2001: 12). Yet, the 
promise all but waned once Uzbekistan’s parliament declared the agreement illegal in 
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1998, basing their decision on the fact that it had been unilaterally ascribed by 
Russia.222  
 However, the bilateral subject area that gained greatest preponderance in the 
international public sphere was the debate over the future status of the Tashkent 
Aviation Production Association (TAPO – Tashkentskoe Aviacionnoe 
Proizvodstvennoe Ob’edinenie). TAPO was one of the Soviet Union’s largest aircraft 
assembly lines and the greatest producer of (Ilyushin) II-76MF airplanes. The factory 
had originally been founded in Moscow in 1932, but moved to Uzbekistan in 1941 to 
avoid being destroyed in World War II. It eventually became an important symbol of 
Central Asia’s industrial potential and thus very much connected to the region’s 
modern economic history and, more importantly, to the roles of seeking genuine 
independence and developer of Uzbekistan’s future invoked by President Karimov, who 
had himself been a manager at the factory before entering political life. Arslan 
Ruzmetov, the former director general of Uzbekistan Airways, confirmed in a number 
of interviews that President Karimov was personally very interested in aviation, which 
evidently increased the public visibility of the sector.223 As a matter of fact, Uzbekistan’s 
leader was swift in creating the country’s first airline company in 1992 and called for 
significant investments in new planes (mostly Boeings).  
Tashkent publicly committed itself to keeping the large facility operational, 
which could only be done with Moscow’s acquiescence, as almost all components 
originated from Russia. Apparently, a significant breakthrough was reached, at which 
point Tashkent was able to remain one of the main production units of Ilyushin-type 
airplanes.224 The agreement came out of Moscow’s decision to create the Ilyushin 
Production Complex in January 1997 in order to absorb all makers of Il-type aircraft.225 
After 1998, the group included TAPO but, according to the press, Tashkent demanded 
300 million dollars to place the factory under Russian control. Moscow was reluctant, 
yet Uzbekistan’s government was not willing to surrender the plant without a financial 
settlement;226 thereby continuing with its defence of equality and pursuit of genuine 
independence. In any case, the negotiations stagnated temporarily in 1998 due to 
economic crisis. The issue remained unsettled for the time being and would resurface 
periodically in following years (see below).  
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IV.3. Rapprochement 2000-2006: A shift in Russia’s Roles 
  
After a number of visible quarrels in the late 1990s, Moscow gradually changed its 
attitude toward the ‘near abroad’. President Putin endorsed Eurasianism (Sakwa 2004: 
269) and publicly subscribed to strengthening his country’s links with Central Asia. The 
lack of political success in the region, particularly with regards to Uzbekistan, probably 
induced a small adjustment in roles, as Moscow sought rapprochement with its CIS 
counterpart. President Putin thus signalled his public wish to normalize a number of 
commercial relationships, particularly in the arms and energy sectors.227 Additionally, 
during the infamous Colour Revolutions, as political instability increased in some 
former Soviet countries, President Putin backed the governments of in-fellow CIS 
partners. All these events built greater role compatibility in the bilateral relationship, 
leading to rapprochement. 
 
The shift in Russia’s strategy in 2000: Recognizing Uzbekistan’s importance 
 
President Yeltsin resigned from his office on 31 December 1999, making Vladimir Putin 
the acting President of the Russian Federation. Curiously, he had travelled to 
Uzbekistan just a few days before - his first ever foreign trip abroad as acting Prime 
Minister.228 The destination was not a random choice and was actually the first step in a 
growing trend. In fact, Uzbekistan was again his first stopover as President in May 
2000. Mr Putin thus conveyed publicly his commitment toward Mr Karimov and the 
rest of Central Asia. Naturally, having Russia’s second President travelling to 
Uzbekistan first among all others played up to Mr Karimov’s prestige-based roles and 
during the visit he admitted that the two countries had clashing interests, although 
Tashkent was in need of Moscow being a reliable partner.229  
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Despite the show of gratitude, it would seem that rapprochement still had a long 
way to go, especially after the problematic 1990s period. Even as the situation in 
Afghanistan deteriorated, President Karimov dispelled any notion that he was changing 
policy and begging Russia for help: ‘please tell Russia, there is no need to defend us. 
Should people come to our country and die on Uzbekistan's borders? There is no need 
to shed blood on our behalf. Uzbeks are capable of responding blow for blow 
themselves. Having said that, we need equipment and armaments in order to defend 
ourselves.’230  
It is important to bear in mind that, in the summer of 1999, Tashkent was 
threatened by the IMU’s incursions into Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Also, in the 
following summer, the IMU was again able to mobilize into former Soviet Central Asia, 
causing widespread fear in Uzbekistan.231 Mr Karimov was subsequently unable to 
attend a CIS summit in Yalta but, according to the Russian press, received a 
sympathetic call from Mr Putin.232 
 So, by the end of 2000, the difficult security situation in Central Asia, coupled 
with President Putin’s efforts to fight terrorism at home and abroad, led to greater role 
compatibility. Tashkent’s military forces cooperated with CIS’s Southern military 
exercises in September 2000,233 and Moscow also opened a business centre in 
Uzbekistan. Still, some incidents made clear that rapprochement remained a sinuous 
path. In October 2000, President Karimov criticized the creation of the Eurasian 
Economic Community (Eurasec), consisting of Russia, Belarus and other Central Asian 
states. Like his previous critiques, he pointed out that the new organization was an 
illusionary scheme and called, instead, for implementing a free trade zone.234 Moreover, 
President Karimov remained consistent in his appeals for seeking genuine 
independence by remonstrating against Moscow’s decision to reinstate the Soviet 
Union’s anthem in December 2000, claiming that the hymn symbolized a totalitarian 
system.235  
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Reinforcing Russia’s role: Military Purchases and Investment in Oil and Gas 
 
President Putin’s public commitment to consolidating Russia’s connection to Central 
Asia was made evident by the number of agreements on energy and arms supplies he 
put forth. In January 2002, he even called for a ‘Eurasian alliance of gas producers’, of 
which Uzbekistan was supposed to be part (Allison 2004: 289). This focus on economic 
partnerships was more in line with President Karimov’s technocratic roles and calls for 
de-ideologized and technocratic relations, based on business, trade and security. Also, 
in March 2001, a Russian delegation led by Col-General Leonid Ivashov met with 
Uzbekistan’s Defence Minister, Qodir G’ulomov, – an encounter which led to more 
Russian arms supplies and a quota increase for Uzbekistani officers in Russia’s military 
academies. President Karimov apparently replied with a quid pro quo by stating that he 
had rejected the US Defense Secretary’s offer of permanent advisers among 
Uzbekistan’s troops.236 Such statements naturally corresponded to a Great Game type 
of rhetoric, which inevitably became more preponderant as Washington engaged 
actively with the region after 2001 (see Chapter V). 
 In May 2001, President Karimov made an official visit to Moscow at President 
Putin’s bequest. According to the press, the two discussed security cooperation and 
boosting trade.237 When returning back to Uzbekistan, President Karimov highlighted 
that he was satisfied with the progress in bilateral relations, although he cautioned 
again that he was not looking for any kind of favours from Russia’s government, since 
these usually came at a price.238 
 In addition to greater security cooperation, President Karimov seems to have 
also welcomed Moscow’s interest in Uzbekistan’s energy sector, which was entirely 
compatible with developing the country’s economy. A new enterprise was established 
in July 2001, when Lukoil and Itera, two Russian oil companies, signed an agreement 
with Uzbekneftgaz.239 Afterwards, in December 2002, Alexey Miller, Chairman of 
Gazprom, signed a strategic agreement with Tashkent, entailing the long-term 
purchase of gas. This was a new hallmark in the relationship and so, in August 2003, 
President Putin travelled once more to Uzbekistan, where he formalized the agreement 
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in Samarkand. At the meeting, Russia’s president gave special emphasis to his country’s 
new commitments towards Uzbekistan’s defence and energy sectors.240  
 
The effects of the Colour Revolutions: Consolidating Russian-Uzbekistani relations 
 
As rapprochement was gaining momentum, the relationship received yet another boost 
when, in the Novembers of 2003 and 2004, revolutions took place in Georgia and 
Ukraine (Kuzio 2005: 429-494; Tudoroiu 2007: 329). Uzbekistani authorities were 
quick to respond to the democratizing trends by placing a variety of legal restrictions on 
local and international NGOs (Ilkhamov 2005a: 298-301). For that reason, President 
Putin’s adjustment toward technocracy and Eurasianism was resulting in increased 
role compatibility with Tashkent, particularly as the international context focused on 
political reform. However, it is important to be aware that even though both were 
visibly sceptical about the reformist backlash instigated by the Colour Revolutions, Mr 
Karimov did not consider Moscow an innocent bystander in Ukraine’s Orange 
Revolution.241 Nevertheless, soon after the Georgian revolution and the subsequent 
ousting of President Shevardnadze, the discontinuity was conducive to protecting 
stability. In April 2004, a Uzbekistani-Russian Business Council was set up in Moscow 
and then, in May, the Russian Defence Minister proclaimed that the two countries were 
preparing joint military exercises for 2005 (Nuritov 2004) - an announcement that 
preceded a new bilateral Strategic Partnership agreement, signed in June 2004.242 The 
treaty strengthened the positive moment in the two countries’ relations and reinforced 
Moscow’s importance in Uzbekistan’s security sector. Article 8 of the agreement even 
prepared for the eventuality of Russian forces using military facilities in Uzbekistan’s 
territory (although the article safeguarded that, if that was to happen, it would have to 
be settled in a separate accord).243 A few weeks later, President Karimov praised the 
new phase in Uzbekistani-Russian relations and underlined the importance of his own 
personal relationship with President Putin.244 The security agreement could also not 
have had better timing for protecting stability given that in both March and July 2004 
Tashkent suffered two terrorist attacks (Islamov 2004).245  
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After Andijan: The peak of Uzbekistani-Russian relations 
 
On 13 May 2005, Uzbekistan’s troops fired on protestors in the Ferghana Valley city of 
Andijan. A day later, the leader of the Russian Communist party argued that the United 
States was in some way behind the Andijan uprising.246 Eventually, Washington 
reprimanded Uzbekistan for the violent outcome (see Chapters V and VI for a more 
detailed description of the events).247 President Putin, in contrast, was quick to support 
his Uzbekistani counterpart. In June 2005, Mr Karimov met with the Russian President 
in Moscow. The latter publicly stated that he agreed with Tashkent’s version of the 
events, pointing out that the crisis had been organized from outside the country.248 
Also, the two leaders continued with business as usual, thereby reinforcing President 
Karimov’s role of protector of stability. In September, for the first time in the history of 
their relationship, the two countries executed bilateral military exercises in 
Uzbekistan’s southern region of Jizzax, as had been planned in the previous year. 
Moreover, the two sides increased their economic linkages when Russian state-owned 
Lukoil obtained a stake in Uzbekistan’s side of the Aral Sea.249 
In November 2005, President Karimov travelled once more to Moscow (the 
second time in that year), where he and President Putin publicly pledged to fulfil the 
2004 Strategic Partnership agreement.250 The bilateral relationship was then at its peak 
and President Karimov eschewed his public scepticism of Eurasec and joined the 
organization in January 2006. He then declared that some of the country’s laws would 
have to change to accommodate the integration projects of that organization.251 Soon 
after, in June 2006, Uzbekistan also became a member of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO), another Moscow-sponsored project for collective military action.  
In spite of the momentum and political adjustments toward cooperation, the 
Secretary General of the CSTO, Nikolay Bordyuzha, was slightly more cautious about 
regional integration. He warned before accession that Tashkent’s membership was not 
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being considered;252 perhaps hinting at how difficult it would be to negotiate a power-
sharing agreement with Central Asia’s persistent defender of equality, seeker of 
genuine independence and voice for non-militarism.253 Obviously, it is important to 
recall that this peak of public goodwill had an uneasy foundation, seeing as a number of 
bilateral issues remained unresolved. Indeed, just a few years before, Russia’s Deputy 
Finance Minister warned that Uzbekistan’s debt to Moscow harmed economic relations 
between the two countries.254 Moreover, as it collided with his role of non-militaristic 
voice for Central Asia, Mr Karimov had in 2002 publicly disapproved of Russian forces 
using the Kant Air Base in Kyrgyzstan.255  
 
IV.4. Deterioration 2007-2010: The persistence of unresolved issue-areas  
 
By 2008, friction between Tashkent and Moscow in the international public sphere was 
out in the open. Indeed, such was the degree of public discord that Prime Minister 
Putin travelled personally to Uzbekistan, in what the Russian press described as an 
attempt to halt the growing tension between the two states.256 The trip managed to 
reopen some channels of communication, although it was not enough to prevent 
Tashkent from announcing its withdrawal from Eurasec a month later.  
The triggers for the discontinuity were essentially the clashes over debt 
payments, gas and oil pricing, the future of TAPO and the degree of Russian 
assertiveness in the region. Given the complexity of the problems, this last part of the 
narrative will portray each of those issues separately, even though one should be aware 
that they were all inter-linked and affected President Karimov’s roles as a defender of 
equality, seeker of genuine independence, mercantilist entrepreneur, non-militaristic 
voice and undisputed authority (see above).  
Still, it is impossible to ignore that, as role conflict between Moscow and 
Tashkent augmented, Tashkent’s relationship with the West improved. The Central 
Asian Republic was actually being contemplated as a major transit country for NATO 
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supplies to Afghanistan (see Chapter V),257 and the EU also removed some of its 
sanctions in October 2008. While this turn of events certainly affected Central Asian 
geopolitics, one must be aware of the fact that the growing level of friction with Russia 
originated from a particular dynamic, intrinsic to that bilateral relationship, rather than 
from the changing external context. The conclusion of this thesis will, however, 
readdress this point as it discusses role theory and strategic interaction. For now, it is 
important to observe that, around 2008, role conflict resurfaced as Moscow underlined 
its Eurasian roles and was more determined to strengthen its position in the region.258 
 
Russia’s encroachment through CSTO and Eurasec  
 
Unease between Tashkent and Moscow in 2008 grew partly in response to a number of 
disagreements over the internal workings of both Eurasec and the CSTO. Looking 
closely at how President Karimov publicly called for seeking genuine independence, 
defending equality and non-militarism, problems could have been foreshadowed 
immediately after Uzbekistan joined the new military organization. At the time, 
President Karimov quickly suggested merging Eurasec with CSTO, thereby questioning 
the independent aims of both Moscow led organizations.259  
Moscow also moved to enhance its roles for the region, advocating in 2008 for 
the creation of a joint CSTO force. President Karimov, though, remained a staunch 
supporter of his country’s genuine independence and non-militarism and thus opposed 
the initiative. Moreover, he rejected implementing a Collective Rapid Reaction Forces 
(CRRF) and publicly conveyed his displeasure by not attending the Yerevan CSTO 
summit in April 2009 (Akhmadov 2009b). Overall, Tashkent’s position was that 
collective forces should not be permanent, that their actions should be based on 
consensus, and that provisions for non-interventionism would have to be ensured if 
Uzbekistan was to contemplate joining CRRF (Tolipov 2009).  
 Tashkent remained within CSTO for the time being, although it was apparently 
less reluctant to leave Eurasec - perhaps because of the growing friction within the 
latter. The decision seems to have been partially instigated by the Eurasec October 
2007 summit, where Russia and all other member states sided with Tajikistan in favour 
of redistributing water resources in Central Asia. President Karimov, who was 
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attending, was also subjected to a wave of criticism from Tajikistani officials, all of 
whom remonstrated against Uzbekistan’s restrictive Visa regime (Saidov 2008). This 
seems to have been the last straw (Ibid).260 Indeed, such blatant attacks conflicted with 
President Karimov’s undisputed authority.  
Consequently, with the relations within Eurasec at a low point, Uzbekistani 
authorities announced their withdrawal from the organization in late 2008, slightly 
after the EU removed its sanctions. Once more, the timing of the decision suggests a 
certain quid pro quo that fits nicely with the strategic rationale of playing one against 
the other (see Introduction and Chapter I). This issue will be readdressed in the 
Conclusion, but, as demonstrated below, the difficult relations within Eurasec and 
CSTO were only one dimension of Russian-Uzbekistani relations and not entirely of 
Moscow’s making, rather the reflection of growing power disputes in Central Asia.261 
Furthermore, the decision to quit Eurasec also has to be read in the light of growing 
bilateral friction. 
 
The persistence of unresolved issues: debt, TAPO and negotiating gas and oil prices  
 
From 2008, several problematic bilateral issues were under the public spotlight. 
Uzbekistan’s debt to Russia was certainly one of them. Indeed, President Medvedev 
visited his Central Asian partner in 2010 and, according to the Russian press, 
personally brought up the issue of debt repayments with his Uzbekistani counterpart. 
Tashkent, though, refused clearing its old credits, but the nature of the talks remained 
secluded (Panfilova 2010). Moreover, Tashkent’s policy of hindering convertibility to 
protect local industries (Rosenberg & Zeeuw 2001: 160) made it difficult for some 
Russian enterprises to transfer profits to their mother companies, making negotiations 
between the two increasingly hard.262 
 As concerns the aviation sector, problems arose mainly due to President 
Karimov’s strict adherence to the roles of mercantilist entrepreneur and seeker of 
genuine independence. Apparently, Tashkent was publicly reluctant to see TAPO’s 
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industrial relevance deteriorate. For example, a few years before, in late 1999, President 
Karimov took Mr Putin on a tour of TAPO; perhaps in order to show its importance to 
Uzbekistan’s industrial sector.263 As such, the plant became a kind of symbol, given how 
much President Karimov appealed for economic self-reliance and the need for 
industry.264 
Following the stagnant negotiations of the 1990s, TAPO gained new life in 2001 
when a contract for six II-78 aircraft was signed with India.265 According to the Russian 
press, though, this did not solve the problem, as Tashkent was unwilling to 
acknowledge Russian royalties (Lantratov 2003). The problem regarding the financial 
reward led Moscow to retort, as it supported transferring Ilyushin production to the 
Voronezh Aircraft Manufacturing Association in Russia. According to the press, this 
imminent relocation was discussed between Presidents Karimov and Putin in 2003.266 
No progress was made, although the press persistently hinted that Ilyushin aircraft 
production would eventually be transferred to Voronezh (Mukhin 2004).  
The situation eventually became more politicized after 2005, when Russia 
negotiated a 1.5 billion dollar contract to supply aircraft to China. TAPO was included 
in the production consortium, even though it was slow in abiding to production 
deadlines.267 Consequently, Moscow demanded publicly that either production would 
have to take place in Russia or TAPO would need to join Russia’s United Aircraft 
Company (UAC).268 Negotiations continued until November 2006, during the peak of 
Russian-Uzbekistani relations. The press revealed that both sides signed a protocol, 
wherein Tashkent agreed to include TAPO within UAC in exchange for receiving shares 
in the holding company (Ivanov 2008). Once more, though, the agreement was not 
implemented, reaching a stalemate in February 2008. According to the press, President 
Karimov disagreed with UAC’s limited design for TAPO (Mukhin 2009) and so it would 
seem that an equal Uzbekistan and its mercantilist roles were only compatible with 
TAPO having greater strategic importance. 
Besides TAPO and the issue of debt, the period running from 2007 to 2008 was 
also complicated as far as bilateral oil and gas negotiations were concerned. Moscow’s 
2006 gas dispute with Kiev brought a degree of discontinuity to the energy market and 
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so the Russian government sought to circumvent the EU’s attempts to bypass its gas 
supplies (see Chapter VI). It is important to bear in mind that President Karimov had 
already agreed in July 2007 to be part of a natural gas transit and supply scheme from 
Turkmenistan to China.269 Given the circumstances, Russia’s influence in the Central 
Asian energy sector was not as preponderant as it had been in the 1990s and President 
Putin moved quickly to secure gas supplies from Central Asia (Kandiyoti 2008: 85-86). 
His dealings were paying off since, by December 2007, Moscow signed a number of 
agreements with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Ibid: 88).  
Nevertheless, Moscow sought quite openly to obtain cheaper gas from Central 
Asia in order to then export its own gas to Europe at much higher prices (Ibid). 
President Karimov like his neighbours was true to equality and demanded European 
prices for gas exports. According to the Russian press, he visited Moscow in February 
2008 (his first visit since his re-election in 2007) in order to settle a new pricing 
mechanism.270 
During the negotiations that followed, Moscow temporarily embargoed 
Uzbekistani cotton on 12 May 2008, which was justified as necessary to prevent the 
spread of crop disease.271 The reasons for the decision remain unclear, yet the timing 
certainly suggests coercion. Tashkent then reciprocated by having the name of one of 
its central avenues changed from Pushkin to Independence (Mustaqillik).272 Moreover, 
Uzbekistani authorities also allowed Petronas, a Malaysian oil company, to explore 
fields that at one point had been allocated to Lukoil.273 Russia’s new President, Dmitry 
Medvedev, responded by ignoring Uzbekistan in his first visit to Central Asia.  
It would seem that negotiations were at an impasse and the relationship 
deteriorating. To solve the conundrum, Mr Putin, who was now Russia’s Prime-
Minister, personally travelled to Uzbekistan, where he appealed for a settlement.274 The 
public gesture apparently had some pay-offs, as President Medvedev later decided to 
visit Uzbekistan and also voiced his personal scepticism toward Tajikistan’s Roghun 
project.275 Moscow thus slightly adjusted its roles and showed greater compatibility 
with President Karimov’s more recent public concerns over protecting Central Asia’s 
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environment. Accordingly, Uzbekistan’s leader praised Moscow’s new position: 
‘Uzbekistan counts on Russia's well-thought-out and considered position on issues 
relating the implementation of hydro power projects in the Central Asian region (…) 
This issue is vital for me, and not only for me, but also for the whole population of 
Uzbekistan, especially, if we take into consideration a disaster and tragedy - the 
shrinking of the Aral Sea - that we have been experiencing for several years.’276  
Overall, 2008 showed that President Karimov never quite relinquished his 
public position on Uzbekistan’s self-reliance. The fact that the relationship peaked after 
2005 was not a sign that things had changed. While President Putin had gradually 
adjusted the way in which Moscow interacted with Central Asian counterparts, Russia’s 
government did not fully abandon some of its other traditional roles for the region, 
which led to less cooperation after 2008.  
President Karimov, too, did not compromise his public positions and continued 
being a staunch advocate of Uzbekistan’s international equality and genuine 
independence, especially vis à vis Russia. So the relationship remained a mixture of 
conflict and cooperation throughout the twenty years. Role compatibility was certainly 
visible between 2000 and 2006 and, afterwards, both agreed to have TAPO become a 
repair centre for Russian helicopters in 2007,277 as well as having Tashkent receive 
surface-to-air missiles.278 Moreover, in December 2009, Gazprom signed another 
contract with Uztransgaz for importing natural gas,279 thereby continuing with bilateral 
energy cooperation. All these instances, among others mentioned above, suggest that, 
when the two managed to downplay competitive rhetoric and focus mainly on 
technocratic roles, cooperation ensued. Nonetheless, with both rarely adjusting their 
core roles - specifically Moscow pursuing unilateral Eurasian interests against 
Tashkent’s demand for equality -, it is difficult to foresee a future of closer cooperation.  
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V. The Uzbekistani-American Relationship 1991-2010 
 
The Uzbekistani-American bilateral relationship is hinged on deep role incompatibility. 
Throughout the years, out of all of the roles in President Karimov’s set, protecting 
stability and developing Uzbekistan’s economic future were practically the only ones 
that converged with Washington. Even in periods of more observable cooperation in 
the international public sphere, such as after 11 September 2001, their partnership 
remained an illusion, as Heathershaw (2007) described (see Chapter II). Role 
discontinuities were also prevalent when a number of shifting contexts led to divergent 
roles resurfacing over time – much like Uzbekistan’s relationship with Russia. In short, 
the narrative is emplotted by several inter-role conflicts, all of which provoked a 
number of public credibility problems for the two actors.  
 One reason for the occasional altercations was the fact that Washington’s 
agenda for the region was never wholly coherent, in part due to intra-role conflict 
between its own foreign policy makers. American foreign policy is both complex and 
highly political, whereby the President, Congress, the Department of State (DoS) and 
the Department of Defense (DoD) endorse a number of frequently competing priorities 
(Rosati & Scott 2011: 5).  
Other than Washington’s lack of role coherency, Central Asia was also a 
relatively novel area for many of its officials and analysts (Hill 2002). In fact, the 
independence of the Central Asian Republics came as a surprise (Rumer 2007: 18), 
causing uncertainty about which strategy to endorse and leading to an ambiguous 
foreign policy (Akbarzadeh 2005: 61). Nevertheless, Washington participated in 
Central Asian politics from the outset and Uzbekistan slowly managed to cooperate 
with the world’s super power as the two sides recognized the importance of protecting 
stability – a role that was very much endorsed by American leadership after the first 
Golf War (Le Prestre 1997b: 72). 
The story begins with Washington seeking to carry out Secretary of State James 
Baker’s principles of self-determination, respect for democracy, Human Rights and 
international law under the 1992 Freedom Support Act (Rumer 2007: 20-22). The roles 
of spreading democracy and market principles became a key aspect of American foreign 
policy for the region and were never fully disregarded, albeit their preponderance 
waning at particular moments in time. 
 Washington’s reformist programme led to bilateral role conflict. President 
Karimov’s roles of technocratic expert and undisputed authority hardly matched the 
American pro-democratic agenda, thereby affecting Washington’s willingness to 
approach Tashkent in the early 1990s. Washington ignored Uzbekistan and, instead, 
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praised its neighbours, all of which was a significant stab at President Karimov’s public 
credibility, particularly his role of defender of Uzbekistan’s great image. Tashkent 
though did not budge from seeking greater recognition as well as American investment 
for boosting technocratic roles. Eventually, as Washington considered new economic 
projects for the region (Blank 2001: 127), channels of communication began opening, 
irrespective of President Karimov’s blatant authoritarianism.  
However, it was not in the field of economics that cooperation surfaced. When 
security in the region reverberated into the international public sphere in the mid-
1990s, the credibility of President Karimov’s regime in protecting stability allowed for 
role compatibility and a degree of rapprochement. By 2008, this became the only role 
with which both sides converged, given that the United States became even more 
committed to ending the Afghan conflict (Blank 2007: 1; Akbarzadeh 2005: 75; Hill 
2002). However, providing stability was frequently at odds with Washington’s other 
roles insofar as it contradicted its reformist and democratic credibility. Gradually, this 
would lead to greater intra-role conflict between the DoS and the DoD, which then had 
repercussions in the bilateral relationship. For that reason, the 2002 partnership was 
characterized by permanent inter-role conflict, leading to a partial change in President 
Karimov’s rhetoric, as he began focusing more on differentiating Uzbekistan from the 
West (see Chapter 3).  
 
V.1. A Bad Start: Uzbekistani-American relations 1991-1994 
 
In March 1992, Washington was quick to open an Embassy in Tashkent, soon after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Another potential boost for bilateral relations came when 
American businesses, such as Newmont Mining Corporation, hastened to tap 
Uzbekistan’s mineral wealth.280 Indeed, economic cooperation was theoretically a way 
in which the two sides could strengthen their relationship, leading to the creation of 
American-Uzbek chamber of commerce in 1993. 
Politically though Washington remained distant from Uzbekistan. Stanley 
Escudero was the first official of the DoS to travel to Uzbekistan in 1993 and reports at 
the time mention little on the prospects of greater cooperation. Instead, Mr Escudero 
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focused on the surrounding context and on assisting the region with humanitarian aid 
as the war in Tajikistan escalated.281  
It would seem, then, that the first instances of Washington’s engagement with 
Tashkent barely corresponded to the grand roles proclaimed by President Karimov 
after independence (see Chapter III), namely the slogans of developer for the country’s 
future, defender of international equality and protector of a great image. The United 
States, as the world’s most powerful economy, would do much to boost President 
Karimov’s credibility, insofar as it fitted nicely with his other role of bridging 
Uzbekistan to other markets. Indeed, Uzbekistan’s President showed his support for 
Washington in a variety of situations. For example, in June 1993 he supported an 
American raid in Iraq282 and, later in November 1993, he also proposed creating a 
Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, thereby aligning his policy with the 
American non-nuclear proliferation programme (Allison 2001: 224).283 Tashkent, 
though, despite the efforts, was effectively rebuffed by Washington while some of its 
neighbours were praised. President Akaev of Kyrgyzstan was received by the White 
House in May 1993 and then, in December, Vice-President Al Gore travelled to the 
region where he met with President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan.  
  
President Karimov’s bad start 
 
Washington’s apparent little interest for Tashkent was triggered in part by President 
Karimov’s roles of undisputed authority, voice for de-ideologizing politics and 
protecting stability. In other words, Mr Karimov’s regime effectively endorsed 
authoritarianism in the early 1990s as it repressed opposition.284 Indeed, no other case 
led to greater inter-role conflict than the May 1992 beating of Abdurahim Po’lat, the 
leader of the opposition party Birlik. The incident had repercussions in Washington, 
given that at the time, an American delegation led by Senator Larry Pressler was 
visiting Uzbekistan to assess the implementation of the Freedom Support Act. On 
returning to the United States, he recounted what he saw to Congress and described the 
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injuries inflicted on one of Uzbekistan’s main opposition leaders.285 He explained that 
he had managed to enter the hospital and talk to Mr Po’lat. The Senator then relayed 
that Uzbekistani authorities were unwilling to take heed of his criticism and that the 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs dismissed his questions, by invoking that it was an 
internal affair.286 The incident certainly led to friction and Senator Pressler 
recommended rejecting all of President Karimov’s requests for being received at the 
White House: ‘the United States should not invite notorious charlatans like President 
Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan to visit the United States to meet and greet President 
Bush (...) I commend the Bush Administration for withdrawing for an indefinite period 
the invitation for Mr Karimov to visit this country. Thugs masquerading as democrats 
also should not qualify for aid.’ 287  
As Bill Clinton was elected President little changed in the short-term. His Vice-
President went on tour of Central Asia and blatantly ignored Uzbekistan. Furthermore, 
during the Secretary of State’s confirmation hearing, in January 1993, Senator Pressler 
pressed him to continue rejecting close ties with Uzbekistan’s President.288 Evidently, 
the Po’lat beating had not been forgotten and the event symbolized how Washington’s 
democratic roles were not compatible with President Karimov’s blatant 
authoritarianism. His role of undisputed authority continued damaging a potential 
relationship with the United States, even more so when, in January 1994, the 
Washington Times reported that Uzbekistan’s government had forbid the renowned 
Central Asian scholar, William Fierman, to enter the country (Morrison 1994). 
 
V.2. Improving relations 1995-2000: The Importance of Security after 
disappointing reform and economic investment  
 
Much to Tashkent’s good fortune, American oil and gas companies invested more in 
Central Asia in the mid-1990s. The Clinton Administration thus gradually took a special 
interest in the region’s pivotal location and the potential that it had for bypassing 
Russia and Iran (Blank 2001: 130-131). The discontinuity would work in President 
Karimov’s favour, especially because he gave some signs of political reform (even 
though he did not relinquish his undisputed authority). Eventually, Washington 
promoted a number of economic investments in Central Asia which, regrettably for 
                                               
285 See the account of Senator Pressler’s visit in ‘A visit to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Turkmenistan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, and Latvia, to examine United States 
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288 Read the full hearing in: ‘Hearing of Senate Foreign Relations Committee’ Federal News Service, 13 
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Uzbekistan, never fully materialized. Alternatively, as the war in Afghanistan escalated, 
it would be President Karimov’s stability that allowed for increased inter-role 
compatibility. 
 
Energy vs. Human Rights: President Karimov’s visit to the United States 
 
After 1994, President Karimov’s regime made a few adjustments, such as freeing 
political prisoners and meeting with a few opposition members.289 These gestures - as 
well as Uzbekistan joining NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994 - coupled with 
speculation over Central Asia becoming a major energy hub, had some effects in the 
bilateral relationship, particularly after Enron Oil & Gas proposed a joint venture with 
Tashkent in February 1995.290 A change was on the horizon and American Secretary of 
Defense, William Perry, visited Uzbekistan in the spring of 1995.   
According to the press, President Karimov’s meeting with Mr Perry focused 
mainly on regional security and Uzbekistan’s PfP participation.291 Curiously, Secretary 
Perry praised Uzbekistan for being an ‘island of stability’ - a great boost to President 
Karimov’s public credibility. Uzbekistan’s leader then thanked Secretary Perry, even 
though he lamented that Washington had a ‘distorted picture of Uzbekistan.’292 He 
expanded on this last point by conceding that he was hoping for a stronger bilateral 
relationship, mainly as a way of leveraging against Russia’s imperialism: ‘first, there are 
the imperialist ambitions rearing up in Russia - I mean the chauvinist attitudes which 
are intensifying day by day in Russia.’293 Secondly, he underlined the necessity of 
obtaining American assistance for facing the threats emanating from extremism, 
namely from Afghanistan and Tajikistan.294 Thirdly, he discussed that American 
investment and commitment was crucial for his country if it were to implement 
political and economic reforms.295 In light of this last concession, it is important to note 
                                               
289 In 1995, President Karimov met with former leaders of the opposition (Fierman 1997: 391), gave 
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that when questioned about Human Rights, President Karimov argued that the 
situation had changed, but that his agenda was economics (i.e. technocratic roles) and 
not politics: ‘the questions you are asking about restrictions on rights and persecution - 
yes, they did take place. But that is all in the past. We are convinced that political 
reforms must be founded on economic reforms, so we admit that political reforms are 
lagging behind economic reforms in Uzbekistan and we can understand the United 
States' critical attitude to the political reforms taking place here.’296 So, Mr Karimov 
remained somewhat consistent with other declarations invoking the need for 
technocracy (see Chapter III). He also added that Uzbekistani mentality was not yet 
suitable to a market economy.297  
Upon returning to Washington, Secretary Perry publicly positioned himself in 
favour of more engagement with Uzbekistan. During a conference at the National 
Defense University College, he noted that, even though Human Rights are important, 
Uzbekistan’s stability could not be ignored: ‘it is one of the few countries in the former 
Soviet Union that is relatively strong economically. Indeed, it is one of the most - has 
one of the most active joint business programs with American companies of any of the 
countries in the region.  From a security point of view, it's important because it stands 
as a countervailing force to regional instability, particularly to forces of extremism that 
are being exported from Iran.’298  
It would seem that President Karimov succeeded in convincing some members 
of the United States security apparatus. So, for the short term, the stage was set for 
rapprochement which, according to the Russian media, allowed President Karimov to 
request an official visit to Washington during his trip to the United Nations in October 
1995 (Musin 1996). The reply given, apparently, was that Washington would sanction 
the visit, if Tashkent pardoned around eighty political prisoners. Uzbekistan’s leader 
quickly obliged and so the visit was scheduled for the next summer (Ibid).  
 
The June 1996 visit and the disappointing economic cooperation that followed 
  
The June 1996 visit boosted President Karimov’s international equality and his 
country’s image abroad. Indeed, protocol and ceremony are relevant for Mr Karimov’s 
public credibility, as he later himself confessed during a NATO summit in 1999: 
‘Uzbekistan and the USA, that is I as the Uzbek president and Mr Bill Clinton, sat next 
                                               
296 ‘Human rights breaches belong to past - Uzbek leader’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 8 April 
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to each other [sic]. Of course, it would not be surprising if many countries envied this. 
But this is not a matter of equality but of partnership.’299  
The visit to Washington also helped strengthen President Karimov’s role of 
committed developer of Uzbekistan’s future. He travelled briefly to Colorado, meeting 
with representatives of American companies, and was also invited to give a 
presentation for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). Evidently, the 
event acted as another boost in prestige - even more so because President Karimov was 
accustomed to delivering lengthy speeches on macroeconomic performance.300 He, 
therefore, gave a lengthy account on economic endowments and the potential for a 
profitable partnership:  
 
I would like to make an official statement to the effect that Uzbekistan is 
interested in seeing our relations with the United States strengthened and 
grow. We are also interested in seeing American business, and American 
capital, take its rightful place in the Uzbekistani market (… ) I want to just, 
you know, make use of this example and take advantage of this opportunity 
to let you all know that Uzbekistan intends to develop strategic long-term 
relations in this area.  We want to orient ourselves to modern technology.301  
 
Following the presentation, President Karimov signed a series of economic 
agreements, strengthening Tashkent’s ties with Enron, as the company planned to 
invest 1.3 billion dollars in Uzbekistan’s gas fields over the next years.302 OPIC also 
signalled its support for the project by pledging 400 million dollars of financing.303 On 
a final note, President Karimov approved a deal with TEXACO inc., which planned to 
market oil products in Uzbekistan’s internal market.304  
All the business opportunities would seem to hint at a new phase in 
Uzbekistani-American relations. Indeed, in the following year, President Clinton’s wife 
visited Uzbekistan and was received by both President Karimov and his own wife, 
Tatyana Karimov. Mrs Clinton answered questions at Tashkent’s University of World 
Economy and Diplomacy and presented her newly-published book, whose Uzbek 
                                               
299 ‘Refile Uzbek head: “We have to think about NATO Membership” – Full Version’ BBC Monitoring 
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edition, according to the press, would be prefaced by Tatyana Karimov herself.305 
Likewise, in November 1997, Prime Minister O’tkir Sultanov hosted a dinner at 
Uzbekistan’s Embassy in Washington where he received a number of executives and 
potential American investors (Boustany 1997). Yet, despite the positive momentum, 
many of the economic initiatives were never fully implemented. In fact, only the 
TEXACO joint venture materialized. By 1998, Enron quit its position in Uzbekistan 
because of difficulties in operating and obstacles placed by Russia (Paige 1998). 
Furthermore, a UNOCAL project designed in November 1996 to supply gas to Pakistan 
was scrapped because of the problematic security situation in Afghanistan.306  
 
Promise in the Silk Road initiative? 
 
Whilst economic projects failed, President Karimov embraced the Silk Road initiative 
proposed by Republican Senator Sam Brownback, who advocated alternative export 
routes for Central Asia in an effort to curtail Russian and Iranian influence. He once 
even argued that this would be the only way to ensure the independence of many 
former Soviet states.307 Such a goal played well with President Karimov’s roles of bridge 
to joining other markets and seeker of genuine independence. It thus seems clear that 
the Silk Road initiatives, as well as President Karimov’s own comments regarding 
Russia’s imperialist tendencies (see above), reveal how power politics was playing an 
important part in Central Asia. All the parties involved (see Chapter IV for some 
references to Russia’s great power politics) were increasing the level of competition. 
Still, from a purely bilateral dimension, the Silk Road initiative conformed to President 
Karimov’s appeals to breach Uzbekistan’s geographical isolation (the possible 
geopolitical and strategic rationale is readdressed in the conclusion). 
Senator Brownback visited Uzbekistan in April 1998308 and President Karimov 
became a signatory of the Ankara Pipeline Declaration – aiming at installing a major 
pipeline along the Caucasus. He thus embraced the Silk Road initiative and then joined 
GUAM during a NATO summit in 1999.309  
                                               
305See one report of Mrs Clinton’s visit in ‘ Mrs Clinton arrives in Tashkent, opens women's hospital’ 
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GUAM was created with the purpose of fostering cooperation with NATO and 
establishing alternative transport routes for bypassing Russia and Iran (Kuzio 2000: 
99). President Karimov, therefore, clarified his public position, by classifying GUAM as 
a promising trade opportunity: ‘Senator Sam Brownback, who wants to gather together 
some six or seven countries linked to the Silk Road and find out our attitude to that law 
(…) What is the aim of that organization? GUAM is an organization of states around the 
Black Sea. From the point of view of communications and routes we are eager to reach 
that region and the world market in general. Our joining GUAM will help us greatly in 
achieving that our goal.’310 Joining the organization, though, barely had any impact in 
the international public sphere and Uzbekistan suspended its membership from the 
organization in 2002, perhaps because no new economic opportunities came about. 
 
The growing importance of the ‘island of stability’ 
 
By December 1995, Uzbekistani forces alongside Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan’s began 
addressing multi-lateral security and, a few months later, created the Central Asian 
Battalion (CENTRASBAT). The measure was supported by Washington, as 
CENTRASBAT participated in several American-sponsored security exercises in the 
late 1990s.311   
On the security front, therefore, Tashkent was gradually regarded as a reliable 
‘protector of stability’ by the DoD, especially after the Taliban threat became more 
visible.  The Clinton Administration favoured President Karimov’s proposal for 
brokering a settlement for the Afghan conflict in late 1998 (Akbarzadeh 2005: 45), 
effectively bolstering President Karimov’s role as voice for a non-militaristic Central 
Asia. His approach became known as the 6+2, consisting of the United States and 
Russia in addition to Afghanistan’s six regional neighbours (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Iran and China), all of whom were supposed to meet 
periodically and find solutions for Afghanistan’s civil war.  
Still, the main spark for greater bilateral engagement came in August 1998, 
when American Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya were bombed by Al Qaida. A few 
months later, in February 1999, Tashkent was also subjected to an attack and so 
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compatibility over protecting stability was on the rise as President Clinton sent a letter 
of support to his Uzbekistani counterpart.312 
Thereafter, Uzbekistani military forces were compelled to face IMU mobilization 
in 1999313 and Washington began assisting Central Asia strengthen its borders. The 
strategic significance of the region was increasing and the DoD took even further action 
by deciding to group the Central Asian security complex within the wider Middle East, 
thereby transferring responsibilities from European Command (EUCOM) to Central 
Command (CENTCOM) (Blank 2001: 138).  
Roles converged further in 2000, after a second IMU operation near 
Uzbekistan’s border, where a number of American mountain climbers were taken 
hostage. Washington responded swiftly and officially designated the IMU a terrorist 
organization.314 Tashkent too continued reinforcing its role of protector of stability in 
the region and, in that same year, took steps to apprehend Iranian cargo vehicles 
carrying radioactive material.315  
 
Despite Uzbekistan’s stability, controversy over Human Rights remained 
 
With Uzbekistan’s increased visibility, President Karimov’s roles would face greater 
scrutiny in the public sphere.  Growing reliability in protecting of stability was not 
enough to detract Washington from its pro-democracy roles, even more so as intra-role 
conflict increased. This growing problem was well reflected in a speech made by Strobe 
Talbott, in 1997, the Deputy Secretary of State. The statement was appropriately named 
‘Farewell to Flashman’ – an allusion to a fictional Great Game character – and argued 
in favour of pushing for reform, security and profitable economic relations in Central 
Asia, without, however, upsetting Russia or ignoring human rights (Rumer 2007: 29-
30). These goals, as worthy as they may seem, somewhat contradicted the overall 
realpolitik of Senator Brownback’s Silk Road strategy, approved by Congress in 1999, 
and designed to offset Russia (see above). Washington’s intra-role conflict was thus on 
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315 See the comments made by Secretary of State Albright commending Uzbekistan’s actions in the 
security field: ‘Albright praises vigilant Uzbek customs’ United Press International, 19 April 2000. 
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the rise and diverging positions were also enounced by some experts of the region, such 
as Martha Brill Olcott and Zbigniew Brzezinski.316  
Although pressure for reform persisted, President Karimov did not compromise 
publicly on his undisputed authority and seeking genuine independence. Instead, he 
showed increasing wariness toward American lecturing, particularly after his first 
meeting with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright: ‘I did not like what she said and 
had to state my own view (…) I asked her a question: I asked her who best knew the 
state of affairs in the USA. In astonishment, she said that they Americans did. Who, I 
asked, best knows the state of affairs in Uzbekistan? Of course, we ourselves do.’317 In 
another incident in 2000, he also criticized the DoS for worrying more about 
journalists who covered the Chechen conflict than the lives of the Russians and 
Chechens. 318  
Whereas Tashkent reached compatibility with Washington on its security policy, 
role conflict increased with the DoS over democracy promotion and economic reform, 
which became more visible during the Secretary of State’s trip to Uzbekistan in April 
2000. The visit very much bolstered President Karimov’s prestige and credibility as a 
protector of stability, given that Secretary Albright recognized the efficacy of 
Uzbekistan’s border policy.319  Still, political reform was also discussed out in the open, 
resulting in a number of public disagreements. In a news conference hosted jointly by 
the Secretary of State and the Uzbekistani Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdulaziz 
Komilov, Ms Albright stated that President Karimov ‘took on board the issues that I 
raised, he disagreed with me and I disagree with him and we will continue to make our 
case and we will continue to follow events here very carefully.’320 The Minister retorted 
that ‘we can participate and have a dialogue. At the same time to some extent this also 
causes doubts among us and we, I'll be very frank with you, cannot accept it.’321 The 
discussion persisted as Secretary Albright underlined her point: ‘I expressed (…) that it 
was necessary for the government of Uzbekistan to distinguish very carefully between 
peaceful devout believers and those who advocate terrorism or violent political 
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change.’322 Mr Komilov then replied that ‘Uzbekistan was more than 80 percent Islamic 
and that the government knows how to tell good Muslims from bad.’323  
Other similar statements made by American personnel demonstrated 
incompatibility, thus affecting President Karimov’s credibility in defending 
Uzbekistan’s image. For instance, one member of Secretary Albright’s delegation 
publicly stated that ‘we hope they [the Uzbekistani government] get the message: treat 
Muslims as they do the Jews.’324 The official was referring to Tashkent’s tolerance for 
Bukharan Jews as opposed to Muslims. American pressure, therefore, wasn’t withered 
by President Karimov’s brief rhetorical concessions a few months before the visit, in 
which he confessed the wish to one day have Uzbekistan become a democracy.325 
 
V.3. The Strategic Partnership 2002-2005: A relationship that never was 
 
After 11 September 2001, Uzbekistan was under the spotlight of the war on terror. 
President Karimov’s public credibility as a protector of stability was greatly boosted 
and his misgivings toward terrorism were now part of the discourse of the international 
public sphere (see Chapter III). Moreover, being visible meant that President Karimov 
could, in theory, enhance his country’s prestige and the roles of developer and 
technocratic expert. Nevertheless, it is important to be aware that greater engagement 
with Washington meant that Uzbekistan’s internal affairs would be under greater 
scrutiny. Still, Tashkent seems to have embraced the relationship’s new dimension, 
albeit in its typical discrete and reclusive manner. 
 
The new momentum after 11 September 2001 
 
President Karimov quickly voiced support for Washington’s fight against the Taliban 
and326, according to the press, spoke on 19 September with President George Bush on 
the phone.327 For some of Washington’s officials, greater cooperation with the Central 
Asian Republics came as a surprise, even if engagement with that part of the world was 
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far from being novel.328  
As negotiations proceeded for the provision of a new military base, a number of 
obstacles came to the forefront. Being a secretive protector of stability, President 
Karimov divulged little information to the media, which led to correspondence 
problems with American officials. For instance, despite Washington’s confirmation that 
military forces arrived in Uzbekistan,329 Mr Karimov denied the report, although he 
later acknowledged that he would allow Washington to use some facilities.330 
 Another problem surfaced due to President Karimov’s role of non-militarism. 
Uzbekistan’s President insisted that the Karshi-Khanabad (K-2) base (also known as 
Camp Stronghold Freedom) was only to be used for ‘humanitarian purposes’ (Cooley 
2009: 118). Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, visited Uzbekistan in the beginning 
of October to broker an agreement, but ended up conceding that the base was just for 
humanitarian operations.331 The outcome of negotiations was apparently unsatisfactory 
and so CENTCOM General Tommy Franks visited Uzbekistan a few weeks later to 
request the deployment of troops for attacking the Taliban. However, Tashkent’s 
position did not shift and Mr Rumseld returned to Uzbekistan’s capital for another 
attempt.332 In the end, the efforts came to no avail and K-2’s status remained for 
humanitarian purposes. 
Further American frustration came out regarding Tashkent’s reluctance to open 
the southern border with Afghanistan.333 This time, the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, 
personally visited Uzbekistan in December to broker an agreement. The meeting 
between both was inconclusive. Reports claimed that Uzbekistan’s leader bargained for 
security guarantees and financial commitment, whereas Secretary Powell remained 
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reluctant to concede much.334  In the end, the bridge opened, but this new stage in the 
relationship revealed how role compatibility was far from being a fact. Washington 
publicly acknowledged President Karimov as a regional provider of stability and had 
practical military goals to achieve.  However, American pro-democratic roles also 
meant that it could not fully relinquish its public misgivings over Uzbekistan’s 
government. For example, just a few weeks before visiting Uzbekistan, Secretary Powell 
was asked by a Senator how he would deal with a regime that ‘crushes its own 
people.’335 This statement demonstrated intra-role conflict, once more, and, at the time, 
Senator Sam Brownback retorted by changing the subject-matter and arguing that the 
regime had actually been a reliable partner.336 These polarized perspectives would 
eventually permeate the American press. Indeed, during Secretary Rumsfeld’s first visit 
to Uzbekistan, Mr Karimov was required to respond to journalists. Standing next to the 
Defense Secretary, he was questioned about the political environment in his country, to 
which he replied that freedom was not rampant and cautioned those present that the 
United States had taken two hundred years to become a full democracy.337  
Such statements reflecting President Karimov’s role of undisputed authority 
strained the bilateral relationship. Consequently, the Bush administration was 
somewhat at odds with how to position itself: either fully support the regime or remain 
critical of its questionable political practices. In practice, the message conveyed in the 
public sphere was mixed, as evinced in a number of early statements. For instance, the 
DoS showed concern with Uzbekistan’s 2002 referendum on extending the Presidential 
term from five to seven years, but also thanked Tashkent for its support. Moreover, 
Richard Boucher of the DoS publicly warned that the nationwide poll might not fulfil 
international standards (Lee 2002), and then the Assistant Secretary for European and 
Eurasian Affairs briefed the press on Uzbekistan’s lagging reforms, while also 
recognizing Tashkent’s contribution to the war in Afghanistan.338  
 
The Unrealistic Strategic Partnership Declaration 
 
A new hallmark for Uzbekistani-American relations occurred in March 2002 when the 
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two parties signed a ‘Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation 
Framework.’ President Karimov obtained commitment from the world’s predominant 
superpower and a significant boost to Uzbekistan’s image. He then paid a quick visit to 
Washington DC where he signed the agreement, recognizing the event as something 
‘numerous countries want to establish’.339  
The declaration in itself encompassed five general Articles, wherein the first, 
third and fifth specified Washington’s conditions for political and economic reforms, 
such as implementing convertibility. Nonetheless, the main principle of cooperation 
entailed ‘respect for international law, sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity 
and non-interference in each others’ internal affairs.’ Typically, respect for sovereignty 
is stipulated in international agreements but, given the scope of reform envisioned in 
the declaration, that guarantee effectively relaxed Tashkent’s obligation to satisfy 
Washington’s external pressure. In fact, the document did not have any binding 
clauses, inasmuch as it did not specify regulatory mechanisms or deadlines on how or 
when Tashkent was to pursue reform. This meant, in short, that President Karimov 
obtained prestige from a formal partnership and could, at the same time, condone 
goals that may have affected the credibility of his roles: ‘we have signed a declaration on 
strategic partnership with the USA and on the fundamentals of relations between 
Uzbekistan and the USA. The document was drawn up by both sides, although, in 
practice, most of it was proposed by us. It has many components (...) Nothing is 
dictated: if we are doing something, we are doing it because it is in the interests of our 
present generation and the one that is coming.’340  
As concerns Washington, the declaration meant that its pro-democratic roles 
were taken into account, without having to offer binding security guarantees. 
Washington’s obligations were only detailed in Article Two, which recognized that the 
United States would consider ‘with grave concern any external threat to the security 
and territorial integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan.’  
In spite of the rise in prestige, by signing the treaty President Karimov opened 
himself toward a crisis of public credibility. That perhaps explains why the Partnership 
Declaration was kept confidential and revealed only a few months later by the DoS.341 
Nevertheless, President Karimov remained a reliable partner on issues that did not 
contradict his roles. He gave his public support for the Bush Administrations’ struggle 
                                               
339‘Uzbek president to sign six documents in U.S.’ New Bulletin, 11 March 2002. 
340 ‘Uzbek leader stresses common interests with Japanese’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 August 
2002. 
341 According to Lewis (2008:17) the exact reasons for why the document was only revealed to the public 
in July remain unknown. 
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against terror,342 and its war against Saddam Hussein.343 Concessions on reform, 
though, still lagged and so President Karimov remained consistent with his roles of 
technocratic and undisputed authority. In fact, just a few months after signing the 
declaration, he proclaimed that he was not up for ‘democratic fundamentalism’: 
‘Uzbekistan has always been against all forms of radicalism (…) We are against religious 
fundamentalism, we are against Communist fundamentalism and, if you like, we are 





It is important to be aware that, while no major reforms were taken, some modest 
changes were implemented. As a supposed technocratic expert and de-ideologized 
leader, focusing on convertibility was not a significant disadvantage to his public 
credibility. As such, he agreed to sign a letter of intent with the IMF in January 2002 
(Rumer 2002: 18-20) and, in October 2003, announced full convertibility (Blackmon 
2003: 391). On political reform, no major institutional changes occurred. Yet, President 
Karimov did allow for the legalization of several human rights organizations 
throughout 2002 and abolished Uzbekistan’s main censorship body (Ilkhamov 2005a: 
299; Lewis 2008: 19).345 He also announced the opening of an Institute of Studies of 
Civil Society as part of his own Presidential apparatus (Kandiyoti 2007: 40-44).346  
 
Limelight, Openness and Growing Criticism 
 
Despite greater openness, President Karimov still had to face the consequences of his 
roles and of the criticism he had been receiving since the early 1990s. Amid reports 
about the use of torture, Mr Karimov was pressured to allow UN Special Rapporteur on 
Torture, Theo Van Boven, visit the country. Uzbekistani officials acceded in December 
                                               
342 On support for the global war on terror, see ‘Uzbek president comments on Afghan issue – text’ BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 October 2002. 
343 On President Karimov’s comments regarding the war in Iraq, see ‘Uzbekistan ready to support US on 
Iraq: Karimov.’ Agence France Presse – English, 6 March 2003. 
344 ‘Uzbek leader stresses common interests with Japanese’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 August 
2002. 
345 He did not prevent the opposition party Erk - whose leaders had been persecuted and forced to seek 
exile during the 1990s - to have its first political conference in Tashkent in June 2003 (Akbarzadeh 2005: 
90). President Karimov also published a law ‘on public funds’, which effectively legalized a number of 
NGOs (Ilkhamov 2005: 298). 
346 As restrictions loosened, Voice of America (VOA) launched its first reports in Uzbek to a number of 
affiliates in December 2003. See ‘USA/Uzbekistan: VOA debuts Uzbek-language television reports’ BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 December 2003. 
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2002, yet Mr Van Boven’s report strongly condemned the regime.347 Uzbekistan’s 
government would also have to face more disparaging accounts made by NGOs, which 
described the use of child labour in cotton fields and other persistent human rights 
violations.348  
 As reports condemned the regime, President Karimov’s public credibility as an 
undisputed leader and an economic developer was put into question. One such case 
took place in May 2003, during a European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) conference in Tashkent. President Karimov took part in the meeting, which 
was filmed live by Uzbekistan’s television broadcaster. This decision proved to be a 
mistake because he was subjected to rampant criticism.349 His frustration was actually 
quite observable when he took his headphones off midway through the conference 
(Lewis 2008: 35).  
Another damaging humiliation to his public credibility occurred in the 
beginning of 2003. The United States Congress attached a clause for all funds being 
transferred to Uzbekistan, aiming to halt American financial assistance if the Secretary 
of State did not declare officially that Tashkent was making progress on reform (Daly et 
al. 2005: 84). Even more problematic though was that Congress decided to give 
Kazakhstan a waiver (Ibid: 24, 84), thereby disparaging Uzbekistan’s image and 
leading President Karimov to confess, in late 2003, dissatisfaction with the level of 
external criticism.350  
 
The Impact of the Colour Revolutions 
  
Soon after Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution, President Karimov warned about the 
potential for instability: ‘first, all the events which are taking place in every country, 
including Georgia, are the internal affair of a country and the internal affairs of the 
people living in that country. I consider any outside interference, any attempt to 
exercise control over these processes or impact on it to be inefficient.’351  
In December 2003, the Cabinet of Ministers quickly reacted and adopted 
resolution no. 543 calling for all international organizations to re-register (Ilkhamov 
                                               
347See the full report in ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture, Theo van Boven, 
submitted in accordance with Commission resolution 2002/38’ available at:  
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/29d0f1eaf87cf3eac1256ce9005a0170/$FILE/G0310766.
pdf, accessed August 2012. 
348 See for example ‘Uzbek Children in South used as slave labour for cotton harvest - opposition’ BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 September 2002.  
349 See the following report ‘EBRD Conference Opens Under Cloud over Human-Rights Scandal’ World 
Markets Analysis, 5 May 2003. 
350 ‘Uzbek leader lashes out at rights bodies over criticism of neighbourhood system’ BBC Sumary of 
World Broadcasts, 7 December 2003. 
351 ‘Uzbek president urges Georgians to abide by constitution’ BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts, 24 
November 2003. 
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2005a: 300).352 A few months later, more measures were taken as President Karimov 
demanded the closure of OSI’s office in Tashkent (Ibid: 313), by stating that it had 
violated the law.353 This incident did not pass unnoticed and the DoS threatened that 
not renewing OSI registration would affect American assistance to Uzbekistan.354 
Tashkent, therefore, made a concession in May, as it acceded to a DoS request to open 
an international inquiry into the death of an Uzbekistani inmate.355 It was later found 
that the prisoner had died by hanging and that there were no signs of actual torture 
being applied. Ironically, though, in that same month, British Ambassador to 
Uzbekistan, Craig Murray, publicly criticized the Human Rights record of Uzbekistan’s 
government, accusing it of systematically using torture.356  
 
Insecurity and the Snub by Congress  
 
While President Karimov revamped his undisputed authority, Mr Powell took action in 
July 2004 by declaring that he would no longer certify that Uzbekistan was carrying out 
reforms. The penalization could not have occurred at a more difficult time in the two 
countries’ relations, since both had been negotiating K-2’s terms of payment (Daly et al. 
2005: 23-25). Indeed, John Daly’s et al. (2005) detailed account later revealed the 
degree to which Tashkent had been pushing for financial commitment. In light of the 
war on terror, President Karimov’s position was not entirely unreasonable (see Table 3 
below). Uzbekistan was hosting an American military base juxtaposed to Afghanistan, 
but received less aid per capita than its two Central Asian neighbours.357 Also, when 
compared to other authoritarian partners of the United States, especially Egypt, 
Uzbekistan obtained a lot less aid.358 Hence, in terms of Uzbekistan’s image and 
international equality, the discrepancy negatively affected President Karimov’s 
credibility. 
                                               
352 Other restrictions on NGOs and political liberties were imposed throughout 2004. See Alisher 
Ilkhamov’s (2005) excellent article for more on the subject. 
353 ‘Excerpts from Uzbek president's speech in parliament on 29 April’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 30 April 2004. 
354 OSI was not the only NGO to be targeted and Uzbekistani officials accused other organizations of 
fomenting discontent. See: ‘US says Uzbekistan aid threatened by closure of Soros Office’ Agence 
France Presse – English, 24 April 2004. 
355 ‘US asks for probe into case of death by torture in Uzbekistan’ Agence France Presse – English, 22 
May 2004. 
356 See a number of critiques in ‘European elections observers: Uzbek election fell far short of democratic 
standards’ The Associated  Press, 27 December 2005 and ‘Uzbekistan, Parliamentary Elections, 26 
December 2004; Final Report’ OSCE, March 2005, available at 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/uzbekistan/41950, accessed September 2012. 
357 Kyrgyzstan hosted the Manas airbase but shared no border with Afghanistan. On the other hand, 
Kazakhstan was relatively far from Afghanistan and has never hosted an American military base. 
358 Martha Olcott (2007), during a hearing at the House of Representatives in 2007, made the same point 
that Tashkent’s concerns were being not taken seriously. 
 131
 
Table 3: United States Aid in Thousands of Dollars359 Total United States Aid 
(2001- 2005) per capita 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 Total   
Uzbekistan 30,599 160,405 52,937 38,442 282,383 9.95 
Kazakhstan 51,189 57,867 51,296 41,867 202,219 11.54 
Kyrgyzstan 36,353 84,652 46,316 7,291 174,612 31.77 
Egypt 199,2053 130,5106 220,6131 186,7652 7,370942 88.08 
Pakistan 132,852 105,0128 502,144 400,441 2,085565 0.09 
 
 
Conflicts within Washington over Uzbekistan 
 
With Tashkent facing increased pressure, Washington’s intra-role also conflict 
escalated, in that many influential individuals didn’t agree with Uzbekistan being 
penalized. Air Force General Richard Myers commented that Congress was being short-
sighted in cutting aid to a pivotal partner.360 Some other American academics and 
analysts also argued that many of the portrayals of the regime were biased and that it 
had actually been a reliable collaborator - opinions which were expressed in a seminar 
hosted in Washington in October 2004.361 Without a doubt, President Karimov’s 
compliance to the issue of protecting regional stability was not wholly forgotten - a 
role which was again reinforced in September 2004, when Tashkent abided to the 
Global Threat Initiative, becoming the first CIS country to return unused nuclear fuel to 
Russia. President Bush, according to the press, expressed his gratitude with an official 
letter to President Karimov.362 The relationship, however, was already mired by the 
exacerbated role conflict.  
 
V.4. The Andijan Spark: The final deterioration in relations 
 
 
Role incompatibilities triggered a gradual change in President Karimov’s rhetoric, 
which began focusing more on defending Uzbekistan’s image and cultural 
authenticity. By the end of 2004, Uzbekistan’s President became more incisive in 
differentiating his country’s supposed eastern culture from the West (see Chapter III). 
                                               
359 Data obtained from ‘Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations’, available at: 
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/, accessed August 2012. 
360 ‘U.S. Opposed Calls at NATO for Probe of Uzbek Killings; Officials Feared Losing Air Base Access’ 
Washington Post, 14 June 2005. 
361 ‘US Experts Hail Uzbekistan Policy on Foreign Religious Freedom’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 20 October 2004. See also Frederick Starr’s support for Uzbekistan’s efforts: ‘US academic 
offers support for Uzbek terror policy’ BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts, 25 April 2004. 
362 ‘US hails Uzbekistan's return of highly enriched uranium to Russia’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 22 September 2004. 
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While the Orange Revolution took place in Ukraine, he consistently underlined the 
dangers of stability and of importing different models of government: ‘we know that at 
all times revolutions are usually based on violence and bloodshed, and they are used as 
weapons to destroy everything created by the ancestors mercilessly (…) We are 
confident that it is impossible to export democracy and different models of open 
societies. It is also impossible to import or push through a universal project of state 
construction from outside’363  
 Although President Karimov had expressed similar themes during the 1990s, his 
undisputed authority was gradually basing itself more on cultural authenticity than 
technocracy (see Chapter III). As such, he argued in January 2005 that events like 
those in Ukraine and Georgia would not take place in his country: ‘I doubt that a 
repetition of the Ukrainian or Georgian scenario would be possible in Uzbekistan. The 
reason is not that I, as the head of state, would oppose this prospect. The citizens 
themselves would not want this, and that is much more important.’364 A few months 
later, however, organized insurgents in Andijan would prove President Karimov wrong. 
 
The Andijan Uprising: Western Reponses and the Eviction from K-2 
 
Depictions of the 13 May 2005 events are available from many sources, but given 
Uzbekistan’s habit of secrecy it is difficult to obtain consistent accounts (see Chapter 
III). A few days after the incident, on 16 May, a Department of State spokesman 
condemned the indiscriminate use of force.365 Afterwards, the new Secretary of State, 
Condoleezza Rice, expressed her own concern and called on Uzbekistani authorities to 
focus more on Human Rights.366 Other Western international responses were, however, 
less restrained. Soon after the uprising, British foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, called for 
an immediate international inquiry.367  
 Amid demands for an international investigation and the increased public 
spotlight, President Karimov reinforced his roles of defender of equality and seeker of 
genuine independence, by insisting that his country was sovereign and perfectly 
capable of carrying out its own internal investigation.368 With criticism coming from 
                                               
363 ‘New Uzbek Parliament Part of Democratic Nation-Building – President’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 29 January 2005. 
364 ‘Uzbek president issues robust defence of elections’ BBC Summary of World Broadcast, 27 December 
2004. 
365 ‘Uzbek leader accepts U.S. statements on Andizhan events’ Interfax News Agency, 17 May 2005. 
366 ‘Secretary Rice Defends U.S. Approach to Uzbekistan on Human Rights’ US Fed News, 18 May 2005. 
367Also, in May 19, the United States Senate Helsinki commission chaired by Senator Brownback 
convened to discuss the situation in Uzbekistan.  See ‘EU urges Uzbek authorities to rein in military 
clampdown on population’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 May 2005. 
368 ‘Uzbek leader says no international probe into Andijon crisis – Fuller’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 25 
May 2005. 
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other international organizations, such as the OSCE, Mr Karimov galvanized his 
authenticity rhetoric, implying that such institutions were unable to evaluate Eastern 
states:  
 
Uzbekistan is in Asia and let everyone remember this. We are members of 
not only the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, but we 
are members of Islamic states' organizations as well (...) This is why, on the 
one hand you are exerting pressure from Europe, and you are forgetting, for 
example, take Ukraine, it is in Europe, or Georgia, it is also in Europe. 
Where is Uzbekistan [sic]? Look at the map. Is Uzbekistan, the city of 
Tashkent, not the gate of the East? (…) We are proud of being from the 
East.369 
 
 As the events continued to be debated in the international public sphere, many 
western officials required a better explanation into what had happened.370 
Subsequently, three American senators (one of which was former Presidential 
Candidate John McCain) followed up on the role of defending Human Rights, by flying 
to Tashkent and demanding a meeting with President Karimov. Their efforts, though, 
were of no avail since Uzbekistan’s head of state completely ignored the delegation.371 
Moreover, Uzbekistan’s government took the additional step of rejecting a VISA to the 
aid of the High Representative of the European Union.372  
 The DoD, in particular, was publicly concerned with how events were spiralling 
out of control and how this could affect its relationship with Tashkent. This concern 
was made public when news came out that Mr Rumsfeld blocked a NATO declaration 
condemning Uzbekistan’s government.373  
 The relationship was now at an all-time low and, in June 2005, Tashkent 
forbade American night-time flights to K-2. 374 Then, at the end of July, after the 
situation reached a stalemate, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded the 
eviction of United States military forces,375 a decision that was then approved by 
Uzbekistan’s Senate in August.376  
                                               
369 Ibid.. 
370 In order to clamp down the pressure, Uzbekistani authorities gave some concessions and allowed 
foreign diplomats and scholars to visit Andijan, albeit under tight supervision (Akiner 2005).  
371 See a report on the visit and President Karimov’s response in ‘Three US senators visit Uzbekistan, 
push for international probe’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 May 2005. 
372 See ‘EU/Uzbekistan: European Union angered by Refusal of Visa for Solana Aide’ EU European 
Report, 11 June 2005. 
373 See ‘U.S. Opposed Calls at NATO for Probe of Uzbek Killings; Officials Feared Losing Air Base 
Access’ Washington Post, 14 June 2005. 
374 ‘Uzbekistan restricts US military's use of air base’ Agence France Presse – English, 15 June 2005. 
375 ‘Uzbekistan demands withdrawal of US mil base’ TASS, 30 July 2005. 
376 ‘Uzbek lawmakers ratify US military eviction, seek compensation’ Agence France Presse – English 
26 August 2005. 
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 As a last token of goodwill, Mr Rumsfeld publicly acknowledged Uzbekistan’s 
stability and reliability, by agreeing to reimburse Tashkent with 23 million dollars, 
despite a congressional attempt to block the transaction (Daly et al. 2005: 37).377 This 
last gesture, while not preventing American troops from being evicted, expounded a 
degree of inter-role compatibility. In light of the fact that role convergence practically 
only existed between the DoD and Tashkent, this action may have left some channels of 
communication open. However, in the meanwhile, President Karimov came down hard 
on all the groups with connections to Washington’s political and democratic agendas.378 
So, in a last ditch effort to downplay the level of friction,379 a DoS representative visited 
Uzbekistan in August 2006, but obtained little success.  Although at the time 
Uzbekistan’s leader confessed that the visit was an opportunity for improving relations, 
the two parties admitted that only on protecting stability was rapprochement and 
cooperation possible.380 
 
V.5. Reigniting relations: the importance of security 
 
After Mr Boucher’s visit in August 2006, public high-level contacts between 
Washington and Tashkent ceased for nearly a year and a half. Meanwhile, the DoS 
altered part of its organizational system and transferred Central Asian affairs to the 
South and Central Asian section, effectively removing the region from the Europe and 
Eurasian affairs division (Heathershaw 2007: 135). Curiously, the timing of the 
decision suggests that the DoS might have been influenced by President Karimov’s 
claims that Uzbekistan was Eastern and not European.   
 
                                               
377Later, in a September visit led by the Assistant Secretary of State, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense and National Security Council senior staff, compensation to Tashkent was publicly confirmed, 
regardless of the eviction. ‘U.S. Officials to Talk With Uzbek Leader’ The Washington Post, 24 
September 2005. 
378Counterpart International, the American Bar Association, the Eurasia Foundation and the Eurasian Law 
Initiative, were all forbidden from working in Uzbekistan. Then, in October 2005, the BBC was also 
forced to close its office in Tashkent. 
379 After 2005, the EU responded to the political situation by placing an arms embargo and restricting the 
access of Uzbekistani government members to Europe. In Washington, Senator John McCain delivered a 
hard line speech at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in 2006, condemning President Karimov. The 
Senate Helsinki Commission also convened in July 2006 to discuss the situation, inviting prominent 
Uzbekistani opposition members, such as the leaders of Erk, Birlik and the Sunshine Coalition to offer 
their points of view. Overall, Uzbekistan’s leadership was strongly condemned in the European and 
American public spheres. 
380 See an account of the tense meeting in ‘US, Uzbek Views on human rights, Andijon differ – official’ 
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 9 August 2006. 
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Interaction after 2007 
 
With conflict in Afghanistan increasing, protecting stability in the region became again 
a prominent role (Blank 2011). Indeed, the discontinuity may have ignited an 
adjustment, in December 2007, when President Karimov asserted that discord with 
Washington was something of the past: ‘there are still those who assert that today some 
discord still continues between Uzbekistan and the United States of America, on the 
one hand, and the European states, on the other. It is not difficult to understand that 
they would want such discord to exist from which they would draw a particular 
interest.’381 CENTCOM Admiral, William Fallon, then visited Tashkent, on January 
2008, to discuss opening a new supply route to Afghanistan via Uzbekistan.382 The 
meeting seems to have ended on a positive note since a NATO official announced in 
March that Tashkent had allowed supplies to cross Uzbekistani territory.383 
Subsequently, a new stage in the two countries’ relations was signalled after President 
Karimov went to a NATO summit in Bucharest on April 2008.384 The EU reciprocated 
by also mitigating its official condemnation and removing sanctions targeting 
Uzbekistani officials (for more on the EU’s position, see Chapter VI).385  
President Karimov downplayed his authenticity-based roles and focused more 
on technocracy (see Chapter III). In other words, the discontinuity brought by discrete 
American rapprochement and the global economic crisis in 2008 allowed for a return 
to his technocratic rhetoric, leading to inter-role compatibility, and less authenticity-
based remonstrations against the West. 
 
Concessions and the Security Relationship that followed  
 
Rapprochement though was not immediate, given how the relationship had 
deteriorated heavily after 2005. Still, protecting stability was clearly the issue with 
which both sides converged,386 and so President Karimov made a rhetorical adjustment 
                                               
381 ‘Uzbek President's address dedicated to 15th anniversary of Constitution’ UzReport.com, 11 December  
2007. 
382 ‘US-Uzbekistan Relations: Another Step Toward Rapproachment’ Eurasianet.org, 23 January 2008.  
383 ‘NATO says US, other members to use air base to resupply Afghanistan’ The Associated Press, 5 
March 2008. 
384 ‘Uzbek President Calls for Resumption of Peace Talks’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 April 
2008. 
385 ‘EU eases Uzbek sanctions despite reporter’s jailing’ BBC Monitoring World Media, 15 October 2008. 
386President Karimov called for the implementation of a renewed 6+3 summit during the 2008 NATO 
summit in Bucharest (calling for NATO to also become a participant). ‘Uzbek leader says Afghan 
situation has ‘extremely’ negative impact on security’ BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit Supplied by 
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 8 October 2008. 
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with a call for reform. On January 2008, the death penalty was officially abolished and 
a civil rights activist was released from prison.387  
Nevertheless, the subject-area dominating the public sphere was the situation in 
Afghanistan, particularly as it became one of the major campaign slogans of American 
Presidential candidate Barak Obama. In 2009, the new CENTCOM commander, 
General David Petraeus, visited Uzbekistan twice, where he signed a security 
cooperation agreement with President Karimov.388 Washington continued lobbying for 
a Northern Distribution Network (NDN) as a major supply route to Afghanistan, 
without referring much to the Human Rights situation.389 Apparently, it was now the 
DoD that was taking the initiative in the region, at least in the public sphere.  
So, the stage was set for a level of rapprochement and security cooperation, 
which was evinced by the Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s visit to Uzbekistan in 
December 2010. Like in previous circumstances, President Karimov seems to have pre-
empted the high-level visit with a long address to parliament proposing constitutional 
reform.390 Yet, given past rhetorical allusions to democracy, it is difficult to foresee Mr 
Karimov fully endorsing a close political connection. Indeed, what the twenty-year 
relationship showed is that only in protecting stability was there a degree of inter-role 
compatibility between the two governments. 
                                               
387 See some of the concessions in the following account: ‘Uzbekistan: Prominent rights activist 
Saidjahon Zainabitdinov amnestied and released’ Ferghana.ru, 5 February 2008.  
388 See ‘Uzbekistan, US sign agreement on military cooperation’ TASS, 21 August 2009. 
389 In that same year, the European Union removed its arms embargo, irrespective of the Human Rights 
situation remaining dubious. However, President Karimov did continue to make some concessions and 
gave amnesty to Sanjar Umarov, the leader of opposition movement, Sunshine Coalition, who had been 
imprisoned since 2005. Still, less tolerance was shown to some potential political adversaries, all of 
whom were imprisoned in May 2010 for having supposed connections to religious institutions. See 
‘Uzbekistan: Opposition figure’s release signal of warming Uzbek-US Ties?’ Eurasianet.org, 20 
November 2009; and ‘Uzbekistan: Journalist Khairullo Khamidov is sentenced to six years of prison’ 
Ferghana.ru, 28 May 2010. 
390 In a long speech, President Karimov called for the Prime Minister instead of the President to become 
head of government. Furthermore, he suggested that Speaker of the Senate was to become the second 
head of state, in case the President became incapable of fulfilling his duties. These measures brought 
some debate in the public sphere about the nature of President Karimov’s intentions. Some argued that it 
was a concession designed to please the West, while others viewed it as a means of balancing rival 
factions. For the full speech, see ‘Address by President Karimov at the joint session of Legislative 
Chamber and Senate.’ UzReport.com, November 15 2010. For an interpretation, read Sikorskaya’s (2010) 
take on President Karimov’s goals. 
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VI. The Uzbekistani-German Relationship 1991-2010 
 
Tashkent’s relationship with Berlin was relatively free from disturbance. Indeed, while 
quarrelling seems to have been the overarching feature of Uzbekistani relations with 
the United States and Russia, both Tashkent and Berlin were able to foster a degree of 
public cooperation from 1991 to 2010.  
Discretion is the element that best describes the relationship, without this 
meaning that it was uneventful. Instead, both consistently engaged with each other 
from the outset and rarely made public outbursts that could damage their political 
connection. Germany was Uzbekistan’s third major import partner (behind Russia and 
South Korea) throughout most of the 1990s391 and also the only state that managed to 
keep its military personnel in Uzbekistan after the 2005 Andijan crisis. Still, the 
apparent lack of public conflict was not without controversy. In 2007, for example, an 
Uzbekistani dissident criticized Berlin’s apparent pragmatism: ‘once I went to the 
German embassy to ask about funding for a project. But the official said - if you were 
applying for a cultural project, like learning to play the dayra [a sort of drum], it would 
be fine, but you are asking for a human rights project.’392   
 Berlin focused on stability and showed a relatively strong commitment towards 
engaging with Uzbekistan’s economy. Moreover, the fact that Germany’s governments 
were advancing toward ‘normality’ (see below) resulted in relatively secluded 
interaction, inasmuch as President Karimov’s undisputed authority was rarely 
questioned. As shown below, these instances of discrete engagement are reminiscent of 
Chancellor Willy Brandt’s slogan of ‘change through rapprochement’ – ‘wandel durch 
annäherung’ (Kempe 2007), which only served to boost President Karimov’s 
technocratic roles, such as fomenting stability. Role compatibility rather than conflict 
thus became the main feature of the relationship, even if after 2007 some friction 
became more systematic in the public spotlight.  
As concerns Germany’s roles, Paul Létorneau and Marie-Elisabeth Rakel (1997) 
observed that Berlin after the end of the Cold War dealt mainly with whether it could 
become a ‘normal power’. In this regard, Dirk Peters (2001) illustrates the complexity 
of normality by showing that Berlin needed to balance assertiveness with the status of 
‘civilian power’, i.e. constraining the use of force and promoting freedom. This 
dichotomy between assertion and being a civilian power, coupled by rhetoric of 
                                               
391 Germany became Uzbekistan’s fourth major trade partner after being surpassed by China in the 21st 
century. See ‘Uzbekistan’ Asian Development Bank: Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2011, 
available at: http://www.adb.org/publications/key-indicators-asia-and-pacific-2010, accessed, November 
2011. 
392 ‘EU ministers to shy away from praising Uzbekistan’ EUobserver.com, 18 April 2007.  
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constraint meant that prudence became one of the hallmarks of Germany’s foreign 
policy. Similarly, Gunther Hellman (2001: 296; 297; 304) argued that Germany’s 
government was striving for a degree of international prestige, although avoiding the 
label of great power. Max Otte and Jürgen Greve (2000: 10) also underlined the level of 
discretion in German foreign policy throughout the 1990s, insofar as it acted as a ‘low-
key leader and legitimate broker in the post-post war Europe’. Hence, while Berlin 
managed reunification, and as normality became more accepted, rhetoric changed 
gradually. Indeed, many other scholars demonstrated convincingly how Germany’s 
military policy adapted to the new challenges and responsibilities of the international 
public sphere (Hyde-Price 2001; Noetzel 2011, 2008; Snyder 2011).  
Berlin’s involvement in Central Asia reflects well its changing foreign policy and 
the manners in which it balanced the assertiveness of its own interests with civilian 
roles. Consequently, inter-role conflict was not a significant feature of the relationship, 
even though it was on the rise after 2007, when Berlin was forced to justify its 
relationship with Tashkent to a variety of significant political actors, namely the 
Bundestag, the press and the European parliament. 
 
VI.1. Uzbekistani-German Relations 1991-2000: Trade and Migration 
 
As discussed in Chapter III, President Karimov’s technocratic roles were very much 
open to receiving external investment. Consequently, Germany’s economic success and 
its technological endowments were all attuned to President Karimov’s appeals for 
development and seeking Uzbekistan’s genuine independence. In an interview to a 
Russian newspaper, in 1993, he specifically outlined Germany as one country he had 
studied and whose model of state-run economic growth he admired: ‘Germany and 
other countries, whose experience we are studying, then, of course, the state will not 
intervene in economic processes, which will run everywhere on the basis of the 
principle of supply and demand. But even in these countries a significant place is 
occupied by the public sector.’393  
 For its part, Berlin evinced that it was concerned with migration. Indeed, during 
the 1990s, Germany received around 1.64 million ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union (Dietz 2000: 653). As such, calling for stability seemed the more 
likely approach, even more so when Berlin took an active policy in supporting its 
companies abroad. This public agenda was thus entirely compatible with President 
Karimov’s roles of protecting stability and developing Uzbekistan.  
                                               
393 ‘Uzbekistan; Karimov defends his policies against accusations of strong-arm tactics’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 12 June 1993. 
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A Good Start: Germany shows concern for Germans in the former Soviet Union 
 
Reinhard Krumm (2007: 9-10) argued that Berlin’s initial policy for Central Asia 
envisaged stability at the forefront, as Germany quickly gave international recognition 
to the five Central Asian Republics (Ibid: 9-10). Apparently, it was Berlin’s concern to 
convince counterparts that it lacked any kind of geopolitical ambitions (Ibid). A 
Russian 1995 article, however, counter-argued and claimed that Germany was hoping 
to become a leading power, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe (Pushkov 1995).  
 Speculation aside, German officials were at the time debating the future of their 
foreign policy (Peters 2001). In the short run, Berlin’s concerns were apparently 
predicated by the scale of immigration, given that the admission of ethnic Germans was 
guaranteed by the 1949 German Constitution and also the Federal Expellee and 
Refugee Law of 1953 (Dietz 2000: 636). Uzbekistan had an important stake in that 
policy for nearly 40,000 ethnic Germans inhabited the Republic – a consequence of 
Stalin’s 1941 deportation policies (Krumm 2007).394  
Uzbekistan’s President had committed himself to technocratic roles and 
especially de-ideologized politics. This meant that nationalistic agendas were mostly 
outside his rhetoric, although he did propound himself as a definer of Uzbek 
authenticity. Accordingly, he directed his public agenda toward protecting stability 
and developing the economy (see Chapter III) which were compatible with Berlin’s 
concerns. 
 The apparent goodwill of both sides thus opened the way for President 
Karimov’s first state visit to Germany in April 1993. The reliability with which the two 
states increasingly saw each other was symbolized by Tashkent returning an evangelical 
church to the German community in Uzbekistan, which was duly noted by President 
Richard Von Weizsaecker.395 Besides prestige and stability, the first visit also 
reinforced President Karimov’s technocratic roles. Before travelling to Germany, Mr 
Karimov told the renowned magazine Der Spiegel ‘that we Uzbeks are sitting on 
gold’.396 He met, therefore, with Chancellor Helmut Kohl and representatives of various 
                                               
394 Kazakhstan, though, was the more relevant target of Germany’s migration policy, given that nearly 
100,000 ethnic Germans inhabited the country. 
395 ‘German-Uzbek relations have good prospects: Weizsaecker’ TASS, April 28 1993. 
396 ‘Lichte Zukunft’ Der Spiegel, 26 April 1993, available at http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-
13680695.html, accessed September 2012..  
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German businesses,397 who all paid heed to President Karimov’s appeals and prepared a 
law for ‘Reciprocal Protection of Investments’.398  
The press then reported that President Karimov was receptive to a lorry 
production project.399 Eventually, a joint venture between Daimler Mercedes and the 
state-run USSELCHOSMASCH - one of Uzbekistan’s largest industrial enterprises, 
employing about 36,000 workers - quickly became operational.400 Investment in the 
field of technology fitted perfectly with President Karimov’s public roles as a 
mercantilist entrepreneur and seeker of genuine independence. However, much like 
some American projects in the 1990s (see Chapter V), the initiative failed after 
producing only a hundred lorries. Apparently, errors in forecasting the costs of 
transportation prevented the project from being fully implemented.401  
 
Business as the motto of Uzbekistani-German relations in the 1990s 
 
In spite of the failure of the lorry production facility, technology and investment were 
especially important to President Karimov’s public credibility. Accordingly, in the 
beginning of 2000, Uzbekistan’s leader appealed for more Western investment in the 
country, specifically in the field of technology: ‘when we speak about the most modern 
technologies, they are in the most developed countries, like Japan, Germany, America 
and France (…) If we want to achieve this we must establish very close relations with 
the most developed countries, because, without attracting investments and foreign 
capital, I cannot see any prospect of developing our economy.’402  Germany seems to 
have acted upon these calls. In effect, from the mid-1990s to 2010, Uzbekistan received 
approximately 265 million euros in development funds from Germany (more than 
Kazakhstan in the same period) (Bruck et al. 2011: 798).  
After President Karimov’s first visit to Germany, Chancellor Kohl declared 
support for Central Asian countries, particularly those who followed a ‘Turkish 
model’,403 i.e. focusing on secular development such as Uzbekistan. Then, in July, 
President Karimov received a delegation of economic experts from the Bundestag (the 
German Federal Parliament), whom he thanked for being one of his country’s ‘most 
                                               
397 ‘President of Uzbekistan arrives in Germany on a visit’ TASS, 27 April 1993. 
398 ‘Gesentzentwurf der Bundesregierung’ Deutscher Bundestag, 12 May 1995, available at: 
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EuropeNewsletter, 19 May 1994. 
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401 ‘Automobile industry in Uzbekistan’ Central Asia & Caucasus Business Report, 24 February 2004. 
402 ‘Uzbek president speaks to journalists in parliamentary session break’ BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
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significant partners (…) that were making a concrete and significant contribution’.404 By 
that time, Alcatel and Siemens were already showing a strong interest in Uzbekistan’s 
communications and electronics sectors.405 In fact, the increased interest in German 
businesses for the region was reflected in the creation of a German industries centre in 
Tashkent in December 1994.406  
 Berlin’s support for Germany’s business ventures in Central Asia persisted, as 
President Chaim Herzog made an official visit to Uzbekistan in April 1995. Having the 
head of state of Europe’s most powerful economy travelling to Tashkent clearly 
reinforced President Karimov’s equality, prestige and technocratic roles (it is 
important to bear in mind that President Karimov had not yet been received by the 
United States President – see Chapter V).  
During the visit, President Herzog was accompanied by a group of 
approximately thirty businessmen, as is custom in many state visits. He further 
highlighted the need of increasing economic cooperation ‘to meet the interests of the 
two countries and peoples.’407 Many of these promises did not just remain on paper 
and, as a result, the Goethe Institute (the leading German cultural and language centre) 
opened an office in Uzbekistan in 1998. Moreover, other German-sponsored 
organizations expanded to Central Asia, such as the German Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ), the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the German Adult Education 
Association (DVV), the German Development Service (DED), the Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung (KAS) and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) (Krumm 2007: 10). 
 Soon after Mr Herzog’s visit, it was President Karimov’s turn to visit Germany in 
November 1995 (his second in two years). Germany’s President was apparently aware 
of Mr Karimov’s calls for defending equality and Uzbekistan’s great image, and so took 
him on an exhibition entitled ‘Uzbekistan-the Heritage of the Great Silk Road.’ These 
occasions were ideal platforms for augmenting Mr Karimov’s credibility, who talked 
with leading representatives of Germany’s industrial sector.408  
President Herzog also mentioned that Germany should invest more in 
Uzbekistan in order to decrease Central Asia’s high level of migration.409 This seems, 
then, to have been an important priority for Chancellor Kohl’s government, as 
immigration from the East intensified. Likewise, Germany’s Foreign Minister, Klaus 
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Kinkel, voiced a similar concern when visiting Uzbekistan just a few months later.410 
Other than business, economic development and migration, Tashkent was also 
receptive to developing stronger security ties with Germany. The two states thus agreed 
in October of 1995 to start a military training programme in German facilities.411 It is 
important to be aware that Germany’s interest in the former Soviet Union was also 
reflected in the European Union’s policy, allowing for President Karimov to bolster his 
role of bridge to other markets. Hence, he signed the EU’s partnership cooperation 
agreement in June 1996.412  
The various public encounters evinced role compatibility, resulting in bilateral 
cooperation during most of Chancellor Kohl’s tenure in office. Indeed, such was the 
level of convergence that Tashkent agreed to broadcast some of Deutsche Welle’s radio 
and television programmes in May 1997.413 
 
 
Germany’s new government: business as usual  
 
In October 1998, Gerhard Schroeder, the chairman of Germany’s Social Democrat Party 
(SPD), was elected Chancellor, thus putting an end to Mr Kohl’s sixteen-year Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) government. Mr Schroeder was forced to make a coalition 
with the Green Party, led by Joschka Fischer, who became Germany’s Foreign Minister. 
However, the leftist credentials of the new government and, in particular, those of the 
Eco-friendly Green Party, did not lead to a shift in Germany’s relationship with 
authoritarian Uzbekistan; quite the opposite, as Chancellor Schroeder appealed for 
Germany’s assertiveness in the international public sphere and pushed for greater ‘self-
confidence’ (Otte & Greve 2000: 198).  
Lack of discontinuity meant that trade and President Karimov’s technocratic 
roles were not put into question. A delegation led by Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister 
visited Germany in September 1999 and signed an Anti-Double Taxation accord.414 The 
two sides also discussed further economic cooperation as well as the importance of 
security, namely fighting illegal drug trafficking and crime.415 Up to the turn of the 
                                               
410‘German foreign minister to visit Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan’ Agence France Presse – English, 29 May 
1996. 
411 ‘Antwort des Bundesregierung: auf die Kleine Anfrage’ Deutscher Bundestag, 6 June 2006, available 
via http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/017/1601759.pdf, accessed August 2012. 
412 ‘Signing of the partnership and cooperation agreement between the European communities and the 
Republic of Uzbekistan’ RAPID, 21 June 1996. 
413 ‘Deutsche Welle TV to be broadcast in Tashkent’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 May 1997. 
414 ‘Entwurf eines Gesetzes’ Deutsches Bundestag, 29 May 2000, available at 
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/034/1403465.pdf, accessed August 2012. 
415 ‘Uzbekistan- Germany sign anti-double taxation accord’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 15 September 
1999. 
 143
century, President Karimov continued receiving important German delegations, such as 
the head of the Bundestag in May 2000.416 Uzbekistan’s leader responded positively to 
the growing level of interaction. For example, in a speech at the United Nations (UN), 
in September 2000, he appealed for Germany (as well as Japan) to become a member 
of the UN Security Council.417   
 
VI.2. The growing importance of security, 2001-2005 
 
The beginning of the 21st century brought added complexity to the relationship. Unlike 
Tashkent’s bilateral relations with Washington, focused on protecting stability, security 
matters were not a significant feature of Uzbekistani-German relations (in spite of the 
1995 bilateral security agreement - see above). Still, the problematic situation in 
Afghanistan and its repercussions for the region became unavoidable, which eventually 
contributed to a growing security relationship. 
Nevertheless, increased visibility in the public sphere meant that Germany 
would have to pay heed to its civilian roles. Hence, appeals for reform became 
somewhat more noticeable in the public sphere, although most rhetoric focused on 
praising Uzbekistan’s stability. 
 
The Beginnings of a Stronger Security Relationship 
 
In April 2001, security became a visible issue-area during President Karimov’s third 
visit to Germany. Uzbekistan’s leader met with his German counterpart, with whom he 
discussed terrorism and international security.418 Afterwards, two agreements were 
signed, aiming to improve transportation links and fighting against drug trafficking and 
organized crime.419  
Curiously, German officials were also less reluctant to discuss reform, perhaps 
due to the financial difficulties faced by some German businessmen in Uzbekistan. 
Chancellor Schroeder made reference to this problem and personally appealed for 
President Karimov to loosen the currency constraints - a controversial issue in that 
year, given that the IMF decided to not replace its representative in Uzbekistan after 
the end of his term. Nevertheless, Financial Times Deutschland reported that most of 
                                               
416 ‘President Karimov, foreign minister receive German Bundestag head’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 24 May 2000. 
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these talks were private and so President Karimov’s technocratic expertise was not 
heavily scrutinized in the public sphere.420  
A month after President Karimov’s visit, it was Foreign Minister Fischer’s turn 
to visit Uzbekistan. As in the April meeting, security was the main subject-area.421 This 
was thus congruent with President Karimov’s role of protector of stability, which Berlin 
helped strengthen when it agreed to supply military hardware to Uzbekistan (Schoeller-
Schletter 2005).  
Other than security, though, Mr Fischer paid heed to Germany’s civilian role 
and confronted Tashkent on the issue of democratic reform - a year after Madeleine 
Albright’s controversial visit to Uzbekistan (see Chapter V). During a press conference, 
Mr Fischer stated that ‘we discussed the questions of democratic reforms and an 
independent press and consider these are key questions in obtaining stability.’422 
Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister admitted that Uzbekistan ‘had not obtained the level of 
freedom of press as developed by democratic countries’, but cautioned journalists that 
Uzbekistan was moving forward. Mr Fisher then praised Uzbekistan for its stability: 
‘we have an interest in peace and stability in this region. For this reason I have come 
here on a visit because we think that should there be peace and stability, Uzbekistan 
will play a central role in the region.’423  
 
Germany leaps to the Hindu Kush 
 
A day after 11 September, NATO invoked article five of its founding treaty, and so the 
tragic incidents were considered an attack on all allies. Chancellor Schroeder took 
Germany’s public commitment to NATO seriously. He and gave full backing to the 
United States and then, in November, decided to supply troops for peace-keeping in 
Afghanistan.424 Berlin’s assertiveness and growing responsibilities in the international 
public sphere gradually became connected to Afghanistan. Germany’s government 
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committed itself to post-conflict resolution in the region, particularly after hosting the 
Bonn conference in December 2001 – an event that quickly became a hallmark in the 
transition phase of Afghan politics and even praised by President Karimov.425  
Assisting Afghanistan was perfectly compatible with Germany’s aspiring foreign 
policy, in that it allowed Berlin to augment both assertiveness and prestige without 
fully comprising its civilian roles.426 This was then reflected in Berlin’s strong intra-role 
cohesion, as all parties in the Bundestag – the SPD, CDU, FDP and Green Party – with 
the exception of the smaller Left party (Linkespartei), voted for the Bundeswehr’s (the 
Federal Defense force) participation within ISAF. For that reason, Uzbekistan became 
one of the main transit countries for the German defence army.  
 At the end of January 2002, Germany’s Defence Minister, Rudolf Scharping, 
visited Uzbekistan to lease a military base in Termez. Unlike those with the United 
States, the meetings between German and Uzbekistani officials seem to have gone 
smoothly (see Chapter V); this was perhaps because Berlin’s original design for Termez 
was always logistical, rather than offensive, thereby not contradicting President 
Karimov’s voice for a non-militaristic Central Asia. A Der Spiegel article also argued 
that the German financial offer for Termez was quite generous.427 As such, President 
Karimov quickly announced that the airport was being used by German forces for 
humanitarian purposes.428  
Uzbekistan’s President was under the spotlight of the international public 
sphere and various German high-level officials applauded the country’s stability and its 
role in post-war Afghanistan. Once more, unlike relations with the United States, Berlin 
did not comment on Uzbekistan’s internal political issues.429 By acting through 
discretion, President Karimov’s roles were not subject to credibility problems. Equality 
was maintained and stability reinforced. It is also curious to observe that Germany and 
NATO’s courting of President Karimov led to disappointment in Kazakhstan. According 
to Der Spiegel, Astana rejected German military over-flights, perhaps because it did not 
see its regional prestige taken into account.430 Given the public importance given to 
protocol (see his statement about sitting next to President Clinton in Chapter IV), this 
controversy certainly boosted President Karimov’s role of defender of Uzbekistan’s 
image. 
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 In February 2002, Mr Scharping met again with President Karimov in order to 
discuss the operational costs of Germany’s new base.431 At the time, President Karimov 
offered high praise to his German partners: ‘we consider Germany our reliable partner. 
Or bilateral cooperation is based on a firm, long-term legal foundation (…) Germany is 
actively taking part in economic investment, providing modern technologies to large 
projects and thus promoting the country's economic development.’ What is interesting 
about the latter statement is that it barely focused on security, which was by far the 
preponderant issue-area of the post-11 September public sphere. Instead, President 
Karimov publicly acknowledged the relationship’s economic contributions and its 
stability. Mr Scharping also gave an equally strong panegyric by praising his own 
country’s investment in the region (Zhukov 2002) and Uzbekistan’s hospitality: ‘my 
Uzbek counterpart Qodir Ghulomov [sic] and I visited many places of interest in 
Uzbekistan, and I acquatinted myself with local traditions. I like Uzbek people's warm 
hospitality. As far as cooperation between the two countries is concerned, I am satisfied 
with its current state. I am sure that socioeconomic and military-technical relations 
between the two countries will further improve.’432 
 The new security dimension in the countries’ relations had thus an auspicious 
beginning and President Karimov’s prestige was on the rise, especially when Chancellor 
Schroeder travelled to the country in May 2002. It was the first visit by a German 
Chancellor and the two parties focused on specific military, security and economic 
issues. Notwithstanding the military dimension, Chancellor Schroeder did concede that 
such issues as ‘civil society, the interdependence of state security on the one hand and 
an individual's rights on the other (…) [would be] continued in future.’433  
Enhanced security cooperation was clearly at the forefront and the credibility of 
Germany’s government in the international public sphere became gradually more 
connected to the situation in Afghanistan. In fact, in December 2002, Germany’s 
newest Defence Minister, Peter Struck, made a controversial remark when he argued 
that the ‘Federal Republic of Germany is also defended in the Hindu Kish.’434 The 
statement reflects how much Germany’s defensive security policy had changed since 
the early 1990s, when, at the time, its armed forces were not authorized to participate 
in foreign military operations. Germany’s new roles led it to supervising ISAF 
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operations in February 2003. Protecting stability thus remained a public priority and, 
in 2003, Germany’s government continued to praise Uzbekistan for its role in providing 
security to the region.435 The two parties thus converged on the problem of drug 
trafficking in Central Asia,436 and the Hizb ut-Tahrir. The latter was frequently posed as 
a threat by President Karimov, who then lauded Berlin for barring the organization 
from public activity in 2003437 (just a few months before President Karimov blamed it 
for orchestrating the attacks against the American and Israeli embassies).438  
It is also important to note that, besides protecting stability, other roles were 
pushed to the spotlight, even if less ostentatiously. Tashkent continued receiving 
German investors, such as in July 2002.439 Moreover, Mr Karimov did make some 
visible, even if minor, concessions on political reform. In October 2002, German and 
Uzbekistani journalists met in Bukhara to discuss media freedom;440 and later, in 
August 2003, Tashkent allowed a foreign journalists association, led by a Deutsche 
Welle correspondent, to be registered.441  
  Therefore, unlike the bilateral relationship with the United States, President 
Karimov seems to have had a reliable and stable partner. Furthermore, the relations 
extended beyond security, thereby reinforcing almost all of Mr Karimov’s role group-
types, namely technocracy, prestige and even its cultural authenticity (see Chapter III 
for more on role group-types). This level of role compatibility fostered strong 
cooperation, which became clearly observable in the year the United States Congress 
blocked aid to Uzbekistan. At the time, Chancellor Schroeder’s showed unswerving 
support for Tashkent: ‘Islom Karimov is a leading politician who proved the drug trade 
was a source of income for international terrorism. We'll continue to support 
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Uzbekistan's policies in the future, and will do everything we can to strengthen 
cooperation.’442  
 
VI.3. Testing the Partnership: The 2005 Andijan Crisis 
 
By the end of 2003, President Karimov had gradually shifted his rhetoric from 
technocracy toward increased authenticity (see Chapters III and V), which could have 
potentially contributed toward role conflict with Germany. However, after the Andijan 
crisis in May 2005, discontinuity meant that Berlin’s roles conflicted, seeing as 
Chancellor Schroeder had to clarify how he would deal with his Central Asian partner. 
In the end, Berlin would continue to cooperate with President Karimov, even after its 
late 2005 elections. The growing importance of Afghanistan in its foreign and defence 
roles (Germany would soon be responsible for peacekeeping in Afghanistan’s north), as 
well as the fact that there was no substantial level of intra-role conflict in the Bundestag 
(unlike with the United States), meant that the relationship was not under intense 
public scrutiny.  
 
Some German misgivings after the Andijan Crisis 
 
Before May 2005, President Karimov’s public relationship with Germany’s government 
remained business as usual. Just a few months before the crisis, the Chairman of the 
State Customs Committee of Uzbekistan visited Germany. Further cooperation was 
discussed and a German official mentioned that ‘our cooperation in countering 
terrorism is acquiring special significance. Uzbekistan is an important partner of ours 
in Central Asia. I recall with great pleasure my meeting with Uzbek President Islom 
Karimov, a man of energy and stamina.’443 Later, in April, Germany’s Defence Minister 
visited Uzbekistan, where he made preparations for enhancing the security 
relationship.444  
The massacre in the Ferghana city of Andijan brought about some friction, as 
President Karimov faced increased public criticism from the West. Indeed, many 
deputies in the Bundestag voiced their disapproval of the relationship. On May 17, the 
foreign policy spokesman of Germany’s Green Party publicly condemned the violence 
in Andijan, thereby pressuring his party colleague, Foreign Minister Fischer, to take a 
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strong stance.445 Furthermore, Deutsche Welle reports covered the consequences of 
human suffering, to which President Karimov had already replied that ‘I have no 
complaints to German media outlets. I may disagree with their reports and statements, 
but I don't have complaints to them.’446 As pressure increased, Foreign Minister Fischer 
waited for feedback from his ambassador, who was at the time visiting Andijan 
(Weiland 2005). The trip apparently did not clarify the scale of events and so Mr 
Fischer called for an inquiry: ‘in order to reach a peaceful solution to this tense 
situation, it is essential that there is a prompt, independent and transparent 
investigation of the reports of a high death toll in Andijon and the circumstances of the 
degeneration into violence.’447  
 Ambiguity and potential role conflict in Germany’s government subsided and 
Berlin did not pronounce itself about the events. However, some of the Bundestag’s 
deputies voiced their concern over German involvement, which was compounded by 
occasional media reports detailing the level of military and financial cooperation 
between Tashkent and Berlin (Schoeller-Schletter 2005). Uzbekistan was becoming a 
controversial part of the public’s knowledge, although the two main German parties 
(SPD and CDU) did not contest Berlin’s role in Afghanistan and its connection to 
Tashkent (Ibid).  
 Discretion in acting was Berlin’s approach to the discontinuity, as Washington 
increased its level of criticism. The silence, however, was noticed by former British 
Ambassador Craig Murray (Murray 2005), who would in the following years become 
one of the strongest critics of Germany’s relationship with Uzbekistan. Still, in August 
2005, a spokesman of the German Ministry of Defence argued that the relationship was 
too valuable and that Americans being expelled was not a reason for its troops to leave 
the country.448  
The political situation, though, was problematic and President Karimov 
reinforced his role of undisputed authority by coming down hard on foreign NGOs and 
the media (see Chapter V). Moreover, President Karimov escalated his rhetoric on 
differentiation by accusing the foreign media, including Deutsche Welle, of intervening 
                                               
445 ‘Kuhn fordert internationale Untersuchung’ Der Spiegel, 17 May 2005, available at 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/aufstand-in-usbekistan-kuhn-fordert-internationale-untersuchung-a-
356299.html, accessed 19 September 2012. 
446 ‘Uzbek president says Andijon media coverage lacked facts’ BBC Monitoring World Media, 18 May 
2005. 
447 ‘German FM calls for investigation into Uzbek violence’ Agence France Presse – English, 19 May 
2005. 
448 ‘Bundeswehr bleibt auch nach Abzug der USA’ Der Spiegel, 8 August 2005, available at 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/usbekistan-bundeswehr-bleibt-auch-nach-abzug-der-usa-a-
367795.html, accessed September 2012. 
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in the country.449 Curiously, President Karimov also hinted at some German 
responsibility for the Andijan crisis when he stated, in October, that many of the 
assailants were carrying both American and German weapons (Mirovalev 2005). Still, 
the crisis, juxtaposed to President Karimov’s strong reactions, did not result in an 
immediate German reaction. Instead, it was the EU as a whole, led by the United 
Kingdom, that took a stance. The European Union’s roles were clearly being put into 
question by the situation in Uzbekistan, and so Brussels reciprocated in October450 by 
placing an arms embargo and restricting travelling access to some of Tashkent’s 
officials.  
President Karimov’s role of defender of Uzbekistan’s image was, therefore, 
being seriously contested. Berlin, however, took the controversial step of allowing 
former Uzbekistani Interior Minister to travel to Germany, in spite of EU sanctions. 
The decision was justified on the basis of the Minister’s health problems,451 which 
eventually sparked intra-role conflict. A number of German parliamentarians in the 
opposition voiced their disapproval and called for a criminal investigation into Mr 
Almatov’s involvement in Andijan. However, in March 2006, the Attorney General 
clarified that no such investigation would take place.452 Furthermore, the government 
in Berlin continued acting in a ‘business as usual’ manner, thereby strengthening 
President Karimov’s technocratic roles. As the future of the Termez base was being 
discussed, an advisor to Daimler-Chrysler and Chairman of the Committee on Eastern 
European Economic Relations visited Uzbekistan and received a warm welcome from 
Mr Karimov.453 By late November, after prolonged private negotiations, Tashkent 
decided that it would allow Berlin to continue using the Termez airbase.  
The decision conformed to Berlin’s new defence and foreign policy roles 
(Zepelin & Kreimeier 2005). As for President Karimov, allowing the Bundeswehr to 
stay was congruent with protecting stability and his roles of developer and bridge to 
other markets. Given Berlin’s financial commitments and the respect shown to 
Tashkent, there was still sufficient role compatibility. Berlin showed through its 
discretion that it did was not undermining President Karimov’s undisputed authority. 
 
                                               
449 ‘Uzbek prosecutor accuses foreign media of continuing “information war”’ BBC Monitoring Central 
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Increasing intra-role conflict in Germany 
 
By the end of November, Germany’s new Chancellor, Angela Merkel, had taken office. 
As a new cabinet was formed, the Parliamentary State Secretary personally visited 
Uzbekistan in December and thanked President Karimov for allowing the Bundeswehr 
to remain in Termez. 
Not all in the Bundestag were pleased with the outcome. Some deputies argued 
that Human Rights were explicitly not for sale.454 Intra-role conflict, though, was not 
widespread and was mainly instigated by Germany’s smaller parties, namely the FDP, 
the Left and Green Parties. Indeed, after the 2005 elections, the SPD and CDU now 
formed a grand coalition and both remained in favour of augmenting Berlin’s more 
assertive roles in the international public sphere.  
President Karimov, however, remained a challenge as he continued 
propounding authenticity-based roles, focused on differentiation (see Chapter IV), and 
increased the level of restrictions on foreign journalists, including on a Deutsche Welle 
correspondent.455 Such actions, whilst increasing the cohesiveness of Mr Karimov’s less 
technocratic stance, brought credibility problems for Berlin as its relationship came 
into the public spotlight.  
News from German reports throughout the period also characterized the violent 
nature of President Karimov’s regime, using loaded expressions such as ‘drinker of 
blood from Tashkent’ (Neef 2006).456 Accordingly, members of parliament pressured 
Germany’s Foreign and Defence ministries to reveal more information concerning their 
relationship with Tashkent,457 to which the government responded in June.458 Also, a 
parliamentary group visited the country in October 2006 and concluded that the 
human rights situation in Uzbekistan was still not optimistic (Bensmann 2006). 
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Meanwhile, role conflict also took place within the EU, prompted in part by 
former British Ambassador Craig Murray’s testimony to the European Parliament. He 
made grave accusations, alleging that Germany’s intelligence services had obtained 
information from Uzbekistan gathered by use of torture (Büchner 2006). The European 
Parliament demanded a clarification, to which the German government responded with 
a closed door committee at the Bundestag - a decision that did not please some of 
Germany’s own deputies.459  
 While intra-role conflict grew, the height of contestation was not yet significant, 
given that the two largest parties, the CDU and SPD, remained committed to 
peacekeeping and also supported stable economic connections with the Central Asian 
Republics. Accordingly, in May 2006, the advisor to Daimler-Chrysler visited 
Uzbekistan again, followed in July by Defence Minister Franz Josef Jung (Muscta 
2007). Indeed, in September 2006, Uzbekistan’s President saw his prestige augmented 
as his new book was published in Bremen; and, when outgoing Ambassador Hans-
Joachim Kiderlen recognized Karimov’s personal expertise: ‘after the delivery 
presentation of credentials, he [President Karimov] struck me by his precise and 
profound knowledge about the situation in the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany], his 
vision of prospects for bilateral relations.’  
Perhaps the most relevant event for the bilateral relationship was the visit of 
Germany’s Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, in November, who confessed a 
desire to pressure for removing EU sanctions.460 This position evidently boosted 
President Karimov’s undisputed leadership, even more so because Germany was about 
to become the acting President of EU. Mr Karimov noted that Berlin was important for 
Uzbekistan and that ‘here the experience and prestige of Uzbekistan are essential.’461 
For his part, Mr Steinmeier replied that he would take into consideration Tashkent’s 
decision to give the Red Cross access to political prisoners and his hope that the EU and 
Uzbekistan would develop a stronger relationship in upcoming years.462 Curiously, after 
the Foreign Minister’s visit, Tashkent released an independent journalist from 
imprisonment.463 In site of Berlin’s public wish to soften EU sanctions, they were still 
renewed in November. Still, the Minister of State, Gernot Erler, argued that more than 
oil and gas was at stake in Central Asia, and that it was necessary for the EU to push for 
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463 ‘Uzbekistan releases independent journalist’ Agence France Presse – English, 8 November 2006.  
 153
equality with countries in the region - a hint that was perhaps directed at President 
Karimov.464  
 
VI.4. An increasingly frail relationship 2007-2010 
 
A December 2008 article in the renowned German newspaper Die Zeit coined Foreign 
Minister Steinmeier’s policy in Central Asia as ‘Change through Rapprochement’ 
(Wandel durch Annäherung) (Bittner et al. 2008). Comparing it purposefully with 
Willy Brandt’s famous Ostpolitik, meant that Berlin was both seeking to engage with 
the East and calling for change. It, therefore, balanced its typical civilian roles with a 
new, more assertive, stance. This approach though was not entirely compatible with 
President Karimov’s roles, since, at its core, it envisaged change, which could 
potentially affect stability. Still, it also meant that Mr Karimov’s undisputed authority 
and public concerns over defending equality and genuine independence were not 
explicitly targeted.  
Slogans aside, the policy, far from instigating serious discontinuity, was rather 
an extension of Germany’s already typical approach to Central Asia. Perhaps the only 
alteration was that now there was a publicly recognized strategy, which effectively 
meant increased visibility for the region, particularly as Mr Steinmeier lobbied for a 
new EU strategy in 2007. This momentum was, in part, the result of Chancellor 
Merkel’s increasing scepticism toward Moscow – an outlook that had already been duly 
noted by Russian press (Tsuvernik & Strokan 2006). The doubts eventually became 
more prominent after the 2006 gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine which, in turn, 
prompted the EU to enhance its energy cooperation with Central Asia (Hoffman 2010: 
87; Kempe 2007; Krumm 2007; Hall 2007).  
 
Foreign Minister Steinmeier’s new EU strategy 
 
In January 2007, as Germany assumed EU leadership, Mr Steinmeier introduced the 
concepts of his new EU strategy for Central Asia, arguing that ‘we should simply check 
to see if we can help with stability in that region (…). It’s a kind of gap in our European 
consciousness. As far as our common European past is concerned I can't see any stage 
where people were strongly interested in this region’ (Rettman 2007b). Since stability 
was at the forefront, role compatibility with Uzbekistan was galvanized. The EU’s new 
concept, therefore, concerned itself less with Human Rights than with the strategic 
importance of Central Asia (Rettman 2007a).  
                                               
464 ‘“Es geht um Abwehr von Gefahren”’ Frankfurter Rundschau, 27 December 2006. 
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Uzbekistani Foreign Minister, Vladmir Norov, showed some public willingness 
to accede to the strategy by clarifying that Uzbekistan did not need to justify itself for a 
stronger relationship with the EU465 and, by July 2007, the New Partnership was 
adopted by the European Council. Still, what seems to have been a quick process was 
actually a complicated endeavour. 
 
President Karimov’s unwillingness to compromise  
 
It is important to be aware that Tashkent, as one of the targets of the EU’s upcoming 
strategy, was still facing sanctions. The embargo and travelling restrictions were serious 
blows to President Karimov’s public credibility as a defender of Uzbekistan’s image and 
equality. Consequently, for cooperation to augment, inter-role conflict with EU would 
have to be mitigated. Berlin, too, would also have to grapple with its own increasing 
intra-role conflict regarding Uzbekistan. 
Berlin demonstrated goodwill as it allowed Uzbekistani authorities to travel to 
Germany, despite the EU’s sanctions.466 Thereafter, a German parliamentary delegation 
went to Tashkent to discuss reform.467 Controversy, though, soon became evident as 
negotiations advanced. Uzbekistan’s Prosecution Office opened a case against a 
Deutsche Welle reporter, who was accused of tax evasion.468 The timing of the case is 
suspicious given that it coincided with Mr Norov’s trip to Astana, where he would 
discuss the EU’s new strategy. According to a variety of press reports, Uzbekistan’s 
Foreign Minister disagreed with the way negotiations were going and how 
international equality was being put into question, stating that ‘we will justify 
[ourselves] to nobody’ and condemning the ‘student-teacher relationship’ that the EU 
was apparently seeking to implement.469  
The situation reached a temporary stalemate, but Tashkent then dropped its 
accusations against the Deutsche Welle correspondent,470 and the EU removed the 
travelling sanctions in October (Ibid). Whether these events are connected is still open 
to discussion, yet they evince the quagmire over conflicting roles, namely Tashkent’s 
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prestige and equality versus Berlin and the EU’s civilian responsibilities of pushing for 
political reform. Removing the sanctions solved part of the problem, but 
simultaneously increased Germany’s intra-role conflict, given that its Foreign Minister 
was now considered to be disinterested in Human Rights issues.471  
 
Security once more: the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) 
 
After the EU’s initial concessions, a number of events in Germany would spark greater 
intra-role conflict. On September 2007, an attack planned by alleged members of the 
so-called Sauerland cell of Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), was foiled by a joint CIA-
German operation. Three people were apprehended - two of German and one of 
Turkish nationality (Whitlock 2007) – all of whom orchestrated an attack on American 
military facilities in Germany. Thereafter, the Bundestag demanded a better 
explanation as to the nature of the terrorist group and some parliamentarians even 
questioned whether the IJU actually existed.472  
Then, another equally damaging incident took place in March 2008 when an 
American military base in Afghanistan was attacked by a terrorist of German 
citizenship (Gebauer & Musharbash 2008), followed then by another incident provoked 
by a German radical, Erich Breininger, who condemned Berlin’s actions in 
Afghanistan.473 These events were indirectly connected to Uzbekistan, even more so 
when, at the time, its head of intelligence, Rustam Inoyatov, visited Germany for 
reasons that remain unknown, thus sparking debate as to the nature of the private 
cooperation between the two states.474 So, intra-role conflict increased in Germany as it 
discussed whether it should retreat from its new, more assertive, roles in the region. 
 While reform in Central Asia was discussed in parliament, mixed cues were also 
conveyed when Uzbekistani Defence officials continued meeting with their German 
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counterparts throughout 2008.475 Foreign Minister Steinmeier could not completely 
avoid Uzbekistan and his own assertive EU strategy, which was then reflected in the 
speech he gave to the Bundestag, commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. He argued that his prudent, yet controversial, policy had 
actually been successful in advancing with reform in Uzbekistan: ‘let me turn to 
Uzbekistan (...) Of course, there is still so much to do there in the sphere of human 
rights. But some positive steps have been taken. I called personally for the abolition of 
the death penalty in Uzbekistan (...) We have created benchmarks. For example, we 
successfully campaigned for the ICRC to be at long last allowed access to Uzbek prisons 
again. I ask for greater understanding for the EU's policy on Central Asia.’476  
 
Growing controversy concerning Germany’s Involvement in Uzbekistan 
 
While the nature of Berlin’s long-term relationship with Tashkent became more visible, 
Germany’s intra-role conflict propagated to Uzbekistan, as President Karimov had to 
pay heed to public criticism. Growing inter-role conflict, though, only appeared 
gradually, as economic roles were still relevant. These were, therefore, wholly 
congruent with Mr Karimov’s technocratic roles since access to loans remained open,477 
in addition to the increase in German investment.478  
By 2009, Chancellor Angela Merkel was re-elected and the grand coalition 
between the CDU and SPD ceased to be. The CDU then formed a new coalition with the 
smaller FDP, making Guido Westerwelle Germany’s new foreign minister. The 
government would thus face some increased criticism, especially when a news report 
conveyed that Germany’s government had cooperated with Uzbekistan’s military 
during the period of EU sanctions.479  
Such reports only reinforced the negative spotlight as well as Germany’s 
apparent disregard for Human Rights and civilian roles. Another report in May of 2010 
remonstrated against a decision taken by the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) - a 
CDU-affiliated foundation – to celebrate Germany’s cooperation with Uzbekistan on 13 
May (the anniversary of the Andijan crisis) without making a single reference to the 
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tragic events of 2005.480 Still, none of these brought about significant intra-role 
conflict. The SPD was now in the opposition, but the new coalition persisted with 
protecting stability. Therefore, when President Karimov met with Mr Westerwelle in 
July 2010, both focused on defence, an issue that was considered very relevant after 
conflict erupted in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan’s President highlighted the 
importance of bilateral relations but paid heed to Germany’s intra-role conflict by 
conceding to the need of pursuing reform: ‘[German-Uzbekistani relations] concerns 
both political and democratic reforms, as well as economic and humanitarian spheres. I 
would like to say that Uzbekistan puts certain trust in German institutions concerning 
cooperation to resolve such important issues as progress of society's democratization 
and economic liberalization and so on.’481 
In spite of the business as usual attitude, it became increasingly evident that 
President Karimov would have to face Berlin’s increased suspicion, especially after 
Zeromax - a large, Swiss-based conglomerate with business links to Uzbekistan - 
declared bankruptcy in November 2010. According to an advisor to Germany’s Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Technology, this meant that Uzbekistan was 130 million 
euros in debt to German businesses.482 Once more, the relationship was visible for the 
worst possible reasons and Germany’s Federal Commissioner on Human Rights 




The end of 2010 finished with uncertainty and relations becoming increasingly tense. 
Indeed, President Karimov’s visit to Brussels in January 2011 did not result in any 
visible economic concessions that could bolster Tashkent’s technocratic roles. Instead, 
it was heavily criticized by the press, affecting Mr Karimov’s role of defender of 
Uzbekistan’s great image. The German press chastised Uzbekistan’s leader, and the 
renowned newspaper Die Zeit mockingly labelled him as ‘Unser Diktator’ (Our 
dictator) (Bota 2011). Consequently, by 2010, President Karimov’s uncompromising 
roles were under greater scrutiny, as both Berlin and Tashkent had to reconcile 
disparaging positions concerning stability, civilizing roles and commercial contacts. 
What seems clear is that Berlin was conflicted between its usual discrete assertion and 
its other responsibilities. Unlike Washington, though, Berlin never evinced strong 
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intra-role conflict within its own cabinet, since contestation originated mainly from the 
Bundestag’s smaller opposition parties (two of which were the FDP and the Green 
Party). Moreover, Germany also assumed a stronger economic role than the United 
States, which meant that, despite incompatibility between reform and stability, it still 




VII. The Uzbekistani-Turkish Relationship 1991-2010 
 
Uzbekistan and its Central Asian neighbours were not the only ones entering an 
unprecedented era after the end of the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the gradual dissolution of Yugoslavia, Turkey’s governments faced new challenges 
(Aydin 2004: 1; Kut 2001: 5; Fuller 1993: 37). This shift in geopolitics, along with 
several internal transformations, convinced Barry Rubin (2001: 1) that Ankara had 
changed ‘its foreign policy and self-image more than any other post-communist country 
in the post-Cold War era.’   
As both Turkey and Uzbekistan opened themselves to the international public 
sphere, everything would suggest the beginning of a fruitful and cooperative 
relationship. Besides a similar language, common culture and ancestry, Ankara’s 
Kemalist roles focused on secularism and Turkish nationalism, all of which was 
potentially congruent with President Karimov’s technocratic roles.484 Indeed, the 
resemblance seemed so straightforward that, in 1994, NATO delegated Turkey the task 
of promoting the alliance’s aims in Central Asia (Winrow 2001: 216).  
However, Turkish-Uzbekistani relations were actually beset by continuous 
inter-role conflict. After the 1980 coup, Turkey progressively liberalized its political 
environment (Zurcher 2004: 289-292), which inevitably led to growing debate over the 
foundations of its foreign policy. According to Mucahit Bilici (2006: 3), the root 
ideologies of modern Turkish politics originated in the Tanzimat period (a time of 
reform in the 19th century Ottoman Empire) and are all more or less classified under 
secularism, Islamism and Ottomanism. The first led Turkey to engage with the West, 
the second toward the Middle East, whereas the latter results from a growing 
fascination for the history of its former empire, the Caucasus and Central Asia (Fuller 
1993: 47). Consequently, Ottomanism may occasionally evince some pan-Turkic 
elements. Those very general roles frequently overlap, however, as was exemplified by 
the rise of the AKP (see below). Moreover, the fluctuating reinterpretations were far 
from being consensual within domestic politics, as many Turkish citizens did not agree, 
for example, with President Turgut Özal’s optimistic engagement with Central Asia 
(Ibid: 73).  
Naturally, Ankara’s contacts and curiosity fostered some role compatibility with 
Tashkent. For one, Turkey’s government quickly recognized President Karimov’s 
regime, which bolstered Uzbekistan’s international image. Ankara’s Ottomanist role 
also envisaged a number of economic projects linking East to West that very much 
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converged with President Karimov’s role of bridging markets. Yet, behind these 
manifestations was a strong level of inter-role conflict, which many times suggested 
that Ankara desired leadership, thereby contradicting President Karimov’s role of 
defending international equality.  
Moreover, Ankara faced a strong level of intra-role conflict after the mid-1990s 
which, compounded by the fact that it was not as economically powerful as Berlin and 
Washington, contributed to bilateral role conflict. In other words, domestic 
controversies in Ankara collided with President Karimov’s appeals for protecting 
stability and de-ideologized transition. Moreover, lack of economic influence was 
hardly compatible with his other technocratic roles, namely developing Uzbekistan, 
seeing as Turkey could not guarantee the level of investment it promised (Winrow 
2001: 204; Fuller 1993). 
Distrust also became increasingly observable in the public sphere, which was 
made clear by Tashkent’s growing repression of the Fetullah Gülen movement 
(Krespin-Sharon 2009; Park 2007). Conspiracies over the Gülen movement led to 
inter-role conflict, which also reverberated into Turkey’s own domestic politics. In fact, 
to this day, the aims of the Fetullah Gülen movement are far from consensual in 
Turkish politics, especially after the more traditional Welfare and Justice and 
Development parties rose to power.  
In addition to incompatibilities over economic development and the rise of 
political Islam, Turkey’s Western orientation could not match the public demands of 
President Karimov. Ankara had to balance its credibility in the public sphere, as 
Tashkent appealed for Ankara to fully reinforce President Karimov’s undisputed 
authority. Ankara many times hesitated, seeing as it did not want to affect its 
important relationships with the European Union and Washington.  
 
VII.1. A Promising Start: 1991-1993 
 
After 1991, everything would suggest that Turkey and Uzbekistan would both become 
major partners, particularly because the Turkish President, Turgut Özal, was publicly 
committed to reaching out to Central Asia, even during Moscow’s rule. Before the wave 
of independence in 1991, he received Azerbaijan’s President in 1990 and also, in early 
1991, made a stopover in both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan whilst visiting the Soviet 
Union (Aydin 2004: 2-3). This interest for the region probably explains why, by 
October, Azerbaijan’s Prime Minister stated that if Ankara did not recognize his state, 
no other country would (Kovaci 1991).  
Similarly, with President Karimov’s declaration of independence, followed in 
December by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkish support boosted the 
 161
international equality and prestige of President Karimov. Accordingly, he soon 
travelled to Turkey at the bequest of his counterpart, where he obtained full 
recognition. Henceforth, the bilateral contacts multiplied, but subtle rhetorical nuances 
conveyed that roles were actually far from being compatible.  
 
President Karimov visits Turkey 
 
On 17 December 1991, President Karimov travelled to Turkey.485 At the time, President 
Özal requested President Karimov to ‘relay our [Turkey’s] warmest wishes to the 
brotherly Uzbek people. We will always be together with our Uzbek brothers (…) [I] am 
sure the people of Turkey and Uzbekistan as well as the people of Turkestan as a whole 
will become respected members of the world community by the year 2000’ (Litvinenko 
1991). Turkey’s President, whose Motherland Party (Anavatan partisi, ANAP) had come 
in second in the November parliamentary elections, was inevitably staking much of his 
public credibility on Central Asia.  
After becoming acquainted with the Turkish capital, President Karimov visited 
President Özal’s official residence and signed a variety of comprehensive agreements on 
culture, education and economic cooperation, of which the most important was a 
protocol proposing diplomatic recognition.486 Curiously, President Karimov iterated 
that Uzbekistan was a sovereign and independent state ‘that determines its own 
domestic and foreign policies’;487 meaning that only after publicly demarcating his 
country’s genuine independence and equality, did he proceed to sign the documents.488 
President Karimov then praised Turkey’s approach in the international public sphere: 
‘in light of the current difficult situation, when the USSR has fallen apart [sic], 
Uzbekistan is compelled to choose an effective course of development. The economic 
model, used by Turkey, is applicable to our republic, too (…) the more so, since our 
peoples are linked by traditional ties of friendship.’489  
Turkey’s secular and western-oriented focus did not contradict President 
Karimov’s technocratic roles, namely his undisputed authority, focus on development 
and attempt to bridge to other markets. Therefore, Ankara saw its prestige and 
preponderance in the region increase. Indeed, the press highlighted that Turkey was 
                                               
485 ‘Turkey to recognize all breakaway Soviet republics’ Agence France Presse – English, 17 December 
1991. 




489 ‘Interview with Uzbek President’ TASS, 20 December 1991. 
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considered the ideal partner by Washington to engage with the Central Asian 
Republics.490   
 
Turkey and Uzbekistan reinforce their ties: The Century of the Turks 
 
Having gradually consolidated his country’s independence, President Karimov went to 
Davos, in February 1992, where he attended the World Economic Forum. He met on 
location with his Turkic counterparts in what was labelled as the first ‘Turkish Summit’ 
by some elements of the press.491 Curiously, the word used was Turkish as opposed to 
Turkic, thereby admitting Turkey’s leading role.  
Uzbekistan’s leader, despite his role of defender of equality, admitted during 
the summit that he, as well as his Central Asian neighbours, was grateful to his ‘elder 
brother’ for bringing their people closer.492 This praise was not in vain, because 
Turkey’s government soon reciprocated by boosting economic relations, which fitted 
nicely with President Karimov’s calls for technocratic relations. Turkey’s Foreign 
Minister, Hikmet Çetin, indicated in Davos that increased Turkish aid would be 
provided by the Exim Bank.493 In fact, Turkey’s government was willing to set up 
credits worth 900 million dollars to galvanize trade. This, however, contributed to 
intra-role conflict, insofar as many Turkish nationals debated whether such huge sums 
should be delivered abroad rather than applied internally (Fuller 1993: 47). Later, 
though, Ankara would prove unable to provide all the loans it had promised (Winrow 
2001: 204), which would hinder its ability to reinforce President Karimov’s 
technocratic roles. 
The relationship appeared to be consolidating as technocratic congruence 
between both parties became evident in the international public sphere. Consequently, 
President Karimov soon underlined the importance of cooperating with, as well as 
following, Turkey’s economic model: ‘Turkish way of development is more acceptable 
to us, first as all as a secular, civilized way of social development.’494  
Tashkent’s growing connection with Ankara reaffirmed President Karimov’s 
supposedly apolitical and de-ideologized stance to politics, particularly when some 
speculated whether the Central Asian countries would follow the Iranian model (e.g. 
Cordahi 1992). President Karimov, however, also made a number of explicit cautionary 
                                               
490 See the following reports by Kovaci (1991) and Lobe (1991). 
491  For a reference to the ‘Turkish summit’, see the following article: ‘Turkish Leader Met Central Asian 
Chief in Davos’ TASS, 3 February 1992. 
492 Ibid. 
493 Ibid. 
494‘“Speaking of borders means breaking up Central Asia” Islam Karimov Speaks in an Interview with 
Foreign Journalists’ Official Kremlin News Broadcast, 15 May 1992. 
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remarks, highlighting that there was first Uzbekistan’s own model and only then 
Turkey’s: ‘I am impressed by the fact that Turkey while simultaneously observing, 
preserving and developing its own national traditions (….) at the same time 
understands that bowing to these traditions is not an aim in itself (…) Therefore when I 
speak about Turkish model I mean it as a reference point. But Uzbekistan had its own 
path.’495 Clearly, Turkey was a partner, but one that had to be equal and not superior to 
Uzbekistan. Moreover, President Karimov’s credibility was increasingly based on his 
roles of seeker of genuine independence (see Chapter III), which meant that 
Uzbekistan’s economy was to be unique. 
In July 1992, President Karimov visited Bursa to attend more meetings of the 
World Economic Forum. He was received by some of the city’s high level officials 
which, once more, enhanced his role of defender of Uzbekistan’s image. Mr Karimov 
confessed that Turkey carried a special place and that he was impressed by its culture 
and level of economic development.496 He then also took advantage of the change to 
bolster Ankara’s own roles by praising its political heritage: ‘we have also chosen the 
path of great Ataturk, and we will not renounce it.’497  
Those comments probably reinforced Ankara’s enthusiasm, as President Özal 
then called for more linkages between Turkey and Central Asia when organizing in 
November the first summit of ‘Turkic-Speaking’ countries. More importantly, he staked 
a high level of his own public credibility in the opening speech, as he laid down an 
ambitious agenda, comprising cultural, political and economic integration; future joint 
regulation; the implementation of a development bank; and the breaking down of walls 
separating the two regions.498 He then concluded with even more optimism by stating 
that ‘if we can exploit this historic opportunity in the best possible way, if we do not 
make any mistakes, the 21st century will be the century of the Turks.’ 499  
The speech reveals perhaps one of the first clear instances of role 
incompatibility between Presidents Özal and Karimov. The latter had predicated his 
roles on a type of bland technocracy that effectively appealed for de-ideologized 
relationships (see Chapter III). This meant, therefore, that cultural affinities and 
schemes beyond the economical were not coherent with his overall public message. 
President Özal was thus actually contradicting President Karimov’s gradual appeals for 
genuine independence, in that he called for a time when borders no longer existed. It is 
                                               
495 ‘Karimov Turkey is a point of Reference – Ties with Russia Immutable’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 3 September 1992. 
496 ‘Uzbekistan President Visits Bursa; Praises Turkey as a model to be followed’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 2 July 1992. 
497 Ibid. 
498 ‘Özal Welcomes Fellow Presidents “21st Century will be the Century of the Turks”’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 2 November 1992. 
499 Ibid. 
 164
also important to be aware that Uzbekistan’s leader had, at the time, hinged a lot of his 
public credibility on protecting economic stability through a monetary union with 
Russia (see Chapters III and IV).  
It should then not have come as a surprise the rather unenthusiastic appraisal 
given by President Karimov, as he barely mentioned political and cultural integration 
and focused just on the economic dimension.500 Evidently, the statement did little to 
reinforce Turkey’s Ottomanist role, although Mr Karimov conceded that ‘the Uzbek 
people had never forgotten the economic and spiritual aided extended by Turkey’.501 
The relationship, nonetheless, progressed and both parties continued augmenting their 
prestige. After President Karimov’s trips to Turkey, it was Mr Özal’s turn to visit 
Uzbekistan in April 1993, the first stop in his journey to the region. Once in Uzbekistan, 
Turkey’s President argued that: ‘we shall always be with our Uzbek brothers at all times 
(…) [and that] relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan, a powerful Central Asian 
state, are successfully developing to the mutual benefit of the two nations.’502 
Recognizing the power of Uzbekistan bolstered President Karimov’s role of defender of 
equality and a protector of Uzbekistan’s image. Uzbekistan’s leader thus thanked 
Turkey’s President for the visit to his ‘ancestral homeland’.503 Thereafter, during a state 
dinner, President Özal highlighted that ‘Uzbekistan is also experiencing the difficulties 
involved in moving to democracy and a market economy following the collapse of 
communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union (…) these difficulties can be 
overcome by unity, patience and a lot of work, adding that Turkey is offering its 
experience in making this transition period easier for Uzbekistan.’504 The latter 
statement hints at paternalism and could also be regarded as a rather blatant denial of 
equality. Nevertheless, President Karimov admitted that their bilateral relations were 
‘eternal’ and then focused mainly on the need for greater economic investment.505 
 
VII.2. The first setback: 1994 
 
Other than Russia, Turkey was perhaps the state at the time with the strongest ties to 
Central Asia and, therefore, a likely candidate for receiving Uzbekistani political 
refugees. This would lead to problems in the bilateral relationship seeing as it 
questioned President Karimov’s undisputed authority. As far as Ankara was also 
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concerned, the situation was not easy to resolve, for its western orientation meant that 
it could not avoid the rights of asylum seekers.  
 
Muhammad Solih and pan-Turkic aspirations 
 
The leader of Uzbekistan’s Erk (freedom) party, Salay Madaminov - known usually by 
his pseudonym Muhammad Solih - was detained under house arrest on April 1993 
(Cordahi 1993). He managed to escape soon after, though, and cross over into Turkey. 
Once in Istanbul, Mr Solih finished an important work entitled ‘Toward Happier Days’, 
which was eventually smuggled into Uzbekistan (Deibler 1996: 33). 
 Once a major opposition spokesman was abroad, the bilateral relationship was 
put to the test. In the early months of 1994, President Karimov attended a breakfast 
hosted by Turkey in Davos to discuss a potential oil pipeline project.506 A press report 
then deliberated that Uzbekistan’s President had requested Turkey’s newly elected 
President, Süleyman Demirel, to extradite Mr Solih (Tütüncü 2002: 20), although the 
content of the conversation was not revealed. 
After the talk, it seems that no action was taken by Turkey and so the setting 
was conducive to inter-role conflict. President Karimov too quick action and recalled 
his Ambassador in February 1994. 507 For Ankara the situation was complex given that 
Mr Solih represented more than just an asylum seeker. Erk (and also Birlik) was 
sympathetic to the ‘Turkestan People’s Movement’ of Uzbekistan (Fierman 1997: 381) 
and other pan-Turkic ideals. Subsequently, there was a degree of role compatibility 
between Ankara and Mr Solih as both had hedged their public credibility on converging 
Ottomanist roles. In fact, Solih’s work did not go unnoticed in Turkey and was 
translated by Șuayip Karakaş, a professor of Turkish and Turkic languages, at 
Erzurum’s Atatürk University.  
Public awareness was on the rise and President Karimov took more action by 
banning the distribution of the newspaper Zaman and restricting the Gülen 
movement’s activities in Uzbekistan (the nature of the Fetullah Gülen’s movement and 
its message will be made clearer below).508 Thereafter, elements of the Turkish media 
made their first public condemnation of President Karimov (Tütüncü 2002: 21). 
Moreover, repression increased. In the summer of 1994, reports indicated that leading 
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Broadcasts, 1 February 1994. 
507 For references to growing inter-role conflict at the time, see ‘Uzbekistan President Arrives for an 
Official Visit’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 June 1994. 
508 Bill Park (2007: 54) acknowledges that the intention behind the decisions remains unclear (whether to 
prevent Turkey from harbouring Uzbekistani opposition, or to curb Gülen’s movement’s activities in 
Uzbekistan). Regardless of the motivation, though, the acts demonstrate a strong public grievance against 
the group’s activities. 
 166
Erk activists were kidnapped from Almaty.509 Indeed, many of those individuals were 
actually apprehended and brought to Tashkent for what became known as the Erk 




In May 1994, Turkey’s foreign minister visited Tashkent and declared that trade 
between the two countries had not risen sufficiently.510 The focus on economics (at least 
publicly) corresponded to President Karimov’s technocratic roles. Ankara also 
acknowledged the importance of energy in the region and the need for arranging 
alternative trade routes to bypass Iran and Russia (Mater 1994), all of which were 
compatible with President Karimov’s role of bridging to other markets.  
After the crisis, rapprochement seemed on its way. President Karimov visited 
Turkey in June, and the visit was dominated by technocratic issues such as trade, 
rather than on political and cultural integration. At the meeting, Prime Minister Tansu 
Çiller underlined Turkey’s interests in Uzbekistan and that ‘these relations are carried 
out based on the principles of equality, non-interference in domestic affairs, and 
mutual interest, love and respect.’511 Later, however, during a state dinner, President 
Demirel confessed that he wished to increase the cultural connection between the two 
countries, but President Karimov barely responded to this appeal and, instead, focused 
on economic issues and investment opportunities.512  
The encounters allowed Uzbekistan’s leader to extol his technocratic claims 
after the 1994 bilateral crisis and mitigate the Ottomanist and pan-Turkic roles that 
had been on the rise after 1991.513 Turkey’s government seems to have conceded to 
President Karimov’s undisputed authority by requesting Mr Solih to abandon the 
country in the fall of 1994. Subsequently, President Karimov participated in the second 
Turkic States summit in October 1994. The event was then marked by a slight 
adjustment in Turkish rhetoric, which renounced discourses of cultural affinity and 
focused mainly on enhancing economic cooperation.514  
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VII.3. An increasingly difficult relationship: 1995-1996 
 
In the mid-1990s, President Karimov’s rhetoric gradually concentrated on protecting 
stability and securing Uzbekistan’s genuine independence (partially as a response to 
the civil wars in Tajikistan and Afghanistan- see Chapter III). Change, though, was 
more visible in Turkey. Following the success in municipal elections of March 1994, the 
pro-Islamic Welfare Party (WP) received 21.1% of the national vote in December 1995 
and formed a coalition government with Ms Çiller’s True Path Party (TPP). Hakan 
Yavuz (1997: 63), for example, highlighted that this event marked a significant ‘turning-
point in the history of the Turkish Republic’ seeing that, in June 1996, it had for the 
first time a Prime Minister whose ideological platform was guided by Turkey’s Islamic 
heritage.  
The shift in Turkey’s politics impacted the bilateral relationship. If President 
Karimov had already shown discord regarding Turkey’s Ottomanist roles, Islamic 
rhetoric in Ankara was an even greater compromise to his role of de-ideologized leader, 
particularly because Central Asia faced the spread of a potentially extreme 
interpretation of Islam (see Chapter III for more on the IMU). 
 
Incompatibility over (a)political relationships 
 
Before the rise of the WP, President Karimov’s relationship with Turkey was also not at 
a high point. In April 1995, Uzbekistan’s paper Narodnoye Slovo reported the story of 
an individual accused at the Erk trial, who he confessed he had sent a number of fellow 
comrades to Turkey.515 Ankara, therefore, was increasingly portrayed as a harbour of 
political opposition, thereby affecting President Karimov’s credibility as Uzbekistan’s 
undisputed authority.  
After the trial and some bilateral rapprochement in 1995, a degree of stability 
returned to the relationship, due to an adjustment in the public approaches taken by 
the Turkish government. For example, in July 1995, Turkish Prime Minister Çiller 
visited Uzbekistan and signed a memorandum for enhancing economic cooperation. Ms 
Çiller, who was Turkey’s first female prime minister, argued that ‘our main goal is to 
develop our relations with the brotherly countries in every field on the basis of mutual 
goodwill and benefits and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.’516  
Prime Minister Çiller’s rhetoric was thus fully compatible with President 
Karimov’s role of developer of Uzbekistan. Yet, rapprochement was still not underway. 
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In August 1995, during the third Turkic summit, news reports highlighted that 
President Karimov threatened to not participate in upcoming Turkic conferences if they 
did not to avoid politicized issues. He was thus referring to some comments made by 
President Demirel, who had alluded to the Turkish-Cypriot predicament.517 As a 
response, Uzbekistan’s President was quoted defending that ‘economic cooperation 
should be developed in the Framework of Central Asian nations’518 - a further stab to 
Ankara’s Ottomanist roles.  
 
Explicit dislike for Turkey’s new government 
 
Ankara’s own domestic situation was also not conducive to enhancing role 
compatibility. When Necmettin Erbakan of the WP became Prime Minister, President 
Karimov remonstrated against the path toward which Turkish politics was heading: ‘we 
[Uzbekistan’s government] have established extremely good relations with President 
Demirel, with Madam Çiller, and there are many other people. I'm not going to name 
all of them I do not know Mr Ebercan [sic]. I am not acquainted with him (…) But I 
must tell you that I have negative attitude to the ideology of this party. And I believe 
that today Turkey is in a kind of transitional period.’519 The statement was reproduced 
in the Turkish press, although President Karimov cautioned that Ankara’s secularism 
and connection to the West could not be shaken: ‘it is impossible to turn Turkey away 
from the path of cooperation with the United States and Europe’ (Akinci 1996).  
 The rise of the WP and its traditionalist message also induced role conflict 
within Turkey, resulting in mixed cues for Uzbekistani leadership. Indeed, just a few 
hours before leaving for another Turkic summit in Tashkent, President Demirel met 
with Mr Erbakan to mitigate the rising friction between the two parties.520 These 
antagonisms grew, in part, due to Mr Erbakan’s new approach. Indeed, Turkey’s new 
Prime Minister confessed that he hoped to create an economic community of Islamic 
states and then made Iran his first official visit (Winrow 2001: 202; Liel 2001). A few 
months later his newly formed government took the unprecedented step to support a 
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Libyan resolution to the UN, which had been explicitly rejected by Uzbekistan’s 
government and also the United States and Israel.521  
 
VII.4. Growing friction: 1997-1998 
 
The rise of political Islam instigated role incompatibility. The ‘transition’ phase of 
Turkish politics, as Uzbekistan’s leader had coined it, meant that Turkey’s path was 
uncertain and thus hardly congruent with President Karimov’s roles of protecting 
stability and fomenting technocracy. Ankara’s internal debate over its future in the 
region reverberated into Central Asia and eventually looped back into Turkey as 
President Karimov strongly condemned a number of incidents. 
   
Signs of a deteriorating relationship: Turkey’s Sincan crisis  
 
In January 1997, President Karimov’s government decreed a law forbidding parties 
based on religion and ethnicity (Melvin 2000: 34). Turkish politics, in contrast, were 
facing an increase of religious rhetoric in the public sphere. The ideas proclaimed by 
Prime Minister Erbakan augmented the friction between him and the strongly secular 
National Security Council, which meant that the lack of internal stability and 
technocratic rhetoric barely converged with President Karimov’s roles (Gozaydin 
2009). However, Turkey’s intra-role conflict quickly escalated, leading to a ‘Kemalist 
restoration’ in February 1997. Turkish armed forces stormed the city of Sincan, where a 
conference hosted by the local mayor was attended by both Prime Minister Erbakan 
and the Iranian Ambassador (Zurcher 2004: 300). Mr Erbakan had, at the time, 
delivered a speech with some Islamic innuendos and thus faced the full pressure of 
Turkey’s secular armed forces. He was cornered and eventually resigned from his office 
in June. As further reprisal, the WP was also banned in the following year. 
 Tashkent responded to these incidents by recalling around 2000 students from 
Turkey in August 1997. President Karimov explained that his decision resulted from the 
path Turkish politics was heading toward: ‘it is incomprehensible why Turkey, 
established by (Kemal) Ataturk, has allowed clerics to come to power. We considered 
your secular country to be a model. You have shocked us [sic].’522 
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Ankara attempts to reassure President Karimov 
 
Ankara’s intra-role conflict was colliding with some of President Karimov’s major roles 
and leading to bilateral role conflict. However, after the Sincan coup, Ankara’s 
government responded by boosting its Kemalist roles. Following a 1997 summit, 
Presidents Karimov and Demirel discussed economic relations.  Turkey’s head of state 
defended that the relationship was intimate and facing a significant increase in trade. 
Evidently, another adjustment toward technocratic rhetoric fostered role compatibility 
and the Turkish Defence Minister travelled to Uzbekistan in January 1998.523   
The greatest attempt at galvanizing the relationship, however, was made in the 
following April during Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz’s visit to Uzbekistan. Before 
travelling to Tashkent, Turkey’s Prime Minister underlined that ‘currently our political 
relations (…) are perfect. But at the same time, I believe that we should spend greater 
efforts to improve the economic and commercial ties between our nations.’524 Ankara 
was, therefore, expounding the type of technocratic roles that had been on the rise 
before Prime Minister Erbakan’s elections. Hence, the two sides were able to meet and 
sign several agreements.525 Accordingly, during a long press conference, President 
Karimov acknowledged the efforts that were being made and so paid homage to 
Turkey’s secularism: ‘I am a follower of Ataturk. If Ataturk's legacy encounters any 
threat in Turkey, we will feel the same danger in Uzbekistan. We endorse the Turkish 
government's attitude towards fundamentalism. Turkey's policies have always been a 
guide for Uzbekistan and the other Central Asian states.’526  
Prime Minister Yilmaz responded to Mr Karimov’s homage by highlighting that 
the relationship had improved considerably after Mr Erbakan’s resignation: ‘Turkey 
took an array of measures to prevent the resurrection of fundamentalism. Our 
government is determined to continue the anti-fundamentalist struggle within the 
principles of democracy and respect for people's religious freedom.’527 
 
A small period of increased cooperation 
 
The gradual public convergence between the two governments would then be put to a 
test in June at another Turkic summit meeting. President Demirel declared that the 
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fifth summit would reinforce Turkic solidarity and make the next century a ‘turkic 
century’.528 Moreover, he confessed that these meetings would eventually allow for 
implementing a new silk road.529 Still, President Karimov continued publicly conveying 
some doubts about the advantages of the summits which continued evincing a number 
of pan-Turkic roles. He once more iterated that he was against them being used for 
political agendas and underlined that nationalistic sympathies had to be downplayed, 
especially for China’s Uyghur community. Alternatively, he proposed that the goal was 
to seek ‘improving economic relations’.530 Incidentally, these declarations were not 
welcomed by all in Ankara, as the deputy leader of Turkey’s Great Unity Party 
lambasted against Ankara not defending the world’s marginalized Turkic 
communities.531  
Yet, compared to the tense period of the mid 1990s, cooperation seemed to be 
on the horizon as a number of Turkish investments in Uzbekistan were soon underlined 
by the press.532 Moreover, Turkey assumed an important stake in constructing the 
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline in the following months (connecting Turkey, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia). The consortium was signed in Ankara, with the presence and support of 
President Karimov, given that it corresponded to his role of bridge to other markets 
(for more on the Ankara pipeline scheme and its American support, see Chapter V). It 
would seem that Turkey’s regional prestige was at its peak and so the State Minister, 
Ahat Andican, stressed the importance of implementing a multidimensional policy 
focused on business and transport in the Caucasus and Central Asia.533 By the end of 
1998, everything would suggest less friction and increased role compatibility.  
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VII.5. The attempt on President Karimov’s life 1999-2000 
 
The attacks of 16 February 1999 are the singular most important events in Uzbekistan’s 
recent history after the Andijan Crisis.534 Six bombs exploded in Tashkent, ‘killing 
sixteen people and injuring more than one hundred. The attack, which targeted key 
government buildings, called the stability of the nation into question for the first time’ 
(Polat & Butkevich 2000: 541). The event affected President Karimov’s public 
credibility, specifically his capacity to instil stability and remain an undisputed 
authority. 
The severity of the attack was then followed by an equally powerful response by 
the government in Tashkent. Repression increased substantially and President 
Karimov soon demanded the full support of his closest international partners. The 
event thus had repercussions for the bilateral relationship, given Ankara’s ambiguous 
support for Muhammad Solih.  
 
The bombings and Turkey’s first demonstration of support 
 
After the bombings, President Karimov depicted the events at a press conference, 
where he described those killed, the explosions, the gunfights and the perpetrators.535 
Then, in March, the press underlined that one of the potential instigators had been 
apprehended in Turkey.536 Ankara was therefore put on the spot, even more so in mid-
March, when President Demirel travelled to Uzbekistan. Originally, the trip was 
designed to galvanize trade and supervise some of Turkey’s investments in 
Samarkand.537 However, with the attacks questioning the credibility of President 
Karimov’s undisputed authority and the regime’s stability, the relevant issue-areas 
rapidly changed.  
Before the arrival of Turkey’s head of state, President Karimov confessed to the 
press that he had urged Interpol to extradite Mr Solih from Turkey, whom he accused 
of meeting Tohir Yo’ldosh (one of the leaders of the IMU). Uzbekistan’s President 
argued that Mr Solih ‘has sunk to the point of dealing with fanatics with whose support 
                                               
534 The event is still to the present day shown on Uzbekistani TV as a reminder of its significance. Also, a 
quick visit to the Museum of the History of Uzbekistan in Tashkent reveals a whole section dedicated to 
the terrorist attacks. 
535 ‘Uzbekistan’s President Survives Assassination Attempt’ Hurriyet, 17 February 1999, available via 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed August 2012. 
536 ‘Suspect involved in plot against Uzbek President Captured in Turkey’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 4 
March 1999. 
537 ‘Turkish, Uzbek presidents to discuss Islamic fundamentalism’ Hurriyet, 16 March 1999, available via 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed October 2012. 
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he intends to become president and to make Yuldash his military minister [sic].’538 
Reports at the time also suggested that Mr Solih had instructed some men to travel 
with him to Turkey for bodyguard training, which, coupled with the fact that he was an 
acquaintance of Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, the former President of Chechnya, increased 
speculation regarding whether he had actually been involved in the February attacks 
(Polat & Butkevich 2000: 548).  
 At the press conference that followed, President Karimov voiced strong public 
support for Turkey, calling his counterpart an ‘elder brother’ whose support he was 
thankful for in an ‘unstable and changeable world.’ He then went on to describe the 
assailants, accusing both Mr Yo’ldosh and Mr Solih.539 Curiously, a BBC reporter then 
asked the Turkish President if Mr Solih was still on Turkish soil, to which President 
Demirel responded affirmatively.540 Nevertheless, Uzbekistan’s leader cautioned that 
his country was still compiling a case against Muhammad Solih and that it was difficult 
for Ankara to extradite an individual specialized in illegal travel. He argued additionally 
that Uzbekistan’s government had not yet appealed to Turkish authorities, but that ‘on 
the contrary, I would like to thank the Turkish president, Mr Demirel, for his 
condolences he expressed to our government and people and for his readiness to render 
a help to fight a common enemy, a common evil - which is currently an evil for the 
whole world – terrorism.’541 It would seem that President Karimov refused to put his 
counterpart on the spot, even though he hinted that he was expecting full cooperation. 
 
Crisis in the relationship 
 
In spite of Turkey’s symbolic show of support and President Karimov’s 
acknowledgement, the actions that followed evinced role conflict rather than 
compatibility. This became more apparent when Tashkent closed twenty Turkish 
schools in the country, most of them connected to the Gülen movement. It is important 
to bear in mind that Ankara, too, had played a part in discrediting the Gülen 
movement’s activities, given that, after Prime Minister Erbakan’s resignation, Mr Gülen 
was targeted for trial by Turkey’s secular establishment, which forced him to seek exile 
in the United States (Krespin-Sharon 2009: 52).542 So, given Turkey’s own intra-role 
                                               
538 ‘Uzbekistan urges Interpol to hep track down terrorists’ Interfax Russian News, 15 March 1999. 
539 ‘Uzbek and Turkish Presidents Give Press Conference: Full Version’ BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 
18 March 1999. 
540 Ibid. 
541 Ibid. 
542 In fact, Mr Gülen was indicted for a crime in absentia by the Turkish judiciary in 2000. 
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conflict, between rigid secularism and renewed political Islam, it is not a surprise that 
the movement’s schools were targeted specifically by President Karimov.543 
Due to the complicated context, the Turkish press surmised that Tashkent’s 
actions were provoked by Ankara’s delay in extraditing the two suspects. Indeed, the 
hold-up seems to have been instigated by the fact that they had appealed to the 
European Court of Human Rights.544 Kiev, in contrast, showed complete solidarity and 
quickly extradited three Uzbekistani citizens, along with the brother of Mr Solih, to 
Uzbekistan in the middle of March. Furthermore, it quickly became public knowledge 
that Mr Solih left Turkey in April and was allowed to stay in Norway.545  
For Ankara, the rise in the intra-role conflict reflected that it would have to 
compromise between pro-western and pan-Turkic roles, especially because the 
extradition would be subject to a court hearing in the European Court of Human 
Rights.546 The situation also reverberated in the Turkish press as many diplomats, 
academics and politicians expressed their opinions on how to solve the predicament.547  
President Karimov, however, continued strengthening his role of undisputed 
authority. Having now staked his credibility in opposing Turkish, or even Islamic 
encroachment, he refused to attend the April 2000 Turkic summit in Baku,548 
prompting reflection within Turkey. The media especially contemplated whether 
Turkey had in fact ‘Missed the bus in Central Asia?’ (Cevik 2000), and if a new 
approach was needed.549 
                                               
543 It is also relevant to acknowledge that, aside from the rumours circulating around the movement, Mr 
Gülen was opposed to the ‘iranization of society’ and endorsed a more complex message than what was 
portrayed by Turkey’s secular establishment (Park 2007: 9). Mr Gülen had actually been in favour of the 
1980 secular coup in Turkey, as well as for the resignation of the WP’s chairman in 1997. However, 
debate regarding the nature of the movement is still pervasive in both public and academic circles. See, 
for example, Rachel Krespin-Sharon’s (2009) particularly negative depiction of the movement and Greg 
Barton’s (2009) different interpretation. Even in 2011, speculation came out as to whether Gülen’s 
actions in Central Asia were supported by American intelligence services. See ‘Gülen, the CIA's favourite 
Imam; United States/CENTRAL ASIA’ Intelligence Online, 6 January 2011. 
544 ‘Uzbek court sentences six dissidents to death’ Turkish Daily News, 29 June 1996, available via 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed September 2012. 
545 For more on Mr Solih’s departure, see ‘Salikh asks for political asylum in Czech Republic - Lawyer’ 
in Coşkunarslan, H. (ed) (2006: 49), The Opponent (Istanbul, Komen Publications). 
546Turkey eventually extradited Uzbek political activists, which then led to a long judicial case in the 
European court, lasting until 2004. For more on this story, see the article: ‘European court rehears Uzbek 
deportation case’ Turkish Daily News, 18 March 2004, available via http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, 
accessed September 2012. 
547 ‘Uzbeks' mistrust of Turkey creates diplomatic tension’ Turkish Daily News, 17 June 1999, available 
via http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed September 2012.  
548 ‘President pleased with summit’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 10 April 2000. 
549See the reports of Ilter (2000) and Bagci (2000). Also Prime Minister Ecevit was reported to have met 
with Uzbekistan’s ambassador in June 1999, where he confessed that Tashkent’s mistrust was baseless. 
See the following reports: ‘PM Ecevit: Uzbek mistrust baseless’ Turkish Daily News, 22 June 1999, 
available via http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed September 2012. 
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 The situation, therefore, did not improve and controversy enveloped throughout 
the year. In effect, the wave of political repression in Uzbekistan continued550 and 
another scandal erupted when some of those implicated in the February bombings 
confessed in June that former Prime Minister Erbakan had provided them with 
assistance.551 Ankara did, however, in the end, cooperate with Tashkent and extradited 
the suspects to Uzbekistan. 
  
Ankara’s renewed attempt at rapprochement  
 
As controversy around the 1999 attacks continued, Ankara – and, in particular, the 
newly-elected President, Ahmet Sezer, - sought rapprochement. The establishment, 
therefore, did not relinquish its public pan-Turkic sympathies and Ottomanist 
aspirations (perhaps in order to counteract the rise of controversial of political Islam). 
Accordingly, news reports in September detailed that Turkey’s Foreign Minister and 
also President Sezer met with President Karimov in the United Nations.552 Uzbekistan’s 
leadership confirmed the meetings during a TV report a few days later by stating that 
he was now satisfied that Turkey had decided to ‘help to Uzbekistan to guarantee its 
independence, security, Uzbek people's peace and stability, and I think that this will 
happen for sure.’553  
President Karimov thus hinted that Turkey would perhaps need to do more to 
support his roles of protector of stability and undisputed authority. Subsequently, 
Ankara’s Minister of Interior visited Tashkent in late September 2000 and stated that 
Uzbekistani forces were going to be trained in Turkey in order to ensure Uzbekistan’s 
stability.554 Then, a few weeks later, it was the turn of Turkey’s Foreign Minister to visit 
Uzbekistan, soon followed by Mr Sezer. It would seem that solidarity was being 
highlighted in the public sphere, insofar as President Karimov’s prestige roles were all 
bolstered after the controversial attacks. 555 If Ankara had hesitated in the spring of 
1999, its press now underlined that the relationship was entering a new phase, which 
                                               
550 See for example: ‘Uzbeks purge Muslims from academia’ Turkish Daily News, 22 October 1999. 
available via http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed September 2012. 
551  ‘Uzbek dissidents claim Erbakan helped them’ Turkish Daily News, 7 July 1999, available via 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed October 2012. 
552 See ‘Cem to meet Turkic-speaking countries' foreign ministers in New York’ Turkish Daily News, 8 
September 2000, available via hhttp://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed September 2012; and 
‘President Sezer to Visit Uzbekistan in October’ Turkish Daily News, 16 September 2000, available via 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed October 2012. 
553 Ibid. 
554 ‘Uzbek forces to be trained in Turkey’ Turkish Daily News, 19 September 2000, available via 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed September 2012. 
555 On Ankara’s support, see for instance ‘Full support from Turkey to Uzbekistan in fight against 
terrorism’ Turkish Daily News, 3 October  2000, available via http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, 
accessed September 2012. 
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was focused more on assuring mutual security.556 Still, it is important to note that 
President Karimov refused to participate in the April 2001 Turkic Summit in Ankara.557 
Tashkent was perhaps no longer endorsing these conferences, where Turkey’s leading 
status was frequently emphasized. Bilateral contacts, though, did decrease in the short-
run as a number of bilateral military agreements were signed throughout 2002.558 
Much like with Berlin and Washington (see Chapters V and VI), discretion was the new 
approach, increasing speculation on the consequences of the new way of engaging with 
Central Asia (e.g. Meixler 2001).  
 
VII.6. A Relationship that never (re)ignited: 2001-2010 
 
In spite of a strong show of support in 2000, the number of high-level public visits 
between Uzbekistani and Turkish authorities decreased substantially after 2002. It 
would seem that President Karimov no longer compromised on equality by playing up 
to Turkey’s leadership aspirations and Ottomanist roles. On the other hand, Ankara’s 
political environment changed with the rise of the Justice and Welfare Party (AKP - 
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi). The AKP was, at its core, a modern Islamist party that 
pursued acceptance in the West, which contrasted somewhat with its more idealistic 
WP predecessor. As such, by subsiding Ottomanist aspirations, and also being more 
open to Turkey’s Islamic and traditional heritage, Ankara barely converged with the 
strong secular and technocratic roles of President Karimov. Additionally, Turkish 
politics faced a rise in intra-role conflict that hardly fostered an image of stability in the 
public sphere. For instance, Turkey’s armed forces continued acting as secular 
guardians when they executed an ‘e-coup’ in April 2007, by threatening to take 
measures against the AKP through their online website (Taspinar 2007: 114). 
 
AKP and the first contacts 
 
In November 2002, AKP won the parliamentarian elections and formed a new 
government. Recep Erdoğan became Prime Minister and completed his rise to power, 
even though he remained highly controversial. Indeed, he originally had a judicial case 
opened against him due to some nuanced Islamic remarks he made when Mr Erbakan’s 
WP was banned (Zurcher 2004: 300-204). 
                                               
556  ‘A New Chapter in Turco-Uzbek Relations’ Hurriyet, 8 October 2000, available via 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed October 2012. 
557 ‘Turkey and Uzbekistan to discuss trade’ Turkish Daily News, 17 April 2001, available via 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed October 2012. 
558‘Kivrikoglu visits Uzbekistan; signs deal for military assistance’ Turkish Daily News, 19 March 2002. 
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 On a bilateral level, Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister travelled to Ankara in 
October 2003, where he met with Mr Erdoğan. The economical dimension of the trip 
was highlighted as the two parties travelled with a large entourage of businessmen.559 
Ankara’s approach still remained discrete and focused on stability which, therefore, did 
not contradict President Karimov’s role set. Indeed, before Mr Erdoğan’s visit to 
Uzbekistan, he donated a number of military vehicles to Uzbekistan’s army.560 On 
arrival, the Turkish Prime Minister also evinced a degree of continuity by declaring that 
‘we appreciate the solidarity that Uzbekistan displays with the international community 
in the fight against terrorism. In light of this, we deem cooperation in military and 
security fields to be very important and we are determined to develop cooperation in 
these fields.’561 It is important to be aware that, at that time, Tashkent was under the 
spotlight of the global fight against terror. So, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s statement 
further reinforced Mr Karimov’s prestige.  
 
The Impact of the Andijan Crisis 
 
The encounters in 2003 did not, however, materialize into any sort of increased 
cooperation between Tashkent and Ankara. The latter progressively turned itself 
toward Europe and downplayed Ottomanist roles. Still, the Turkish foreign ministry 
did publicly support its ‘brotherly’ counterpart, such as in March 2004, after Tashkent 
was forced to deal with terrorist attacks.562  
 Later, the Andijan crisis of May 2005 sparked internal debate in Turkey, much 
like the 1999 crisis. Following those tragic events, President Abdullah Gül of Turkey 
conveyed a mixed message; condemning, on the one hand, the use of force by 
protestors and, on the other, calling for greater moderation: ‘we think that the security 
forces of the Uzbekistan government, reacting with common sense and demonstrating 
moderation towards demonstrators and the civilian population, will avoid further 
bloodshed in the region.’563 Ankara, therefore, cautiously placed itself in the middle 
ground; distancing itself from some of the West’s incisive condemnation, yet hardly 
providing the level of support shown by Moscow and Beijing. 
                                               
559 ‘Uzbek foreign minister in Ankara to discuss ties’ Hurriyet, 28 October 2003, available via 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ , accessed September 2012. 
560 ‘TSK donates military vehicles to Uzbek Army’ Cihan News Agency, 3 December 2003, available via 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ , accessed September 2012. 
561 ‘Turkey, Uzbekistan to boost security, trade cooperation’ Turkish Daily News, 20 December 2003, 
available via http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed September 2012. 
562 ‘Turkey denounces Uzbek attacks’ Turkish Daily News, 31 March 2004, available via 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed October 2012.  
563 ‘Britain slams rights abuse, Turkey and OSCE urge restraint in Uzbekistan’ Agence France Presse – 
English, 15 May 2005.  
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It is important to be aware that Turkey could not fully avoid being connected to 
the Andijan events, even if very tenuously. It seems that the Andijan crisis was 
instigated by a relatively unknown conservative organization, Akrimaya, whose 
members, at time, were unfairly arrested by the local governor. Reports also stated that 
the Akrimaya network was inspired by Said Nurci, a Turkish Islamic thinker, who had 
also influenced the Fetullah Gülen movement.564  
Meanwhile, intra-role conflict was sparked in Turkey as parliamentarians 
contested President Gül’s statement about the Andijan crisis. Curiously, some AKP 
deputies were unsatisfied with the silence that their President had adopted after his 
statement and appealed for stronger condemnation.565 The opposition, though, was also 
not consensual, as some proposed supporting President Karimov’s government.566 
Consequently, in the months that followed, the press and various renowned Turkish 
officials debated whether or not Turkey was still losing its ground in Central Asia.567  
 The debate in the public sphere led to discontinuity, in that it instigated Prime 
Minister Erdoğan to organize a new Turkic Summit in Antalya in 2006. However, once 
more, President Karimov refused to attend. Besides role incompatibilities between the 
AKP and Mr Karimov, it also seems clear that Tashkent remained concerned with 
protecting stability as it was probably unconvinced of the political climate in Turkey. 
This would then clarify why, in 2007, a number of Uzbekistani citizens were prevented 
from attending a seminar in Turkey.568  
 
Turkey’s Ottomanist roles reborn and President Karimov’s disinterest 
 
Following his inability to lure Uzbekistani leadership to the 2006 summit, President 
Gül declared, in late 2007, that he was aiming to revive Turkey’s relationship with the 
countries in the region.569 Bilaterally, however, both sides demonstrated compatibility 
on technocratic issues, as a number of business and aid agreements were developed 
between 2008 and 2010.570 So, like with Moscow in the 1990s (see Chapter IV), it 
                                               
564 See for example Alisher Ilkhamov’s (2005b) piece on the Akrimaya. 
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would appear that Tashkent would not endorse multilateral schemes that diluted its 
political equality. 
Moreover, Tashkent continued protecting stability and showed little tolerance 
toward several religious or quasi-religious organizations of Turkish origin. For 
instance, in February 2009, Uzbekistan’s court jailed eight individuals considered to be 
part of a Turkish Nurchilar or Nurcular movement (inspired by the renowned Turkish 
scholar, Said Nurci).571 Thereafter, in March 2010, Uzbekistani security forces again 
arrested another forty suspects accused of having ties to a Nurchilar society.572  
Given public speculation over AKP’s sympathies with Said Nurci, and even the 
Fethullah Gülen movement,573 Turkey’s ruling party continued to be indirectly 
implicated in events. Their public agenda very much contrasted with President 
Karimov’s roles, which could perhaps explain the political distance arising between 
Uzbekistan and Turkey. For example, in August 2010, President Gül appealed for 
President Karimov to participate in that year’s Turkic summit,574 which Tashkent again 
refused to attend. 
In sum, after the role incompatibilities of the 1990s, the relationship never 
recovered. Indeed, it is hard to argue that the relationship ever had any particular 
moment of strong cooperation. There were of course a few instances of mild role 
compatibility, particularly regarding stability and technocracy. Yet, Ankara lacked the 
economic power of Berlin and Washington to fully bolster President Karimov’s roles of 
developer and mercantilist entrepreneur. These issues led to lack of role congruence, 
and eventually little cooperation, as society in Turkey debated the future of Islam and 
Ottomanism, which persistently contradicted Tashkent’s appeal for equality and de-
ideologized relations. 
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Role theory is one way of depicting interaction in the public sphere and emplotting how 
actors cope with challenges to public credibility. Roles are more than just interesting 
typologies and allow for identifying, shaping and suggesting probable action in addition 
to depicting how several issues beyond national security affect international 
relationships.  
From 1989 to 2010, the notion of self-reliance persistently captures President 
Karimov’s role set, which was centred on seeking genuine independence and defending 
Uzbekistan’s international equality. Annette Bohr (1998: 43) had already perceptively 
indicated that President Karimov was concerned with assuring national independence 
(see Chapter I). Similarly, self-reliance shows that Tashkent’s roles were relatively 
consistent, in spite of the friction existing in some important relationships. Indeed, 
arguing for self-reliance implies that it is difficult to conceive of alignment  - closely 
cooperating with a country on security goals (David 1990: 234) – in the ways described 
by Fumagalli (2007a) and Aneschi (2010) (see Chapter I).  
David’s (1990) characterization of alignment is broad, and so Robert Axelrod 
and Robert Keohane’s (1985: 226) classic definition is necessary to understand what is 
meant by cooperation: the adjustment of behaviour according to the roles of the other 
(see Chapter II). Having understood the two concepts, it is clear by definition that 
alignment is more restrictive than cooperation, depending essentially on security and 
close interaction. Consequently, all the narratives show that it is hard to deduce 
unequivocally whether Uzbekistan’s relationships had a strong security dimension and, 
more importantly, if they were ever close. Whereas periods of cooperation were 
certainly observed, they could hardly be described as cases of alignment.  
As concerns security, President Karimov’s relationships were predicated by 
many relevant issue-areas, such as prestige and economic development. At least in the 
public sphere, President Karimov manifested that he was hoping to obtain American 
foreign investment as well as recognition as an equal partner (see Chapter V). So, 
cooperation was certainly possible, but it was not driven by one-dimensional security 
goals. Yet, if alignment is understood more as ‘close cooperation’, it is clear that there 
was never any great proximity between Tashkent and any single power. President 
Karimov increased reformist rhetoric and implemented some liberalizing measures 
after signing the 2002 Partnership with the United States, but simultaneously rejected 
anything that questioned or weakened his own authority. Similarly, after joining the 
CSTO, Uzbekistan’s leader immediately called for combining the organization with 
Eurasec (see Chapter IV), thereby contesting multilateralism and Russian influence in 
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the same way he had done in the 1990s. Even with Berlin, where inter-role conflict was 
less pervasive, compatibility existed only in a few roles, such as developing 
Uzbekistan’s economic future and protecting stability, which meant that the two sides 
were unable to cooperate fully once Germany sought greater influence in Central Asia 
in 2007.  From the outset, President Karimov’s roles were hardly conducive to fostering 
close relationships of any sort, regardless of some adjustments in action between 
Tashkent and other governments.   
The narratives also show that public interaction had strong impact on bilateral 
relationships, thereby challenging some balancing models and Great Game narratives 
(e.g. Aneschi 2010; Smith 2009; Tomé 2007; Fumagalli 2007a; Akbarzadeh 2005; 
Berman 2004; Menon 2003; Rashid 2002: 150-182). In other words, predicating 
interaction as geopolitical, tactical and rational, rather than as a highly adaptive and 
publicly contested process, prompted by unpredictable incidents, ignores important 
aspects of Uzbekistan’s relationships. Recalling Matteo Fumagalli’s (2007a) use of 
omnibalancing; the scholar assumed strict preferences based on survival that 
compelled regimes to balance against both internal and external threats (see Chapter I). 
Each narrative herein, in contrast, demonstrates that instead of constantly weighing the 
pros and cons, political actors adapted themselves to the situations at hand in order to 
keep credibility. As such, there is a lot more to Walter Benjamin’s (1940) ‘here-and-
now’ (jetztzeit) than to a linear trend, meaning that relationships evolved according to 
how roles cohered at particular moments in time rather than through clear-cut strategic 
calculation. As laid out in Chapter IV, for example, Uzbekistan’s relationship with 
Russia improved from 2000 to 2007 not because of a deliberate tactic to counterweigh 
Washington, but due mainly to Mr Putin’s new approach, which was compatible with 
Mr Karimov’s roles. So, even though both concepts – balancing and role compatibility – 
depict similar outcomes, their repercussions for understanding the region are highly 
dissimilar. Whereas balancing suggests a sort of mechanistic reaction based on 
exogenous interests, bilateral roles imply that cooperation and conflict evolve according 
to contingencies of a particular public relationship, not necessarily dependent on the 
intrinsic interests of both parties. 
 It is important to emphasize, nevertheless, that the aim is not to make roles 
seem all-explanatory. Naturally, given the assumptions made, private issues are left 
open to interpretation, such as ideas and the intrinsic motivations that shape intent. 
Arguing that roles persisted does not imply that the actions taken were not actually 
manipulative, i.e. seeking to obtain something other than what was being publicly 
conveyed. For that reason, one cannot ignore that explanations based on 
strategic/tactical behaviour reveal other important elements of Uzbekistan’s 
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international relations. Public roles leave some questions open given that all the 
narratives from Chapters IV to VII disclose at least one moment in time when a 
government strategically targeted another’s influence. Even Germany, for example, 
counteracted Russia’s growing energy supremacy by putting forward the 2007 
European strategy. These instances probably also reveal the circumstances in which the 
actual intentions were not congruent with roles. This means that relative gains, 
strategic interaction and therewith geopolitics cannot be ignored, as Cooley (2012, 
2009) clearly showed. For example, the timings for when Uzbekistan left Eurasec, 
coinciding more or less with the removal of EU sanctions, are not fully explained 
herein. It is also difficult to ignore that GUAM had a security dimension designed to 
offset Russia and so it is likely that President Karimov’s decision to join the 
organization was not solely derived from his public role of bridge to other markets, as 
indicated in Chapter V. Likewise, Roy Allison (2004: 287-288) argued that one of the 
reasons for Moscow’s engagement with Central Asian Republics was to constrain 
Uzbekistani influence, which tacitly matches Donald Carlisle’s (1995b: 76-77) thesis 
that Tashkent aspired to become a regional leader. This would suggest that the 
differences between Moscow and Tashkent over Tajikistan in the 1990s were perhaps 
more concerned with leadership issues in Central Asia rather than just the public calls 
for defending equality and voicing non-militarism (see Chapter IV).   
Yet, in spite of the problem of volition, Uzbekistan’s leader still had to face 
credibility problems as friction increased in the public sphere. Regardless of backstage 
negotiations or secluded motives, public incompatibility between Russia and 
Uzbekistan during the Civil War in Tajikistan galvanized conflict. As the stakes 
escalated, the way President Karimov publicly accused Russia of compromising 
Uzbekistan’s equality (see Chapter IV) made any sort of public or private compromise 
difficult if credibility was not to be hampered. In sum, one cannot ignore how 
interaction takes place in the public sphere and its importance to the political process; 
otherwise actors would not deliver speeches, appear in press conferences or conduct 
interviews. An ideal account, like a thorough biography, would include the public as 
well as the private dimension, whereby one could understand the context in which 
individuals were compelled to act in a particular way. Roles reveal part of that story, 
given that they disclose which issue-areas become prominent and how actors construct 
their agenda through past and present interaction, which is perhaps better than 
assuming strict preferences for such an opaque regime. The remainder of the 
conclusion thus revisits some of the main findings using the language of role theory and 
sketches ideas for future research (for the framework of role theory see Chapter II). 
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Role coherence and self-reliance 
 
A relatively stable role set does not mean that public credibility remained unblemished. 
President Karimov adopted slightly contradictory roles both during the collapse of the 
ruble zone and after the Andijan crisis, which effectively compelled him to legitimate 
his actions in the public sphere.  
Chapter III revealed that President Karimov invoked a self-reliant role set based 
mainly on defending Uzbekistan’s equality and seeking genuine independence. His 
other roles can be classified under the relatively flexible group-types of technocracy, 
authenticity and prestige, which allowed President Karimov to adapt to discontinuities 
over time by gradually reemphasizing his priorities - as suggested by James Rosenau 
(1987: 57-72) and Cameron Thies (2009; 2001). Indeed, the paradigms of Sebastian 
Harnisch (2012: 56) and George McCall and Jerry Simmons (1966: 95-99) (see Chapter 
II) can be adapted to Uzbekistan, as President Karimov coped with credibility problems 
by legitimating his actions through changing his commitment from technocracy to 
authenticity.  
Gradual shifts, however, which were clearly noticeable after 2005, also helped 
reveal incoherencies and ambiguities within certain roles. For example, when 
defending Uzbekistan’s equality and seeking genuine independence, it is important to 
recall that the former is an end and the latter a process. So it is rather unfeasible to call 
for their simultaneous fulfilment. In fact, the root for this problem derives from the 
ambiguity of defending equality and how it can be appropriated by all three group-
types. 
In President Karimov’s case, the concept of equality includes notions of respect 
for sovereignty, cultural authenticity and economic development. However, as 
President Karimov progressively switched his commitment from technocracy to 
authenticity from 2003, questions are immediately raised: were Uzbekistan’s economic 
achievements capable of being generalized to a so-called ‘civilized’ status among the 
world’s powers, or was Uzbekistan’s model of development designed to shelter its 
culture, preventing it from being compared to others? In other words, would equality 
be based on respect for authenticity or on economic technocracy? The question 
remained unanswered. Evidently, the conflict also affected the relevance of genuine 
independence, i.e. the capacity to become militarily and economically powerful enough 
not to depend on others. If authenticity was on the rise, reaching genuine independence 
was no longer as important as it had been in the 1990s. 
So, the degree of ‘complementarity’ between cultural authenticity and 
technocracy allowed for adapting to role discontinuities, but their contradictory nature 
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also enhanced the ambiguity behind specific roles, especially when defending 
Uzbekistan’s equality. Obviously it is difficult to argue that any sort of role set can be 
perfectly coherent and impervious to inconsistency. President Karimov’s public 
message from the start was both flexible and cohesive enough to last for such a long 
period. As the times changed, though, it was clear that a degree of change was required 
if relationships were not to be affected. Indeed, at the date this thesis is being 
concluded, President Karimov is aged seventy-five. Someday Tashkent will have new 
leadership, which will inevitably have to reconstruct or reproduce the roles propounded 
during President Karimov’s tenure in office. When that happens, the conflict between 
Uzbekistani authenticity and pragmatic technocracy will have to be better addressed, 
otherwise it will remain unclear. However, imagining that these core issues are 
gradually modified, Uzbekistan’s government will most likely cease to be considered 
self-reliant. It may either progress toward isolationism, perhaps by bolstering its 
authenticity vis à vis the rest of the world, or gradually tilt toward technocracy and 
thereby allow for a degree of economic opening. 
 
The impact of roles in bilateral relationships 
 
One of the main reasons for breaking down this thesis into distinct bilateral relations 
was to downplay the logic of geopolitics and relative gains (see Introduction and 
Chapter I) and demonstrate that each relationship had a story of its own that did not 
depend necessarily on what was ensuing with other actors. Overall, the following 
summaries of Chapters IV through VII apply role theory’s rich terminology to 
summarize the outcomes of each relationship (see Chapter II on role theory). 
As concerns Tashkent and Moscow, the narrative’s diachronic dimension 
evinces how President Karimov’s roles were constructed and reinforced by interacting 
with Moscow. The account also shows reciprocity, in that Uzbekistan’s responses 
played a part in influencing Russian leadership. Their relationship began in a 
particularly complicated setting, as Mr Gorbachev balanced between keeping the Soviet 
Union intact and introducing reform, to which President Karimov responded with 
caution. So, in the early 1990s, Uzbekistan’s leader gradually differentiated himself 
from pro-democratic rhetoric and to become an undisputed authority, an equal among 
others, a technocrat, an expert on economics, a seeker of stability and a defender of 
Uzbekistan’s image. Nevertheless, when the Soviet system collapsed, President 
Karimov began facing intra-role conflict, in that seeking to be an equal to Russia was 
hardly compatible with preserving the economic foundation of the Soviet Union. As this 
conflict led to friction between Tashkent and Moscow’s reformers, President Karimov 
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separated formally from Russia after the end of the ruble zone, in 1993, which 
reinforced his roles of seeker of genuine independence and defender of Uzbekistani 
equality. On the other hand, the Civil Wars in Tajikistan and Afghanistan increased 
President Yeltsin’s will to serve as an intermediary for regional Mr Karimov claimed 
that equality was being denied. Consequently, roles were hardly compatible and 
friction increased, especially as a number of bilateral issue-areas remained unresolved 
during the 1990s – such as debts and the future of the TAPO plant -, all of which was 
portrayed in the public sphere as connected to Tashkent seeking genuine independence 
and defending equality. 
 President Putin’s election in 2000 led to a discontinuity. McCall and 
Simmons’s (1966: 95-99) legitimating acts fit nicely with the events that followed: 
Moscow’s growing lack of success in engaging with Uzbekistan led it to adjust its 
responses by ‘nicifying’ its actions. President Putin propounded Eurasian ideas, thereby 
paying heed to President Karimov’s appeals. Visiting Uzbekistan first among all others 
bolstered Tashkent’s prestige group-types, and then a focus on technocracy and de-
ideologized issues was compatible with President Karimov’s own roles, leading to more 
cooperation in the international public sphere from 2000 to 2007. 
 Still, disparities in roles remained as discontinuities made inter-role conflict 
resurface. After the Andijan crisis, defending Uzbekistan’s equality continued to be a 
permanent block in the relationship between the two countries, since President 
Karimov stuck to his word and so refused to allow Russia to reinforce its presence in 
the region. By 2010, it was difficult not to make parallels with the 1990s. Moscow 
publicly demonstrated that it was acting to preserve its own status in Central Asia, 
which was diametrically opposed to President Karimov’s claims for undisputed 
authority, prestige and equality.  
 Elsewhere, the story of President Karimov’s relations with Washington is 
emplotted by deep role malintegration. Unlike Uzbekistan’s relationship with Russia, 
where instability derived from conflict over equality and seeking genuine 
independence; with the United States, most roles - excluding protecting stability - were 
barely compatible in the public sphere. The United States, nevertheless, had a number 
of roles that were appealing to President Karimov’s role set. Being the world’s military 
and economic superpower meant that it could help reinforce a number of President 
Karimov’s roles, namely boost Uzbekistan’s great image, serve to bridge other markets 
and develop the country’s economic future. Moreover, as the situation in Central Asia 
became increasingly unstable, Washington could have been an important regional 
security partner and assisted President Karimov fulfil his role of protector of stability. 
Still, Washington’s reformist stance meant that it distanced itself from Uzbekistan until 
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the mid 1990s, which harmed President Karimov’s image and undisputed authority; 
even more so when other Central Asian Republics were praised.  
Eventually, though, Central Asia became more prominent in the public sphere 
as its economic potential and insecurity became more visible. Washington progressively 
adjusted its roles and began focusing on geopolitical stability in the region, allowing for 
greater cooperation with Tashkent. Even so, this eventually led to intra-role 
competition between the DoD and the DoS, seeing as the latter’s credibility was based 
on pursuing reform in Central Asia. 
After the Colour Revolutions, role conflict became unmanageable, even after the 
11 September attacks and the partnership agreement of 2002. The revolutions 
increased Uzbekistan’s visibility greatly and so affected President Karimov’s credibility 
as an undisputed authority and economic expert. On the other hand, interacting with a 
strongly authoritarian state also harmed Washington’s own credibility as a purveyor of 
democracy and political reform. The role conflict gradually intensified after 2003 and 
erupted after the 2005 Andijan crisis, leading to temporary withdrawal from 
interaction in order to resolve this collapse in public credibility. Another legitimating 
mechanism was made evident when the DoS switched its role for the region, as Central 
Asia was included in the South Asian department and removed from European Affairs. 
President Karimov, on the other hand, faced a grave challenge to his credibility and so 
pressed to condemn his audience (namely the West) for not supporting his actions, and 
refocused on other roles, such as a defender of Uzbekistan’s image and definer of 
authenticity.   
As the situation in Afghanistan re-entered the international public sphere in 
2008, Washington adjusted by mitigating its reformist roles and tacitly endorsing 
protecting stability as its main public goal for Uzbekistan. This revamped compatibility 
with Tashkent and President Karimov made some rhetorical concessions on reform, 
without, however, upsetting the core group-types, i.e. authenticity and technocracy. So, 
by 2010 the two states focused almost exclusively on a security dimension, thereby 
avoiding public friction.   
 As concerns Germany and Uzbekistan, the story is less volatile than Tashkent’s 
interaction with Moscow, Washington and Ankara. In short, cooperation was visible in 
the public sphere between these two actors because of role compatibility. President 
Karimov claimed technocratic roles, such as developing the economy, that were in turn 
acceded by Berlin as a number of German companies entered Uzbekistan’s market. 
Moreover, German governments rarely if ever publicly contested President Karimov’s 
undisputed authority and his claims for stability, mainly due to their concerns over the 
well-being of local German communities. Indeed, discretion was a key element in 
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Berlin’s approach, letting it assert itself in the region while simultaneously 
implementing its traditional civilian roles, namely peacekeeping and development. 
Nevertheless, once Germany assumed security provision roles in the north of 
Afghanistan, and as it sought to implement a new EU partnership in 2007, Uzbekistan’s 
visibility grew. Intra-role conflict was therefore on the rise as Germany’s press and 
opposition parties questioned the credibility of its civilian roles, particularly the lack of 
importance given to Human Rights. Nevertheless, unlike with Washington, both the 
SPD and CDU controlled the majority in the Bundestag and built their credibility on 
returning Germany to normality and reasserting its interests abroad. Consequently, 
Berlin’s intra-role conflict was never as ostentatious as in the United States, which 
resulted in fewer credibility problems. Germany could legitimate its interaction in a 
manner very similar to President Putin, by adjusting their rhetoric in a manner that 
‘nicified’ President Karimov’s roles.  
 Lastly, the Turkish-Uzbekistani relationship reveals that roles can clash with 
any state and not just with the so-called ‘great powers.’ The story has a deceptive start, 
since everything would suggest that Turkey’s secular (Kemalist) roles would result in a 
cooperative relationship with Uzbekistan. However, behind these public 
manifestations, some rhetorical nuances hinted that there was in fact little 
compatibility, particularly with President Karimov’s own predicates, such as defending 
equality and de-ideologized relationships. Ankara’s initial patronizing stance could be 
seen as a way of ascertaining leadership in Central Asia, thereby conflicting with 
Tashkent’s equality. Moreover, Ankara’s ideas of cultural integration were hardly de-
ideologized, contradicting President Karimov’s preference for technocratic relations. 
This then became even more problematic once Turkey hosted important members of 
Uzbekistan’s opposition in the end of 1993. However, the relationship managed not to 
deteriorate fully since Turkey also insisted on acclaiming President Karimov’s prestige 
and bridging Eurasian markets.  
Gradually, role conflict became a permanent feature in the relationship. Once 
the domestic and regional situations changed in both countries, different priorities 
came to the fore. Turkey’s intra-role friction - between secularism and Islamism - 
became less concealed, and was hardly compatible with President Karimov’s persistent 
appeals for technocracy and protecting stability. Therefore, Turkey’s own alternating 
domestic landscape soon led to permanent inter-role conflict between the two states, 
given that political Islam, no matter its moderation, – as an ideological counter-weight 
to President Karimov’s roles – explicitly contradicted Tashkent’s public stance. 
Uzbekistani leadership responded to these changes by recalling students from Turkey 
and shutting Turkish schools, which in turn also fostered increased debate within 
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Turkey. Ankara’s secular establishment did however show that it sought reconciliation, 
particularly as it tried to instigate its Ottomanist roles. However, Turkey did not have 
the financial means to boost President Karimov’s role of developer, which, in addition 
to its pan-Turkic ideas, contradicted Tashkent’s persistent appeal for technocracy, 
protecting stability and defending equality.  
 
Suggestions for further inquiry 
 
Chapter IV shows that both the end of the Soviet Union and the ruble zone reinforced 
President Karimov’s appeals for seeking genuine independence and defending 
equality; a process that reveals how roles became prominent, but not how they 
originate. It seems that the end of the Soviet Union had a lasting impact on shaping 
President Karimov’s rise to power, and so it would be interesting to revisit and expand 
James Critchlow’s (1990) research on how Uzbekistani elites were affected by the 
Cotton Scandal of the 1980s. This would better contextualize the overall foreign policy 
behaviour of Tashkent, given that continuity seems to be an important theme within 
Uzbekistani society (Adams 2010: 7). Glasnost and Perestroika potentially had more 
impact in Uzbekistan than in other Central Asian Republics; perhaps explaining why 
President Karimov built his entire career on resisting change. Uzbekistani leadership, 
while often praising Russia, also has little qualms in lambasting against the injustices of 
the Soviet Era. These mixed emotions can offer important clues about the existing level 
of grievance with - and also admiration for - Russia and the Soviet past, which might 
clarify why equality was so important from the beginning and why change was so 
disdained. Critchlow (1990) seems to suggest that the age of reform in the Soviet Union 
had a strong impact on Uzbekistan’s elites, many of whom may have felt they were 
being made scapegoats and portrayed unjustly. In fact, the concern with bolstering 
prestige and defending an image persisted since independence, even more so because 
some negative stereotypes regarding Uzbeks did not change and perhaps even 
deteriorated. Indeed, David Remnick (1994: 186-187) in his renowned bestseller of the 
fall of the ‘Soviet Empire’ barely described any Uzbek people, with the exception of one 
or two individuals, whom he portrays as mafiosos. Whether or not it is fair to describe 
Uzbekistan’s politics in this way is beside the point. It does seem clear though that its 
leadership has been adamant in protecting the image of the country. Hence, a more 
comprehensive work on the impact of the last days of the Soviet Union would most 
likely reveal how Uzbekistan’s experience may have differed from others, as well as its 
lasting impact on continuity and resisting change. 
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 Besides the impact of the Soviet period, it would also be important to 
understand where President Karimov’s role set came from and how it was formed.  
Regarding the history of ideas, it would be important to complement public roles with 
the very general ‘Independence Idea’ (Mustaqillik Mafkurasi), which was progressively 
endorsed by President Karimov’s regime in the mid 1990s (Muminov 2010: 148-149). 
Given that this thesis is more concerned with classifying public themes rather than 
understanding their distinct local meanings, Mustaqillik was not central to the 
discussion herein because President Karimov never publicly declared that he was 
following a strict ideology. However, future analysis could probably verify how much 
President Karimov’s rhetoric is influenced by that vague conception or whether in fact 
it is the other way round. It is mostly likely a mutually dependent relationship, and so it 
would be important to widen the spectrum from public rhetoric to the broader 
conception of discourse so as to identify who are the cultural and intellectual elites and 
how they have responded to the events happening around the world. Indeed, how much 
were President Karimov’s ideas shaped by Uzbekistani intellectuals and technocrats? 
Edward Allworth (1990) and Anita Sengupta (2003) offer detailed accounts of how 
Uzbekistan and its historiography were gradually constructed by local elites during the 
Soviet Era. In spite of the secrecy of the regime, seeking to answer these questions 
might offer a better idea of Uzbekistani foreign policy making and how these ideas 
shaped Uzbekistan’s controversial political ideas. It would also allow for understanding 
some political trends for the future, once President Karimov leaves office. Is internal 
debate prevalent or is Uzbekistan’s President simply representing a dominant 
worldview? Given the level of cabinet reshuffling after the Andijan Crisis, it seems clear 
that not all is consensual.575 
 A better understanding of Tashkent’s political ideas would also diminish some 
existing problems with depictions of Uzbekistan’s politics, of which this thesis is also 
guilty. As argued by Laura Adams (2010), Nick Megoran (2008) and Sarah Kendizor 
(2007), the top-down hierarchy constantly applied to the country does not show how 
wider discourse influences Uzbekistan’s politics. It is thus essential to comprehend how 
informal politics takes place and how both the system and its ideas affect foreign policy 
decisions. In this regard, a variety of works describe how regional rivalries, patrimonial 
competition and family connections affect local politics (e.g. Tunçer-Kilavuz 2009; 
Ilkhamov 2007; Collins 2006; Luong 2002, 1995). To a certain degree, these specific 
characteristics do not differ from those of any other political environment, yet the fact 
that Uzbekistan’s political establishment is so opaque makes it even more important to 
understand who the principal pawn-brokers are and also the basis of their legitimacy. 
                                               
575 Interview source (2009-2012). See Appendix IV for information regarding sources. 
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Given my own brief experiences in the country, it is difficult to talk about almost any 
political event. So, such a research goal would involve years of building trust, but 
further contributions to Uzbekistani politics still need to find ways of penetrating the 
complex system of informal politics and reveal its secluded and more private dimension 
to show how a number of decisions are made. 
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Appendix I: Sources of President Karimov’s rhetoric 
 
 
‘Second Day’s Debate on Gorbachev’s Report’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 
September 1989. 
 
‘Other Speeches on Morning of First Day’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 8 February 
1990. 
 
‘Speech of the President of the Uzbek SSR’ Russian Press Digest, 25 March 1990 
 
‘Speech by Karimov’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 July 1990. 
 
‘Congress of CP of Uzbekistan’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 December 1990. 
 
‘Fourth Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR Statement by Deputy of the USSR, President 
of the Uzbek Republic Islam Karimov’ Official Kremlin News Broadcast, 19 December 1990. 
 
‘Excerpters from Interview with Islam Karimov, President of Uzbek SSR’Official Kremlin 
International News Broadcast, 24 January 1991. 
  
‘Interview with President of Uzbekistan on USSR Referendum’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 11 March 1991. 
 
‘President of Uzbekistan Interviewed’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 April 1991. 
 
‘Interview with Uzbek President’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 June 1991. 
 
‘Uzbek President Reads out statement on recent events’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 
August 1991. 
 
‘Uzbek President Addresses party in week following coup’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
18 September 18 1991. 
 
‘Representatives of eight republics sign treaty press conference’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 21 October 1991. 
 
‘Karimov “No Sense” in signing proposes Union Treaty’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 
November 1991. 
 
‘“Speaking of breaking borders means breaking up Central Asia”: Islam Karimov speaks in an 
interview foreign journalists’ Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 15 May 1992. 
 
‘Uzbekistan cannot imagine a future without Russia’ Official Kremlin International News 
Broadcast, 2 June 1992. 
 
‘President Karimov gives press conference on eve of independence anniversary’ BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts, 29 September 1992 
 
‘Karimov addresses the republic on independence day’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 
September 1992. 
 
‘Uzbek President fears second Karabakh in Tajikistan, appeals to UN’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 9 September 1992. 
 
‘Uzbekistan; President in favour of staying in rouble zone’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
9 December 1992 
 
‘New Constitution enshrines democratic values and respect of human rights’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 22 December 1992. 
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‘President Criticizes CIS interparliamentary assembly but says CIS necessary’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 5 January 1993. 
 
‘CIS heads of state answer questions at Press Conference’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
19 April 1993. 
 
‘Uzbekistan’s President Speaks on the Economy and hints at possible reshuffle’ BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts, 2 March 1993. 
 
‘Press Conference by CIS Leaders on Results of Moscow Meeting’ Official Kremlin International 
News Broadcast, 14 May 1993. 
 
‘Uzbekistan; Karimov defends his policies against accusations of strong-arm tactics’ BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 June 1993. 
 
‘Uzbek President Tells “Pravda” he is looking for cooperation, not aid’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 7 August 1993. 
 
‘President Karimov on Independence Day; speaks on Russia’s regional role’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 15 December 1993. 
 
‘Briefing at Uzbek Embassy in Moscow’ TASS, 22 October 1993. 
 
‘Uzbek Gold is Best Guarantee for Investment-President’ TASS, 29 October 1993. 
 
‘President Karimov criticizes the work of Tashkent's city Soviet’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 15 December 1993. 
 
‘Uzbek President Calls for De-Ideologising economy’ TASS, 25 January 1994. 
 
‘Kazakh, Uzbek and Turkmen leaders on relations with Russia’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 29 January 1994. 
 
‘Uzbek President satisfied with results of Moscow visit’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 
March 1994. 
 
‘Karimov interview on CIS integration’ TASS, 14 April 1994. 
 
‘President Karimov urges Russia to promote greater economic cooperation in CIS’ BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 February 1994. 
 
‘Uzbek President Karimov satisfied with results of Moscow visit’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 8 March 1994. 
 
‘Karimov warns of dangers of fundamentalism at CSCE meeting’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 12 March 1994. 
 
‘Karimov interview on CIS integration’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 April 1994. 
 
‘President Karimov rejects idea of Eurasian union as “populism”’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 3 May 1994. 
 
‘Uzbek president announces introduction of new currency from 1st July’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 11 May 1994. 
 
‘Uzbekistan leader supports UNSC seat for Japan’ Japan Economic Newswire, 17 May 1994. 
 




‘Karimov Interview with Russian Paper’ BBC Summary of World of Broadcasts, 1 June 1994. 
 
‘Uzbekistan calls South Korea to help settle Tajik Conflict’ TASS, 5 June 1994. 
 
‘Uzbek-Kazakh-Kyrgyz summit held in Alma-Ata’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 July 
1994. 
 
‘Karimov says Uzbekistan to be self-sufficient in oil and grain’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 28 September 1994. 
 
‘President Karimov addresses parliament’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 September 
1994. 
 
‘Uzbek president's visit to Kiev: closer cooperation called for’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 14 November 1994. 
 
‘President Karimov says no alternative to CIS, dismisses idea of Eurasian union’ BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts, 8 December 1994. 
 
‘Europe must pay more attention to Central Asia, says Karimov’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 10 December 1994. 
 
‘Uzbek leader denounces Chechen war’ United Press International, 11 January 1995. 
 
‘Uzbek president in talks with OSCE chief’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 January 
1995. 
  
‘Uzbek president stresses importance of new markets’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 
January 1995. 
 
‘Uzbek leader says dependency obstructing reform’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 
January 1995. 
 
‘Uzbek president warns Tajikistan of threat of civil war’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 
February 1995. 
 
‘Uzbek statement stresses supremacy of law following Yeltsin remarks’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 10 March 1995. 
 
‘Kazakh and Uzbek leaders review Aral Sea conference’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 
March 1995. 
 
‘Uzbek president holds talks with Tajik opposition leaders’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
6 April 1995. 
 
‘Uzbek president seeks creation of “common Turkestan”’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 8 
May 1995. 
 
‘Uzbekistan capable of stopping any aggressor - defence minister’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 9 May 1995. 
 
‘Uzbek leader wants no borders between Kazakhs and Uzbeks’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 24 May 1995. 
 
‘Uzbek leader says Tajik rulers holding on to power “at any price”’’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 27 May 1995. 
 
‘President Karimov and Russian premier give joint news conference’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 31 July 1995. 
 
 194
‘Karimov unsure about effectiveness of Turkic economic cooperation’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 20 August 1995. 
 
‘President praises Uzbekistan's achievements on eve of independence anniversary’ BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 September 1995. 
 
‘Uzbek president's opening speech to Central Asian security seminar’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 19 September 1995. 
 
‘Tajik and Uzbek presidents call for UN peace steps in Afghanistan’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 26 October 1995. 
 
‘Uzbek president gives interview on relations with other Central Asian states’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 31 October 1995. 
 
‘Pakistani premier and Uzbek president discuss Afghan conflict’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 20 November 1995. 
 
‘President rejects notion of supranational bodies in CIS’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
24 March 1996. 
 
‘Uzbekistan warns against using ECO summit as political platform’ Agence France Presse -
English, May 1996.  
 
‘Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov and OPIC President Ruth Harkin discuss a joint U.S.-
Uzbekistan Energy Venture’ NBC, 24 June 1996. 
 
 ‘Remarks by Islam Karimov, President of Uzbekistan regarding his country’s investment 
potential’ Federal News Service, 26 June 1996. 
 
‘President outlines type of opposition he will accept’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 
September 1996. 
 
‘Uzbek president emphasizes need to stop Taleban at Salang Pass’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 7 October 1996. 
 
‘Leader urges world to cotton on to Uzbekistan's potential’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
11 October 1996. 
 
‘President Karimov slams regional authorities over corruption’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 29 October 1996. 
 
‘President Karimov seeks security guarantees from OSCE membership’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 5 December 1996. 
 
‘President Karimov warns Tajik sides to observe peace accords’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 31 December 1996. 
 
‘President Karimov addresses parliament, opposes military bloc to counter NATO’ BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, 31 December 1996. 
  
‘President Karimov denies problems over currency conversion’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 3 January 1997. 
 
‘Uzbek president opposes Russia's integration with Belarus’ Associated Press Worldstream, 16 
January 1997. 
 
‘Karimov Quizzed over state of Uzbek Democracy’ CTK National News Wire, 16 January 1997. 
 
‘President Karimov hails 1996 feats, urges new view of wealth and property’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 10 February 1997. 
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‘Uzbek president criticizes poor administration of Fergana Region’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 18 February 1997. 
 
‘Uzbek president answers BBC reporter's questions on Afghanistan’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 20 September 1997. 
 
‘Uzbek president criticizes formation of CIS unions’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 
October 1997. 
 
‘President Karimov criticizes officials for poor cotton harvest’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 24 October 1997. 
 
‘Uzbek President says his country is with Russia forever’ TASS, 11 November 1997. 
 
‘President Karimov gives interview on presidential elections, corruption’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 12 November 1997. 
 
‘President warns of threat of an Islamic Tajikistan’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 
January 1998. 
 
‘Uzbek president speaks on CIS, regional issues at Ashkhabad meeting’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 6 January 1998. 
 
‘Uzbek president speaks on CIS, regional issues at Ashkhabad meeting’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 13 January 1998. 
 
‘Uzbek head on Aims of Ukraine Visit’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 18 February 1998. 
 
‘Presidents Karimova and Clinton confirm commitment to raising cooperation’ BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts, 3 March 1998. 
 
‘Uzbek President’s Address on Spring Holiday’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 13 March 1998. 
 
‘Central Asian Presidents’ Press Conference’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 March 
1998. 
 
‘Presidents call Tajikistan’s Joining Central Asian Economic Union’ Interfax, 30 March 30 1998. 
 
‘President: Economic Rules must apply throughout CIS’ Interfax Russian News, 17 April 1998. 
 
‘Uzbek head addresses parliament on CIS Summit’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 30 April 1998. 
 
‘Uzbek president pleas for EU help against Afghan drug trade’ Agence France Presse –English, 
May 1998. 
 
‘CIS: Uzbek leader says ready to shoot islamists himself’ AAP NEWSFEED, 3 May 1998. 
 
‘Uzbek President reiterates concern over spread of “Wahhabism”’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 
6 May 1998. 
 
‘Uzbekistan should save hard currency for technology – president’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 7 May 1998. 
 
‘Uzbek head: No return to old system’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7 May 1998. 
 
‘Uzbek head wants to solve problem of seaport access’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 11 May 
1998. 
 
‘Uzbek leaders warns helping Uighurs could upset relations with China’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 9 June 1998. 
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‘President Karimov says security and unity prime tasks of state’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 3 September 1998. 
 
‘Uzbek President gives interview on relations with other Central Asian states’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 31 October 1998. 
 
‘Uzbek President: Struggle for power under way in Tajikistan’ Interfax Russian News, 30 
November 1998. 
 
‘President Karimov demands internal change to face external economic challenges’ BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 December 1998. 
 
‘Karimov says Russian intelligence provoking Uzbek-Tajik friction’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 30 November 1998. 
 
‘President Karimov: 1998 was a “difficult” year’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,  5 January 
1999. 
 
‘Uzbek President voices concern about CIS restructuring’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring,  26 
January 1999. 
 
‘Russia has no clear policy on Central Asia’ TASS, 11 February  1999. 
 
‘Uzbek President Sums up 1998 Economic results’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 
February 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek President Speaks on Bomb Attacks’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 February 
1999. 
 
  ‘CIS relations depend on Yeltsin’s successor, says Uzbek Leader’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 9 March 1999. 
 
‘President Karimov says 30 suspects arrested following Tashkent Bombings’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 23 March 1999. 
 
‘President Karimov calls for “well-defined” national ideology’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 6 April 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek President rejects criticism of controls on Kazakh Border’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 14 April 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek President’s speech at parliamentary session’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 
April 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek head warns of russian embroilment in the Balkans’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
15 April 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek President repeats line on NATO, Kosovo’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 April 
1999. 
 
‘Uzbek head: “We have to think about NATO Membership’’’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 29 April 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek President’s Speech at Parliamentary session’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 
August 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek President – “No secret” Uzbeks fighting in Dagestan’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 19 August 1999. 
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‘Uzbek President Congratulates Nation on Independence day – Text’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 1 September 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek President is willing to give his life for the country’s children’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 3 September 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek defence minister says army on high alert in view of the Kyrgyz Situation’ BBC Summary 
of World News, 8 September 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek president appreciates China's Central Asia policy, anti-separatism’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 11 September 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek defence minister denies presence of Uzbek forces in Kyrgyzstan’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 14 September 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek President Pledges support for Kyrgyzstan in fighting Militants’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 24 September 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek President challenges “Forces with Evil Intentions”’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2 
October 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek President Optimistic about New car and telecoms deals in South Korea’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 4 October 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek President Interviewed on visit to Ukraine Aboard Aircraft – Full Version’ BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts, 10 October 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek President says positions with Ukraine Coincide “on virtually all issues”’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 11 October 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek President Interviewed on Visit to Ukraine aboard aircraft’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 
12 October 12 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek leader against playing role of raw materials supplier’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 17 October 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek President Views to defend territory “with all available means”’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 20 October 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek president's interview on his visit to China - FULL VERSION’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 12 November 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek head criticises OSCE for focusing on human rights’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 18 
November 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek head criticized OSCE for focusing on human rights’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
17 November 1999. 
 
‘President Karimov comments on elections on eve of Constitution Day’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 9 December 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek president backs Russia's steps in Chechnya FULL VERSION’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 11 December 1999. 
 
‘Uzbek president says democratic mechanisms not working yet’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 9 
January 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek president calls for new system of appointing senior officials’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 16 January 2000. 
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‘Uzbek president addresses parliament: parts 1-4 complete’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 23 
January 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek president speaks to journalists in parliamentary sessionbreak’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 24 January 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek president's views on conversion problems and privatization issues’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 1 February 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek leader criticizes US for "game" over Radio Liberty reporter: full version’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 11 February 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek addresses parliamentary session - full version’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 12 February 
2000. 
 
‘Military doctrine is one of defence’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 22 February 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek head calls for agricultural reforms in southern Region’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 24 
February 2000. 
 
‘President Karimov calls for "well-defined" national ideology’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 11 April 2000. 
 
‘Central Asian Summit: Uzbek head details Afghan threat’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
21 April 2000. 
 
‘Central Asian security summit ends in Uzbek capital full version’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 
21 April 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek head calls for more ties with India, trade via Iran’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 5 May 
2000. 
 
‘Karimov asks for Putin's protection against terrorism in Uzbekistan’ Agence France Presse -
English, 19 May 2000. 
 
‘Russian, Uzbek presidents for expanding military cooperation to ensure security’ BBC 
Worldwide Monitoring, 20 May 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek president tells parliament of plans for new army’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 26 May 
2000. 
 
‘President warns air force could strike Afghan bases if necessary’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 30 May 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek head answers newspaper questions on national ideology, religion, policy’ BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts, 8 June 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek head answers newspaper questions on national ideology, religion, policy’ BBC 
Worldwide Monitoring, 9 June 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek head stressed need to tackle Afghan issue, Access to Iranian Port’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 9 June 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek head claims certain ECO states focusing more on political issues OOT2’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 9 June 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek heads stresses need to tackle Afghan issue, access to Iranian port’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 10 June 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek president's visit to Tajikistan - Full version’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 17 June 2000. 
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‘Uzbek leader says Russia had, has, will have interests in Central Asia’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 22 June 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek president at Shanghai Five summit urges joint security efforts’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 6 July 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek president: job creation “a matter of life or death” - full version’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 22 July 2000. 
 
‘Bishkek Central Asian security summit 20th August: full version’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 
21 August 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek leader on unrest in south and northeast of capital’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 23 
August 2000. 
 
‘Avoiding losses in clashes “main objective”, Uzbek president says - full version’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 31 August 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek president calls for reform of United Nations’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7 September 
2000. 
 
‘Uzbek president leaves for Turkmenistan, interviewed at airport’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 
21 September 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek president calls for “pragmatic approach” towards Afghanistan’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 27 September 2000. 
 
‘Uzbekistan and Ukraine agree on payments, Uzbek president says’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 12 October 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek leader against playing role of raw materials supplier’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 17 
October 2000. 
 
‘Karimov slams abuses among officials, businessmen on Constitution Day’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 9 December 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek president blasts Russian plan to reinstate Stalinist anthem’ Agence France Presse - 
English, 14 December 2000. 
 
‘Uzbek head to call referendum on changing parliamentary system’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 14 December 2000. 
 
‘Karimov rubbishes draft law’s definition of terrorism’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 
December 2000. 
 
‘President Karimov criticizes economic sector’s performance’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 1 January 2001. 
 
‘President Karimov hails independence, urges vigilance in New Year message’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 3 January 2001. 
 
‘President Karimov urges Central Asian states to pursue rigorous security policy’ BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts, 9 January 2001. 
 
‘President Karimov criticizes economic sector's performance’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 16 January 2001. 
 




‘Uzbek head calls for people to engage in public affairs’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 18 
February 2001. 
 
‘Uzbek leader against politicizing Central Asian water issues’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 26 
February 2009. 
 
‘Uzbek leader against "third" parties involvement in water talks’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 
28 April 2009. 
 
‘Uzbek President urges public to remember Uzbek contribution to V-Day’ UzReport.com, 11 May 
2009. 
 
‘Uzbek President: Uzbekistan has no intention to join military-political unions’ RIA Novosti, 11 
May 2001. 
 
‘One should not make fetish of market relations - Uzbek leader’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 22 
May 2009 
 
‘President slams Soviet Past, calls for structural reforms’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
17 July 2001. 
 
‘President visits Eastern region – Full Version’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 August 
2001. 
 
‘Uzbek head visits eastern region – full version’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 24 August 2001. 
 
‘Uzbek leader calls for judicial and legal reform – fuller version’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 29 
August 2001. 
 
‘Uzbek president admits police use “illegal methods”’ Agence France Presse - English, 29 
August 2001. 
 
‘Uzbekistan made no pledge to give US its bases for strikes’ TASS, 19 September 2001. 
 
‘Uzbekistan ready to offer use of airspace if “security guaranteed”, head – full’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 27 September 2001. 
 
‘Uzbek leader says anti-terrorism campaign not over, hails US efforts’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 28 December 2001. 
 
‘Central Asian leaders hail peaceful coexistence, forge common positions’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 28 September 2001. 
 
Zhukov, T. ‘Uzbekistan's president says government will reopen bridge leading to Afghanistan’ 
Associated Press, 6 December 2001. 
 
‘Uzbeks can face 2002 with pride after difficult year – leader’s New Year Message’ BBC 
Worldwide Monitoring, 31 December 2001. 
 
‘Uzbek president gives high marks to military-technical cooperation with Germany’ News 
Bulletin, 11 February 2002. 
 
‘Uzbek president to sign six documents’ U.S. News Bulletin, 11 March 2002. 
 
‘Uzbek head promises increases in people’s wages in 2002’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
March 21 2002.  
 
‘Uzbek government has much to do to improve human rights situation’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, April 2002. 
 
‘Uzbekistan praises US assistance’ TASS, 5 April 2002. 
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‘Uzbek president criticizes leaders in Aral Sea area for poor performance’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 3 May 2002. 
 
‘Uzbek president berates central region for high crime figures - fuller version’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 1 June 2002. 
 
‘Uzbek leader stresses common interests with Japanese’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 
August2002. 
 
‘Uzbekistan establishes strategic partnership east and west – leader’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 3 August 2002. 
 
Bukharbayeva, B. ‘Uzbek president urges radical democratic change, military reform’ Associated 
Press, 29 August 2002. 
 
‘Uzbek leader calls for vigilance, says world recognizes role in fighting terrorism’ BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts, 31 August 2002. 
 
‘Uzbek president comments on Afghan issue – text’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 
October 2002. 
 
‘Uzbek president speaks of Russian passivity on eve of CIS Moldovan summit’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 6 October 2002. 
 
‘Uzbek president blasts UN for lack of support on security issues’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 19 October 2002. 
 
‘Karimov describes international terrorism as “21st century plague”’ TASS, 21 November 2002. 
 
‘Uzbek TV reports on president's visit to central region’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 
November 2002. 
 
‘President attacks Uzbeks for lavish ceremonies’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 
December 2002. 
 
‘Uzbek President says no foreign military rivalry in Central Asia’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 12 December 2002. 
 
‘Uzbek president outlines new parliament’s powers’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 
December 2002. 
 
‘Uzbek, Ukrainian leaders discuss cooperation - Uzbek TV’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
19 December 2002. 
 
‘Uzbekistan keeps threat of terrorism from the door - leader's New Year message’ BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, 31 December 2002. 
 
‘(CORR) Uzbek leader leader lashes out at imports for sake of future generation’ BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts, 19 February 2003. 
 
‘Uzbekistan supports USA's stance on Iraq, Uzbek president says - fuller version’ BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts, 7 March 2003. 
 
‘Uzbek leader urges “vigilant approach” to terrorism in his Nowruz address’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 21 March 2003. 
 
‘Uzbekistan, Romania for redoubling efforts to fight terrorism’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 22 April 2003. 
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‘Uzbek President explains move to reduce his authority’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 
April 2003. 
 
‘Uzbek president promises decent living conditions to people’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19 
July 2003. 
 
‘Uzbekistan, Russia to begin direct cotton trade’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 August 
2003. 
 
‘Uzbek president promises convertibility by the end of the year’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 31 August2003. 
 
‘Uzbek president against politicization of Eurasian transport corridor project’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 10 October 2003. 
 
‘Karimov says good relations with U.S. crucial’ News Bulletin, 11 November 2003. 
 
Uzbek president urges Georgians to abide by constitution’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
24 November 2003. 
 
‘Uzbek leader lashes out at rights bodies over criticism of neighbourhood system’ BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts, 7 December 2003. 
 
‘Uzbek president's interview on 11 December’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 December 
2003. 
 
‘Uzbek president says outgoing year “not an easy one”’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 31 
December 2003. 
 
‘Uzbek president reviews 2003 economic achievements’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 8 
February 2004. 
 
‘Uzbek leader slams agricultural sector, says 40,000 jobs to go’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 14 February 2004. 
 
‘Uzbek leader hails operation on Pakistani-Afghan border as success – excerpts’ BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts, 25 March 2004. 
 
‘Uzbekistan should align with great powers’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 April 2004. 
 
‘Uzbek leader says God saved Uzbekistan during recent terror attacks’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 7 April 2004. 
 
‘Terrorists outpacing antiterror coalition, Uzbek leader tells Putin – excerpts’ BBC Sumary of 
World Broadcasts, 18 April 2004. 
 
‘Excerpts from Uzbek president's 29 April news conference’ BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts, 
30 April 2004. 
 
‘Uzbek president says Soros foundation broke the law’ BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts, 1 May 
2004. 
 
‘Uzbek leader warns Central Asian summit of strategic uncertainty in region’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 30 May 2004. 
 
‘Uzbek leader hails Shanghai body's “iron will” in promoting security, prosperity’ BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts, 18 June 2004. 
 
‘Uzbek president pleads to nation to resist extremist Islamic influences, says one group behind 
all suicide attacks’ Associated Press Worldstream, 31 July 2004. 
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‘Uzbek President’s news conference on 26 August’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 
August 2004. 
 
‘Uzbek leader urges clerics to work against radical groups’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
1 September 2004. 
 
‘Uzbek leader urges vigilance in Independence Day Speech’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 1 September 2004. 
 
‘Uzbek leader promises to tighter borders against illegal exports’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 20 September 2004. 
 
‘Uzbek president issues robust defence of elections’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 
December 2004. 
 
‘Uzbek president recalls blasts in New Year message’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 31 
December 2004. 
 
‘Uzbek President gives wide-ranging interview to Russian paper’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 20 January 2005. 
 
‘New Uzbek Parliament part of Democratic Nation-Building – President’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 29 January 2005. 
 
‘Uzbekistan keen on more South Korean investment – leader’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 10 
May 2005. 
 
‘Uzbek leader gives news conference on Andijon events - full version’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 14 May 2005.  
 
‘Uzbek leader accepts U.S. statements on Andizhan events’ News Bulletin, 17 May 2005. 
 
‘Uzbek leader says no international probe into the Andijan crisis – Fuller’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 25 May 2005. 
 
‘Great powers want to control Central Asia - Uzbek leader’ UzReport.com, 18 June 2005. 
 
‘Uzbek president warns against “plan” to dominate in Central Asian region’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 6 July 2005. 
 
‘US, Israel Russia helped set up bloody events in eastern Uzbekistan, says report’ BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts, 29 June 2005. 
 
‘Kyrgyzstan frees half of its refugees wanted by Uzbekistan’ Agence France Presse, 28 July 
2005. 
 
‘Uzbek leader’s independence speech urges vigilance – fuller’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 1 September 2005. 
 
‘Uzbek defendant says foreign media supported Andijon plot – TV’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 28 September 2005. 
 
‘Uzbek leader urges greater ties with Malaysia’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 October 
2005. 
 
‘Uzbek leader laments lack of cooperation in Central Asia – fuller’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 
8 October 2005. 
 




‘Uzbek leader says democracy cannot be universal – fuller’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 8 
December 2005. 
 
‘Uzbek president calls for vigilance in New Year message’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 31 
December 2005. 
 
‘Uzbek leader outlines economic tasks for 2006’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 12 February 
2006. 
 
‘Uzbek leader assesses work of parliament's upper house – fuller’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 
25 February 2006. 
 
‘Uzbek leader makes Nowruz speech’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19 March 2006. 
 
‘Uzbek president accuses West of waging “information war”  against ex-Soviet Nation’ 
Associated Press Worldstream, 20 March 2006. 
 
‘Uzbek leader talks up gains from SKorean visit’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 28 March 2006. 
 
‘Uzbek leader hails Shanghai body before anniversary summit’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 13 
June 2006. 
 
‘Iran, Uzbekistan leaders hit out at interference by foreign powers’ Agence France Presse -
English, 15 June 2006. 
 
‘Uzbek leader at CICA warns against linking terrorism to Islam’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 17 
June 2006. 
 
‘Uzbek president comments on decision to rejoin CIS security body’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 24 June 2006. 
 
‘Uzbek leader calls on Shanghai Body to Fight Treats “Decisively”’BBC Monitoring 
International Reports, 4 July 2006. 
 
‘Uzbekistan invites Japan investment in energy sector, offers uranium’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 29 August 2006. 
 
‘Uzbekistan, Japan pledge to step up trade, business ties – statement’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, August 2006. 
 
‘Uzbek leader warns “aggressive forces” against undermining stability’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 31 August 2006. 
 
‘Uzbek leader sets up ideological propaganda centre’ BBC Monitoring BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 31 August 2006. 
 
‘Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan see their future only with Russia – leader’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 
4 September 2006. 
 
‘Kyrgyz president urges closer ties with Uzbekistan, end to “isolation”’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 4 October 2006. 
 
‘Uzbek leader urges fighting Islamic group – fuller’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 5 October 
2006. 
 
‘Uzbek leader’s speech to eastern Fargona region’s officials –fuller’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 
23 October 2006. 
 




‘Uzbek leader urges European countries not to teach democracy’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 8 
December 2006. 
 
‘President of Uzbekistan stresses importance of parties' role’ UzReport.com, 11 December 2006. 
 
‘Uzbek leader's New Year speech’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 31 December 2006. 
 
‘Uzbek leader calls for boosting oil and gas sector, fighting “shadow economy”’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 14 February 2007. 
 
‘Uzbek leader urges long-term approach to cooperation with Ukraine’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 27 April 2007. 
 
‘Uzbek president says “full understanding” with China’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 1 May 
2007. 
 
‘Uzbek leader says relations with Arab world “a priority”’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7 June 
2007. 
 
‘Uzbek leader calls for creating “real conditions” for freedom of speech’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 28 June 2007. 
 
‘President resolves to intensify privatization, attraction of foreign investments’ UzReport.com, 
24 July 2007. 
 
‘Uzbek leader outlines Muslim world’s “most topical” tasks’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 15 
August 2007. 
 
‘SCO important in fighting terrorism, drug trafficking – Karimov’ Central Asia General 
Newswire, 16 August 2007. 
 
‘Uzbek leader against military presence in Afghanistan’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 16 August 
2007. 
 
‘Central Asian presidents hail SCO Bishkek summit’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 16 August 
2007. 
 
‘Uzbek leader highlights importance of new railway line’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 24 August 
2007. 
 
‘Uzbek leader warns of foreign influence at his Cabinet speech’ BBC Worldwide monitoring, 31 
August 2007. 
 
‘President's address at the ceremony dedicated to Uzbekistan's independence’ UzReport.com, 3 
September 2007. 
 
‘Backgrounder: Tajikistan cancels giant Russian dam project’ BBC Monitoring Research, 11 
September 2007. 
 
‘Uzbek leader recalls presidential polls in New Year address’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 31 
December 2007. 
 
‘President delivers inauguration speech’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 16 January 2008. 
 
‘Uzbek leader hails Russian military assistance’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 6 February 2008. 
 
‘Uzbekistan's, Russia's positions in intl organizations mostly coincide – Karimov’ Central Asia 
General Newswire, 6 February 2008. 
 
‘Uzbek leader says all work to focus on raising life standards – fuller’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 10 February 2008 
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‘Kyrgyz president urges closer ties with Uzbekistan, end to “isolation”’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 7 March 2008. 
 
‘Uzbek, Turkmen leaders upbeat on bilateral ties’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 11 March 2008. 
 
‘President addresses participants of international conference on Aral’ Uzreport.com, 13 March 
2008. 
 
‘President's address at celebrations dedicated to Navruz holiday’ UzReport.com, 24 March 
2008. 
 
‘Uzbek President Calls for Resumption of Peace Talks’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 
April 2008. 
 
‘President attends Partnership for Peace NATO summit’ Uzreport.com, 4 April 2008 
 
‘Uzbek leader calls for coordinating water projects in Central Asia’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 
23 April 2008. 
 
‘Uzbek leader says US official’s visit to boost relations’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2 June 
2008. 
 
‘Uzbek leader voices concern over Afghan security – fuller’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 28 
August 2008. 
 
‘Uzbek leader independence speech lists foreign policy priorities’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 1 
September 2008. 
 
‘Uzbek leader says Afghan situation has “extremely” negative impact on security’ BBC 
Worldwide Monitoring, 8 October 2008. 
 
‘EU eases Uzbek sanctions despite reporter’s jailing’ BBC Monitoring World Media, 15 October 
2008. 
 
‘Uzbek leader urges better use of untapped potential with Bulgaria’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 
6 November 2008. 
 
‘Uzbek leader says economy protected from financial crisis’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 6 
December 2008. 
 
‘Uzbek leader sacks regional, district governors’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 17 December 
2008. 
 
‘Uzbek leader highlights achievements of 2008 in New Year Message’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 31 December 2008. 
 
‘Uzbekistan ready to supply to Gazprom 16 billion cubic meters of gas in 2009 - President 
Karimov’ Russia & CIS Business and Financial Newswire, 23 January 2009. 
 
‘Uzbek leader focuses on Afghan security during Russian counterpart’s visit’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 24 January 2009. 
 
 ‘Global crisis negatively affects Uzbek exports’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 14 February 2009. 
 
‘Uzbek leader against politicizing Central Asian water issues’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 26 
February 2009. 
 




‘One should not fetish market relations’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 22 May 2009. 
 
‘Uzbek leader urges border guards to be more proactive’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 31 May 
2009. 
 
‘Uzbekistan ready for pragmatic relations with U.S. - President Karimov’ Central Asia General 
Newswire, 13 July 2009. 
 
‘Uzbekistan marks constitution day, President addresses the nation’ Uzreport.com, 8 December 
2009. 
 
‘Leader says living standards rising in Uzbekistan despite global crisis’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 29 December 2009. 
 
‘Uzbek leader praises achievements of 2009 in New Year Message’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 
1 January 2010. 
 
‘Uzbek leader calls for strengthening of army's combat readiness’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 
14 January 2010. 
 
 ‘Uzbek leader says stability in region depends on Afghanistan – fuller’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 28 January 2010. 
 
‘Kyrgyzstan unrest could become permanent – Karimov’ Russia & CIS General Newswire, 20 
April 2010. 
 
‘Uzbek leader notes need to increase Shanghai body's efficiency’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 
23 April 2010. 
 
‘Kazakh paper: Uzbek leader scolds Russian media as ties remain tense’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 25 April 2010. 
 
‘Uzbek leader addresses Asian Development Bank Summit’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 4 May 
2010. 
 
‘Uzbek leader gives positive assessment of SCO summit results’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 11 
June 2010. 
 
‘SCO leaders express readiness to help Kyrgyzstan - President Karimov’ AKIpress News Agency, 
11 June 2010. 
 
‘Uzbek leader says no revenge to be allowed for Kyrgyz violence’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19 
June 2010. 
 
‘Uzbekistan: Islam Karimov congratulated Roza Otunbaeva with “being granted presidential 
power in Kyrgyzstan”’ Ferghana.ru, 30 June 2010. 
 
‘Uzbekistan marks Independence Day Uzbekistan’ National News Agency (UzA), 2 September 
2010. 
 
‘Address by H.E. Mr. Islam Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, at the Plenary’ 
Session of the UN Millennium Development Goals Summit, 29 September 2010, available at 
http://www.gov.uz/en/press/politics/6612, accessed September 2010. 
 
‘Uzbek president calls for probe into riots in Kyrgyzstan’ Russia & CIS Diplomatic Panorama, 
21 September 2010. 
 




‘Uzbek president vows to settle Aral Sea problem – TV’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 5 October 
2010. 
 
‘Agenda behind clashes’ IPS Inter Press Service, 12 November 2010. 
 
‘Address by President Karimov at the joint session of Legislative Chamber and Senate’ 
UzReport.com, 15 November 2010. 
 
‘Uzbek president warns against “dangerous” projects to protect nature’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 17 November 2010. 
 
‘Closure of Uzbek borders helps stabilize situation in Kyrgyzstan – Karimov’ TASS, 10 December 
2010. 
 
‘Lessons must be learnt from Kyrgyz June ethnic clashes - Uzbek leader’ BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 13 December 2010. 
 




Appendix II: Coding Rules for Content Analysis 
 
A)  
To avoid journalistic bias, statements have to be an ample body of text and not just selected 
quotations made by reporters. These will not enter the tabulations indicated above, but may 
nonetheless be used to later contextualize and discuss the results. The sources are all indicated 




Analyze the paragraph (P) by filling in the table below and relating it to three variables: 
Status, Motivational Orientation and Substantial Issue-area. A paragraph may be related 
to more than one attribute in each given variable. 
 
P STATUS MOTIVATIONAL ORIENTATION SUBSTANTIAL ISSUE-AREAS 
  Capability Status 
Wish to 
expand  Coop/Comp 
Systemic 
change Eco  Security Other 
Political 
Aims Universal Unilateral Integration 
               + - + -     
 (0,1,2,3) (0,1,2,3) (0,1,2) (0,1,2) (0,1,2,3,4) (0;1) (0;1) (0;1) (0;1) (0;1) (0;1) (0;1) (0;1) (0;1) 
  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Bi1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bi2 0 0 0 2 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
(…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) 
 
- Status refers to which domestic endowments or capabilities leadership attributes 
greater absolute advantage (A) and how it perceives its relative position in the 
international system (B). The coding for those attributes works as follows: 
o In the case of attribute A, 
§ if there is no reference, mark 0; 
§ if there is an indication of its human resources or people as being the 
primary quality place 1; 
§ if there is an indication that its domestic resources are the main 
endowments, place 2 
§ if there is an indication that qualities other than 1 and 2, such as 
culture, arts and language are the primary advantages, place 3. 
o In the case of attribute B, 
§ If there is no reference, mark 0; 
§ If leadership argues that the state is less strong, influential, or powerful 
than others, place 1; 
§ If leadership argues that the state is equally strong, place 2; 
§ If leadership argues the state to be stronger, more influential or 
powerful than others place 3. 
- Motivational Orientation corresponds to statements on political and international 
affairs, meaning if it is willing to expand internationally (C), if it is for being cooperative 
or competitive in politics (D) and to which degree it wishes to change both its internal 
and external system (E). Their numerical classification works as follows: 
o In the case of attribute C, 
§ If there is no reference, mark 0; 
§ If there is an indication of willingness to participate in international 
affairs, place 1; 
§ If there is a reference of unwillingness to participate in international 
affairs, place 2; 
o In the case of attribute D 
§ If there is no reference, mark 0; 
§ If there is a reference to the following sub-categories, place 1: 
· If it rejects verbal or physical conflict; 
· If it emphasizes cooperation with others; 
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· If it does not argue against opponents, different ideologies or 
points of view; 
· If it connotes either a positive outlook or neutral one toward 
known opponents. 
§ If references oppose the cases above, place 2. 
o In the case of attribute E, 
§ If there is no reference, mark 0; 
§ If there is a reference calling for a change in the international political 
arena, borders, or of global norms, place 1; 
§ If there is a reference calling for the status quo, place 2; 
§ If there is a reference to internal reform, place 3; 
§ If there is a reference to not wishing to pursue internal reform, or a 
reluctance to do so, place 4576. 
- Substantial Issue-area corresponds to the main themes being discussed: economics (F), 
security (G), others (H), such as culture or history, the defence or dismissal of political 
ideologies and systems (I,J)577, the defence or dismissal of universal values (K,L), the 
pursuit of unilateral goals or own interests (M), the wish to practice bilateral, multi-
lateral or political/economic integration with other partners (N).578  Their numerical 
classification works as follows: 
o In the case of attribute F, 
§ If there is no reference, mark 0; 
§ If there is an emphasis on economic related issues, place 1; 
o In the case of attribute G, 
§ If there is no reference, mark 0; 
§ If there is an emphasis on security related issues, such as imminent 
threats, military goals, social crises, wars, revolution, place 1; 
o In the case of attribute H, 
§ If there is no reference, mark 0; 
§ If the attribute is discussing environment, culture, history, or issues no 
related to foreign policy, economics or security, place 1; 
o In the case of attribute I 
§ If there is no reference, mark 0; 
§ If leadership is emphasizing the benefits of a political system, such as 
democracy or authoritarianism,  mark 1; 
o In the case of attribute J, 
§ If there is no reference, mark 0; 
§ If leadership is emphasizing the downfalls of a political system, such as 
democracy or authoritarianism, mark 1; 
o In the case of attribute K, 
§ If there is no  reference, mark 0; 
§ If leadership is arguing for the respect for universal values, such as 
respect for certain human rights, place 1; 
o In the case of attribute L, 
§ If there is no reference, mark 0; 
§ If leadership is arguing against universal values, place 1. 
o In the case of attribute M, 
§ If there is no reference, mark 0; 
§ If leadership emphasizes the pursuit of its own goals or isolationism 
rather than the wish to follow a path of international integration or 
multi-lateral contacts, fill in 1; 
o In the case of attribute N, 
§ If there is no reference, mark 0; 
§ If leadership emphasizes the opposite of what is indicated in M, fill in 1. 
                                               
576 Recognizing the reluctance to actually pursue reform is a difficult task. Perhaps the best way of 
classifying such an attribute is by assuming that reluctance exists when an actual leader underlines more 
the difficulties of pursuing reform, instead of actually emphasizing the advantages. 
577 The emphasis on Political Aims is given primarily to political ideologies and systems. 
578 Paragraphs may discuss more than one issue and they should all be accounted for. Nevertheless, if the 
emphasis is clearly given to one over the other, the least important one should not be accounted for. 
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Appendix III: Content analysis on status, motivational orientation and issue-areas 
 
 
Table 4: Sample Description 
Periods Number of Speeches 
/Statements 
Total Paragraphs Total Issue-area Assertions 
1989-1993 36 313 392 
1994-2001 181 1929 1908 
2002-2005 80 1314 1408 
2006-2008 52 853 917 
2009-2010 31 673 705 
1989-2010 380 5082 5330 
 
  
A total of 380 statements and speeches were categorized by status, motivational orientation and 
issue-areas according to Wish’s (1980) paradigm for national role conceptions. The following 
categorizations, especially the discussion on substantial issue-areas demonstrate the quantity of 




Graph 1: Substantial Issue Areas 1989-2010









Economic Security Other Political Universal Unilateral Multilateral
 
 
According to Graph 1, the issue that dominated President Karimov’s rhetoric between 1989 and 
2010 was economics, accounting for nearly 30% of all analyzed paragraphs.  In second place 
came both security and international cooperation; both above the 15% mark. Other issues and 
politics were relatively frequent and the lowest rankings are unilateralism and universal values. 
The latter was classified in only 2% of all paragraphs.  
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Graph 2: Issue Areas from 1989 to 2010 as a percentage of total assertions


















When looking at how issue-areas varied through time, economic related issues were the main 
theme discussed at any given time period. President Karimov tends to start many of his formal 
parliamentarian speeches by presenting lengthy accounts of Uzbekistan’s macroeconomic 
situation. Also, when questioned by sceptical media he habitually reveals economic figures to 
reinforce the prowess of his country’s performance. As Graph 2 reveals, these became 
particularly prominent after 2006, when President Karimov declared frequently that Uzbekistan 
was able to avoid economic crisis. 
 Both security and political issues were relatively volatile. The former was invoked 
mostly in the 1990s, which suggests that they are heavily correlated with the civil wars in 
Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Other issues-areas increased steadily since independence, showing 
the growing importance that President Karimov gave to Uzbekistan’s culture, spirituality 
(‘Manaviyat’) and ideology. It is also interesting to observe how in a post-Andijan crisis scenario 
these matters of cultural authenticity subsumed around 20% of the assertions between 2006 
and 2008 and then nearly 25% after 2009.  
Both graphs 1 and 2 also show the pervasive concern of President Karimov with 
international politics. If one adds the multilateral issue-area assertions with the unilateral ones, 
it becomes evident that external matters were routinely discussed. Also interesting to note is 
that multilateral concerns are a relatively stable and recurrent theme and tended to outrank 
unilateralism.  
Table 2 below shows which were most numerous composite issue-areas articulated by 
President Karimov. The three main themes indicated in Table 2, demonstrates the relevance 
given by President Karimov to external affairs. The most recurrent interconnected theme was 
international economic cooperation which accounted for 7% of total analyzed paragraphs and 
27% of all interrelated assertions.  
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Table 2: Interrelationships between attributes 1989-2001 
  
Absolute Frequency of 
assertions 
% of total interrelated 
assertions 
% of total 
paragraphs 
1) 
Economic/Multilateral 376 27 7 
2) Security/Multilateral 229 17 5 
3) Security/Unilateral 121 9 2 
4) Economic/Unilateral 110 8 2 
5) Other/Economic 79 6 2 
6) Economic/Security 78 6 2 
7) Other/Political 67 5 1 
8) Economic/Political 55 4 1 
9) Other/Multilateral 42 3 1 
10) Security/Other 40 3 1 
11) Other/Unilateral 39 3 1 
12) Security/Political 31 2 1 
13) Political/Unilateral 26 2 1 
14) Security/Universal 21 2 0 
15) Other/Universal 14 1 0 
16) Political/Universal 15 1 0 
17) Economic/Universal 9 1 0 
18) 
Political/Multilateral 14 1 0 
19) 
Universal/Multilateral 11 1 0 
20) 
Universal/Unilateral 4 0 0 
TOTAL interrelations 1381 100   
 
 The fourth interrelationship indicated in table 2 is a key connection to take into account, 
since President Karimov frequently emphasized the importance of economic self-sufficiency.579 
Accordingly, he made recurrent announcements about the need of mitigating economic 
dependence, which may conflict with the apparent wish to propound trade. 
The fifth category, Other/Economic, is associated primarily with statements calling for 
the interests of economic growth and justice to be intertwined. As President Karimov claimed 
gradual economic reform, he would state the need of not forgetting those left behind. Hence, 
welfare issues were frequently discussed, particularly to emphasize the importance of the 
state.580 This subject may also be connected to the sixth interrelationship, namely tying security 
to economics. President Karimov consistently invoked attaining economic stability to prevent 
social upheaval - arguments that were especially predominant in the early 1990s, when 
economics and security were the two most discussed issues. 
Finally, Table 2 reveals President Karimov’s dominant concern with security. Even 
though economics is the issue that was most articulated, it is not the most interconnected issue-
                                               
579 See for example ‘Speech by the President of Uzbek SSR’ Russian Press Digest, 25 March 1990. 
580 See for example ‘Karimov interview with a Russian Paper’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 
June 1994. 
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area. Accordingly, economics is connected to five other variables (multilateral, unilateral, other, 
political and security), whilst security to six (multilateral, unilateral, other, political, security 
and universal). Moreover, if one were to remove economic/multilateral and 
security/multilateral assertions from Table 2, themes connected to security would be almost 
systematic. Security is therefore the subject matter that tends to permeate all his rhetoric, 
implying that almost all issues are securitized and presented as potential threats to a particular 
















The status variable is divided into two categories (capabilities and status toward others) and 
seven respective sub-categories, each describing different subjects. As concerns capability, 
Uzbekistani leadership overwhelmingly underlined the country’s economic resources and the 
quality of its people as the prime advantages to face the international system. President Karimov 
argued continuously that Uzbekistan’s main absolute advantage resides in its economic 
resources, specifically in the country’s endowments, such as oil, gas, cotton, fruits and 
vegetables. A second but important quality President Karimov underlined was his people’s 
readiness for the challenge of transition, especially during the immediate independence period.  
President Karimov was not militaristic in spite of arguing persistently for Uzbekistan to 
maintain its own forces; but not necessarily to oppose anyone besides invaders.581 Furthermore, 
assertions with regards to military capabilities were perhaps the most volatile ones; even though 
they were mentioned less than economic and human resources, they rose from 1994 to 2001 and 
also after the Andijan crisis.582 
 Local culture or history was rarely articulated as an advantage for engaging with the 
international system. Besides economic, human and military factors, only the geography of 
                                               
581 See for instance ‘“Speaking of borders means breaking up Central Asia: Islam Karimov Speaks in an 
Interview with Foreign Journalists’ Kremlin News Broadcast, 15 May 1992. 
582 These observations are based on analyzing the relative frequencies and were not statistically tested. 
Yet it is not too farfetched to assume that they were not random incidents but genuine increases because 
of the increased military threats coming from the Taliban in the 1990s. 
Table 3: Status from 1989 to 2010 
  
% of total status 
assertions 
Capability   
      People 29 
      Economic Resources 48 
      Military 15 
      Other 8 
Status toward others   
      Less 5 
      Equal 93 
      More 2 
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Uzbekistan was frequently presented as a capability or advantage. Nevertheless, this category 
was difficult to code because while President Karimov sometimes recognized the potential of 
Uzbekistan’s geographical position, he would in other circumstances mention that it was a 
drawback.583   
Statements deliberating that Uzbekistan was a lesser partner were rarely mentioned. 
However, the contexts and the persistence with which President Karimov argued for equality 
bring a degree of subjectivity to coding and therewith to Table 2. Indeed, the constant emphasis 
given to equality might hide an inferiority complex. For example, he argued in 2004 that his 
country should not be treated in a backward manner, rather as an equal one by other more 
advanced economies.584 Regardless of the subjectivity of the explicit calls for equality, references 
were usually coded as equal unless the complex was clearly shown, such as in the case when 
President Karimov underlined that Uzbekistan was not strong enough to achieve independence 
by itself.585  
Lastly, there were a few explicit references to Uzbekistan having greater than other 
status. These statements tended to be hidden through certain wordings. For example, an 
interesting indication occurred during a heated moment in October 1999 when the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan mobilized into Kyrgyzstan. At the time, President Karimov said that 
his country’s armed forces had the right to enter the territory of neighbouring states to defend 
their own people,586 thereby demonstrating that he considered Uzbekistan to be more than 




Graph 3: Motivational Orientation and Willingness to Change the System 1989-2010

















                                               
583 See for example  ‘Uzbek President Interviewed on visit to Ukraine aboard aircraft’ BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 10 October 1999. 
584 ‘Uzbek leader says God saved Uzbekistan during recent terror attacks’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 7 April 2004. 
585 ‘Uzbek President Tells “Pravda” he is looking for Cooperation, not aid’ BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 7 August 1993. 
586 See for example ‘Uzbek President Vows to defend his territory “with all available means”’ BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 October 1999.  
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Graph 1 illustrates three Motivational Orientation variables as percentages of their total 
assertions: Wish to expand or participate in international affairs; Cooperative/Competitive 
and Willingness to change.  
As regards the wish to participate category, President Karimov expounded to be fully in 
favour of Uzbekistan participating in international affairs. References to this variable were 98% 
of total motivational orientation assertions. Logically, as a percentage of total paragraphs, these 
kinds of statements were much lower, around 2%. Still, very few arguments denoted a reluctant 
attitude toward participating in international affairs. Only before independence was a degree of 
unwillingness to participate in international affairs found, as President Karimov mentioned that 
it was too early to consider whether the jurisdiction of Uzbek SSR should fall under 
international law.587  
 Regarding the Cooperation/Competitive attribute, President Karimov’s assertions from 
1989 to 2010 tend to be worded in a cooperative manner (around 60% of assertions) or, in other 
words, without portraying negatively certain issues or actors. However, these different wordings 
depend very much on the issue that was being argued. For example, in the pre-independence 
period, competitive references were slightly higher. When the Union treaty was being reformed, 
President Karimov showed again and again impatience toward the way journalists summarized 
his public statements. After independence he continued to make negative allusions against 
cooperating with specific political rivals or the media. Also, during the 1990s, competitive 
assertions were used to describe the general threat of terrorism and, after 2002, to portray the 
activities of NGOs.  
Cooperative references occurred usually when subject-areas were not related to politics 
or journalism, such as economics. Also, after international summits, such as CIS or SCO 
meetings, he remained mostly cordial.  
As for the Willingness to change attribute (see Graph 1), President Karimov showed 
himself to be a reluctant changer of the international system. Before independence, there were 
no obvious pro-external external change assertions, given that Uzbekistan was not yet 
independent. During this period, though, he was in favour of reforming the Soviet space, 
especially on matters of constitutional revision and economic dependence on Moscow. Looking 
to statements after independence, little willingness for changing the international system was 
shown. For example, President Karimov rejected the aims of major regional institutions, such as 
the CIS. Also, he constantly argued for respecting sovereignty and delivered routine statements 
calling for respect of all borders and internal differences between countries. 
Nonetheless, outliers existed, particularly for issues outside Central Asia. He  stated that 
he was in favour of Security Council reform if it meant granting permanent seats to Germany 
and Japan (coincidentally, two of Uzbekistan’s biggest commercial partners).588 Moreover, 
                                               
587 See for example ‘President of Uzbekistan interviewed’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 15 April 
1991. 
588 See for example ‘Uzbek leader supports UNSCE seat for Japan’ Japan Economic Newswire, May 17 
1995. 
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during the second Iraqi invasion debate, in 2003, he positioned himself deliberately against 
Sadam’s regime and favoured the ‘coalition of the willing.’ 
Graph 1 also shows that President Karimov portrayed himself as an internal reformer 
(81% of all willingness to change assertions). Uzbekistani leadership constantly discussed the 
need of adopting market reforms (which does not mean that they were actually implemented).  
Still, it is important to note that these references were usually accompanied by a disclaimer 
invoking the need for gradual change, which may be interpreted as actual reluctance to reform. 
Also, he showed some concern for economic reform but little for political change. In fact, 
interest in political reform only became slightly more prominent after 2001 and in 2008, which 
suggests that Washington’s involvement in the country triggered a certain kind of pro-
democratic discourse.  
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Appendix IV: Ethical considerations for interviewees 
 
 
I conducted thirteen interviews during my visits to Uzbekistan although they were not a 
significant feature of my research. The closed nature of the regime as well as my lack of contacts 
in the country prevented me from engaging with important political actors in Uzbekistan. 
Nonetheless, the interviews were perhaps relevant to raise my awareness on some issues.  
I contacted most interviewees to check whether they would be available to answer some 
questions about the regime. Most interviews were structured around a pre-determined set of 
questions on foreign policy, but I otherwise allowed respondents to digress on what they felt 
were the important issues for around thirty to forty minutes.  
The interview could have brought some risk to the participant, given the authoritarian 
nature of Uzbekistan’s regime. To minimize that risk, any information on the interviewees is not 
accessible and all their responses are made strictly confidential and anonymous. Accordingly, all 
respondents are encoded and no description of the interviewee, such as the nature of his/her 
work and the date of our meetings, is indicated throughout my research.  
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